Abstract
If existence is a property, as argued in Chapter 7, then there seems no reason to prevent an individual from possessing that property in more than one world. Yet David Lewis’s view (beginning in Lewis 1968) that an individual cannot exist in more than one world has been put forward so cogently and forcefully that some discussions have appeared to assume that counterpart theory, the view that although an individual exists in only one world yet it has counterparts which exist in others, is part and parcel of possible worlds semantics and stands or falls with it.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cresswell, M.J. (1990). Counterpart Theory. In: Entities and Indices. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2139-9_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2139-9_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-0967-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2139-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive