Abstract
Case #1: In New Guinea there is a tribe of crocodiles, that is, human beings who say they are crocodiles. These tribesmen are neither blind nor crazy; for example, they do not swim in crocodile-infested rivers (otherwise, they could not survive). They are not so foolish as to believe that they are more like crocodiles, or more similar to crocodiles, than other tribes are, or that they resemble crocodiles more than they resemble fish or sharks. It is not that an etiological story relates them to crocodiles; they say not that they are related to crocodiles but that they are crocodiles. How are we to understand these people? To call a man ‘a crocodile’, we say, is to use the term ‘crocodile’ metaphorically. Right: but what is that? If these people are crocodiles metaphorically, they are not merely being crocodile-like or crocodile-related. To “translate” them thus banalizes and impoverishes what these people say. On the other hand to say that they use the term ‘crocodile’ metaphorically, without explaining what the metaphorical sentence says, is empty. To explain what a metaphor is we must, therefore, explain how a human being can be a crocodile.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
Bibliography
Bogen, W.: 1978, ‘Metaphors as Theory Fragments’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 37, 177–188.
Davidson, D.: 1984, ‘What Metaphors Mean’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 245–264.
Eco, U.: 1983, ‘The Scandal of Metaphor’, Poetics Today 4, 217–238.
Erwin, E., Kleiman, L. and Zemach, E.: 1976, ‘The Historical Theory of Reference’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54, 50–57.
Geach, P.: 1962, Reference and Generality, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Geach, P.: 1967, ‘Identity’, The Review of Metaphysics 21, 3–13.
Geach, P.: 1968, ‘A Reply’, The Review of Metaphysics 22, 556–559.
Geach, P.: 1973, ‘Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity’, in M. Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology, New York University Press, New York, pp. 287–302.
Goodman, N.: 1968, Languages of Art, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.
Griffin, N.: 1977, Relative Identity, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hintikka, J.: 1975, The Intentions of Intentionality and other New Models for Modalities, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 130–131.
Hirsch, E.: 1982, The Concept of Identity, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kohut, H.: 1977, The Restoration of the Self, International University Press.
Kripke, S.: 1980, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Noonan, H.: 1980, Objects and Identity, Nijhoff, The Hague.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1953, Philosophical Investigations, Macmillan, New York.
Zemach, E.: 1974, ‘In Defence of Relative Identity’, Philosophical Studies 26, 207–218.
Zemach, E.: 1976, Putnam’s Theory on the Reference of Substance Terms’, The Journal of Philosophy 73, 116–127.
Zemach, E.: 1982, ‘Schematic Objects and Relative Identity’, Nous 16, 295–305.
Zemach, E.: 1983, ‘Essences and the Meaning of Metaphorical Language’, Poetics Today 4, 259–273.
Zemach, E.: 1991, ‘Vague Objects’, Nous 25, 323–340.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Zemach, E.M. (1994). Metaphors and Ways of Life. In: Hintikka, J. (eds) Aspects of Metaphor. Synthese Library, vol 238. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8315-2_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8315-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4385-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8315-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive