Abstract
It is easy to dismiss this as a chicken-and-egg question. As construed by received philosophies of science, as requiring a definitive and general answer, it seems irrelevant. Theorizing is often the continuation of experiment by other means (pace Popper and van Frassen). Hacking has shown that different episodes in the history of science show different answers to the question of the priority of theory and experiment.1 In earlier chapters I showed how phenomena are created: first construed, then interpreted and integrated into arguments. The bias towards the literary or theoretician’s view of experiment means there are few philosophical studies of how phenomena are made into centrepieces of theory. In this chapter I show how a significant innovation in the physical understanding of force — Faraday’s concept of a field of action defined in terms of properties of systems of lines of force — emerged from the attempt to integrate electrostatics and new discoveries in magnetism made during the 1840s.
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity, or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames. For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Hume
But what is “experimental” reasoning?
Lakatos
Traditionally scientists are said to explain phenomena that they discover in nature. I say that often they create the phenomena which then become the centrepieces of theory.
Hacking
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Notes
Lakatos addressed his question directly to Hume’s injunction: see Lakatos (1980a), p. 2.
For analogies to technological invention see Gooding (1990a) and Carlson and Gorman (1990).
See Kitcher (1988).
See Hesse (1961), Heiman (1970), Doran (1975). Accounts that highlight results emphasized in textbook accounts of Maxwell’s theory are Kline (1985) and Owen (1971).
On electrostatic and magnetic results see Whittaker (1951) and for the impact of the Faraday-effect see Knudsen (1976).
Studies emphasizing metaphysical and theoretical sources of experimental problems are Hesse(1961), Williams (1965) and Agassi (1971).
See Faraday (1844 and 1846).
For other criteria of the meaning of field concepts see Nersessian (1985). Faraday insisted that his principle of contiguous action did not forbid action across sensible distances (see Gooding, 1978) but this only postponed the problem of deciding whether empty space can transmit inductive action: see section 10.8.
See, for example, Drake (1978) on Galileo.
Thomson (1870) in Thomson (1872), at p. 575.
Thomson refers to a statement published in 1846 (see Researches., vol. 3, para. 2805 and the Diary, vol. 4, para. 8109 ff. and 8127–44). He discussed Faraday’s results in Thomson (1847 and 1850).
See Thomson (1845, 1846).
See Thomson (1850), reprinted in Thomson (1872), at pp. 502–4, Thomson’s italics.
This must have a general mathematical description compatible with the principles governing all dynamical descriptions. Both Thomson and Maxwell developed dynamical models for the electromagnetic aether. Thomson’s willingness to accept Faraday’s new description increased when it became clear that fields are entities obeying higher-order principles such as conservation. Thomson himself contributed to this demonstration: see Wise (1979a) and Smith and Wise (1989).
Faraday defined the term as “any portion of space traversed by lines of magnetic power”, commenting that “there is probably no space without them”, Faraday (1839–55), v. 3, para. 2805. Thomson’s first definition of the term ‘magnetic field’ reverses the priority. In 1851 he defined ‘field’ in terms of points: “Any space at every point of which there is a finite magnetic force is called ‘a field of magnetic force’, or, magnetic being understood simply ‘a field of force’ …”.He then defined lines as lines drawn ‘through a magnetic field in the direction of the force at each point through which it passes’, Thomson (1851), reprinted in Thomson (1872), at p. 467.
See the Diary., vol. 4, paras. 7979, 8014, 8085, 8108, 8180. He first used the term ‘field’ in the Researches at para. 2247. Faraday’s first theoretical definition appeared in 1850 at ibid., paras. 2805–6.
For Thomson’s dissemination see: Thomson (1850, 1851) in Thomson (1872), pp. 467 and 486.
For Herschel see Gooding (1985b). Faraday described some of his earlier attempts during the 1830s in the Faraday (1839–55), vol. 1, paras. 951–55, 1252–1306, 1688–98.
For a description and diagrams see Gooding (1981), pp. 234–35.
See Thomson (1856) and for other examples, Knudsen (1976).
Faraday’s experimental use of light is described in James (1985).
See Diary., vol. 4, paras. 7874 ff., where Faraday describes a new and more powerful magnet. For several days he got no results at all.
Ibid., paras. 7902 ff.
Further differentiation between dia-, para-and ferro-magnetics came between 1847 and 1850: see Gooding (1975, 1981).
See Kuhn (1962a).
See the Diary, vol. 4, paras. 8115–21 and Gooding (1982a), p. 52–55.
Kuhn loc. cit. note 26 and Feyerabend (1975), chs 6–9.
See Gooding (1980a) for an exposition of these principles.
See Gooding (1980b, 1882b).
Cf. Diary, vol. 4, paras. 8118–28, for 10 November 1845.
J. Plücker to Faraday, 3 November 1847, in Williams et al., eds. (1971), v. 1, p. 511; Diary, vol. 5, paras 9415–31. For Plucker’s work see Gooding (1981).
Faraday to Whewell, 7 November 1848, in Williams et al., eds. (1971), vol. 1, pp. 528–29.
For Faraday’s theology of nature see Levere (1971).
See Gooding (1982a) and for aspects of the cultural context, Cannon (1978) and Smith and Wise (1989).
See Thomson (1847, 1850).
Thomson (1842) and Smith and Wise (1989).
For references see Gooding (1980b, 1981) and Thomson (1850), in Thomson (1872).
Faraday (1851a, 1851b),(1852), Researches, paras. 3070–3299, and Faraday (1855), ibid., paras. 3300–3362.
Faraday (1847), p. 476 ff. and (1850).
The experiments are described in Gooding (1981), p. 249 ff.
Diary, v. 4, paras. 8398, 8455–8639 and Researches, vol. 3, para. 2399. Thomson’s first treatment of Faraday’s law corresponded to the two-list interpretation because the coefficient of magnetic susceptibility is positive and near unity for ferromagnetics, positive for paramagnetics, and negative for diamagnetics; Thomson (1847), p. 499.
Researches., vol. 3, paras. 2721–22, 2730–50.
See Gooding (1981), pp. 266–68.
Researches, vol. 3, para. 2807.
Faraday argued that “mere motion would not generate a [physical] relation” in (1851), at paras. 3171 ff.; see also (1852) and (1855), paras. 3336–40.
See the papers cited in notes 39 and 46.
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Gooding, D. (1990). Experiment and meaning. In: Experiment and the Making of Meaning. Science and Philosophy, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0707-2_10
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