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Abstract

The history of the theory of voting is relatively long but discontinuous. The first systematic accounts seem to have been written in the late 18’th century just before the French 1789 revolution. Surely, some descriptions of voting procedures antedate the French writers. The volume of social choice classics edited and translated by McLean and Urken (1995) contains a writing from the second century AD (by Pliny the Younger) as well as one from the 13’th century (by Nicolaus Cusanus). In addition, Pufendorf in the 17’th century discussed themes related to voting procedures (Lagerspetz 1986). But it seems that Jean-Charles de Borda was the first to look at voting procedures from the viewpoint of aggregating individual opinions so that the end result-the social choice — would bear a reasonable relation to the opinions. Borda’s view was thus in a sense instrumental: voting procedures are methods of combining individual opinions and some methods are better than others with respect to certain criteria.

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References

  1. Some authors are of the opinion that Condorcet’s notes on which alternatives should be chosen in the absence of a Condorcet winner were too sketchy to be given an unambiguous interpretation (Black 1958, 176; Van Deemen 1997, 53–56).

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  2. Several versions of Nanson’s procedure have been discussed in the literature (Fishburn 1977; Niou 1987; Nurmi 1989; Richelson 1981; Schwartz 1986). The version discussed here seems to be what Nanson himself had in mind.

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  3. Kelly defines a Condorcet winner as an alternative that defeats or ties all other candidates by a majority of votes in pair wise contests. In Kelly’s terminology it is, thus, possible that there are several Condorcet winners in a given profile. See Table 3.13.

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Nurmi, H. (1999). Paradoxes of the Enlightenment Era. In: Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03782-9_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03782-9_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08551-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-03782-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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