Abstract
A construction worker falls from the top of a scaffold and is transported by EMS to an Emergency Department. At the time of admission, the Emergency Department is understaffed and many patients are waiting to be evaluated. Due to the hectic workflow, the only available physician performs only a very basic clinical check before heading for the next patient. Because the initial clinical findings suggest serial rib fractures, the physician orders a CXR. At the Radiology Department, the CXRs are swapped and the patient returns to the Emergency Department with the wrong images. Because the patient carries the CXRs and because the family name on the film is identical to the patient’s name, no suspicion arises that the films could be wrong. Neither first name nor date of birth is verified. The actual severity of his injuries is misjudged because an inexperienced student nurse accompanies the patient, and because vital monitoring (pulse oximeter) is not immediately available. When the patient’s clinical status deteriorates, the physician cannot correlate the symptoms with the normal radiological findings. Because the CXRs show no pathology, the resident neither crosschecks the radiological findings by repeating the clinical examination (e.g., chest auscultation) nor reexamines the CXR (e.g., verifying the patient’s name); instead, he orders pain therapy with morphine, which worsens the clinical situation. It is only after a successful intubation that new clues emerge (e.g., decreased breath sound, subcutaneous emphysema) which point to a pneumothorax. The situation is complicated by the fact that controlled ventilation precipitates a tension pneumothorax which rapidly develops into cardiac arrest. Moreover, the defibrillator that the code team carries is a new model with which nobody is really familiar. The delay of the first shock is caused by the conscious effort to identify the necessary steps for action.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Alvesson M (2002) Understanding organizational culture. Sage Publications, London
Amalberti R, Auroy Y, Berwick D, Barach P (2005) Five system barriers to achieving ultrasafe health care. Ann Intern Med 142(9):756–764
Argyris C (1957) Personality and organization. Harper and Row, New York
Argyris C, Schön DA (1996) Organizational learning II: theory, method and practice. Addison-Wesley, Reading
Bedeian AG (1984) Organizations. Theories and analysis. Saunders College Publishing, New York
Black RJ (2003) Organisational culture: creating the influence needed for strategic success. Dissertation.com, London
Bolman LG, Deal TE (1984) Modern approaches to understanding and managing organizations. Jossey-Bass, London
Burke CS, Salas E, Wilson-Donnelly K, Priest H (2004) How to turn a team of experts into an expert medical team: guidance from the aviation and military communities. Qual Saf Health Care 13(Suppl 1):i96–i194
Carayon P (ed) (2006) Handbook of human factors and ergonomics in health care and patient safety (Human factors and ergonomics series). Erlbaum, Mahwah
Chopra V, Bovill JG, Spierdijk J, Koornneef F (1992) Reported significant observations during anaesthesia: a prospective analysis over an 18-month period. Br J Anaesth 68:13–18
Cooper JB, Newbower RS (1975) The anesthesia machine: an accident waiting to happen. In: Picket RM, Triggs TJ (eds) Human factors in health care. Lexington Books, Lexington, pp 345–358
Cooper JB, Newbower RS, Long CD, McPeek B (1978) Preventable anesthesia mishaps: a study of human factors. Anesthesiology 49:399–406
Cooper JB, Newbower RS, Kitz RJ (1984) An analysis of major errors and equipment failures in anesthesia management: considerations for prevention and detection. Anesthesiology 60:34–42
Currie M (1989) A prospective survey of anaesthetic critical events in a teaching hospital. Anaesth Intensive Care 17:403–411
Entin EE, Serfaty D (1999) Adaptive team coordination. Hum Factors 41:312–325
Flin R, Maran N (2004) Identifying and training non-technical skills for teams in acute medicine. Qual Saf Health Care 13(Suppl):i80–i84
Gaba DM (1989) Human error in anesthetic mishaps. Int Anesthesiol Clin 27:137–147
Gouldner AW (1959) Organizational analysis. In: Merton RK, Broom L, Cottrell LS (eds) Sociology today. Basic Books, New York
Helmreich RL (1998) The downside of having a brain: reflections on human error and CRM. University of Texas Aerospace Crew Research Project Technical Report 98-04
Helmreich RL, Merritt AC, Wilhelm JA (1999) The evolution of crew resource management in commercial aviation. Int J Aviat Psychol 9:19–32
Hoff T, Jameson L, Hannan E, Flink E (2004) A review of the literature examining linkages between organizational factors, medical errors, and patient safety. Med Care Res Rev 6:3–37
Hollagel E, Woods DD, Leveson N (eds) (2006) Resilience engineering. Concepts and precepts. Ashgate, Aldershot
Hymann WA (1994) Errors in the use of medical equipment. In: Bogner MS (ed) Human error in medicine. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, pp 327–347
Jung H (2001) Personalwirtschaft [Human resource management]. Oldenbourg, München
Kieser A (2002) Organisationtheorien [Organizational theories]. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart
Kohn L, Corrigan J, Donaldson M (eds) (1999) To err is human: building a safer health system. Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, Institute of Medicine (IOM). National Academy Press, Washington DC
LaPorte TR (1982) On the design and management of nearly error-free organizational control systems. In: Sills DL, Wolf CP, Shelanski VB (eds) Accident at Three-Mile Island: the human dimensions. Westview, Boulder, pp 185–200
Moray N (1994) Error reduction as a systems problem. In: Bogner MS (ed) Human error in medicine. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, pp 67–91
Morell RC, Eichhorn JH (eds) (1997) Patient safety in anesthetic practice. Churchill Livingstone, New York
Norman DA (1988) The psychology of everyday things. Basic Books, New York
O’Connor RE, Slovis CM, Hunt RC, Pirrallo RG, Sayre MR (2002) Eliminating errors in emergency medical services: realities and recommendations. Prehosp Emerg Care 6:107–113
Perrow C (1984) Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. Basic Books, NewYork
Perrow C (1994) Accidents in high-risk systems. Technol Stud 1:1–38
Perrow C (1999) Normal accidents. Living with high-risk technologies. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Rasmussen J (1982) Human errors: a taxonomy for describing human malfunction in industrial installations. J Occup Accid 4:311–335
Reason J (1990a) Human error. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Reason J (1990b) The contribution of latent human failures to the breakdown of complex systems. Philos Trans R Soc Lond 327:475–484
Reason J (1997) Managing the risks of organizational accident. Ashgate, Aldershot
Roberts KH (1990) Managing high reliability organizations. Calif Manage Rev 32:101–113
Rochlin GI (1993) Defining “high reliability” organizations in practice: a taxonomic prologue. In: Roberts KH (ed) New challenges to understanding organizations. Macmillan, New York, pp 11–32
Schulman PR (1993) The analysis of high reliability organizations: a comparative framework. In: Roberts KH (ed) New challenges to understanding organizations. Macmillan, New York, pp 33–54
Senge P (1990) The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization. Doubleday, New York
Thomas EJ, Helmreich RL (2002) Will airline safety models work in medicine? In: Rosenthal MM, Sutcliffe KM (eds) Medical error: what do we know? what do we do? Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp 217–234
Valentin A, Capuzzo M, Guidet B, Moreno RP, Dolanski L, Bauer P, Metnitz PG (2006) Patient safety in intensive care: results from the multinational Sentinel Events Evaluation (SEE) study. Intensive Care Med 32:1591–1598
Vaughan D (1997) The challenger launch decision: risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Vicente KJ (2004) The human factor. Revolutionizing the way people live with technology. Routledge, New York
Webb RK, Russell WJ, Klepper I, Runciman WB (1993) The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Equipment failure: an analysis of 2000 incident reports. Anaesth Intensive Care 21:673–677
Weick KE, Sutcliffe KM (2001) Managing the unexpected: assuring high performance in an age of complexity. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco
Weinger MB (1999) Anesthesia equipment and human error. J Clin Monit 15:319–323
Woods D, Cook R, Sarter N, McDonald J (1989) Mental models of anesthesia equipment operation: implications for patient safety. Anesthesiology 71:A983
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
St.Pierre, M., Hofinger, G., Buerschaper, C., Simon, R. (2011). Organizations and Accidents. In: Crisis Management in Acute Care Settings. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19700-0_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19700-0_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-19699-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-19700-0
eBook Packages: MedicineMedicine (R0)