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Darwin’s Theory and Darwin’s Argument

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What the Philosophy of Biology Is

Part of the book series: Nijhoff International Philosophy Series ((NIPS,volume 32))

Abstract

One admirable characteristic of David Hull’s work is that it is both genuinely interdisciplinary and consistently disciplined. His work presents therefore a splendid counterinstance to the usual tendency for discipline — in the sense of boundaries — hopping to be accompanied by discipline — in the sense of standards — dropping. In moving back and forth between history, philosophy, sociology and biology, David has always wanted to get things right by meeting, not dodging, the demands set for any good work on the subject in hand.

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Hodge, M.J.S. (1989). Darwin’s Theory and Darwin’s Argument. In: Ruse, M. (eds) What the Philosophy of Biology Is. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 32. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1169-7_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1169-7_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7020-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1169-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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