Justification of Judicial Oppression

Abstract

Judges may find themselves in situations where they contribute to or are the direct perpetrators of substantial and obvious infringements of individual rights. Despite this, it may not always be just to prosecute them and hold them criminally responsible for this. As we have seen, judges are under pressure from different values and ideals when it comes to their duty to uphold the law. The decision of whether to stay on the bench, giving support to the regime while trying to do justice as far as possible, or to resign is not an easy decision. Since open defiance often will undermine the effective role of the judiciary as a modifying factor, it is also hard to know to what extent it serves justice to apply techniques to modify suppressive measures. For such reasons, judicial responsibility must be confined to the more obvious infringements of fundamental rights. But even in these cases, there may be circumstances excluding individual criminal responsibility for the judge. Such circumstances may be found under the principle of culpability under the general principles of the ICC Statute, Articles 30–33.