Applications of the Typed Theory

Abstract

In this section, we translate and discuss the propositional attitude data which involve English names and definite descriptions that denote individuals. The data sentences are labeled (A)-(X), and because we are supposing with Frege that certain English terms occurring in them are ambiguous, there are several readings possible for each one. These readings are provided immediately after the particular datum is presented , and a discussion usually follows. In these discussions (in this section only), we revert to using the word “object” to refer to individuals and the word “property” to refer to properties of individuals (i.e., i/p-properties).

Frege’s explanation, by way of ambiguity, of what appears to be the logically deviant behavior of terms in intermediate contexts is so theoretically satisfying that if we have not yet discovered or satisfactorily grasped the peculiar intermediate objects in question, then we should simply continue looking.

David Kaplan¹