Abstract
Since the Obama administration introduced the rebalancing strategy, Taiwan has been seeking answers to what does the US policy mean to Taiwan; where and how does Taipei fit into Washington’s Asia-Pacific strategic schematics; what role should Taiwan play; and what are Taiwan’s interests, costs, and risks for its role on the American chessboard. This chapter attempts to find an answer to these questions. Other than an introduction, it covers three parts on the rebalancing strategy’s meanings and implications for Taiwan, including rebalance and US relations with Taiwan (an overview), and regional context (the case of the South China Sea dispute), which is followed by an overall analysis and conclusion.
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Notes
- 1.
1. TPP is a high-standard, comprehensive, and ambitious free trade agreement (FTA). Reading into the Obama administration’s rebalancing blueprint, TPP aspires to be a multilateral architect that could connect US and Asia-Pacific markets, restructure the American economic fabric, and prolong American economic clout in the Asia-Pacific region. The combined trading volume of the 12 TPP economies today accounts for about 40 % of the global trade.
- 2.
2. See Tomas Donilon, “President Obama’s Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to the Region” (speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 15, 2012), http://csis.org/files/attachments/121511_Donilon_Statesmens_Forum_TS.pdf; Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” (speech, East–west Center, November 10, 2011), Department of State, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176999.htm; U.S. Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf; Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, “Shangri-La Security Dialogue,” (speech, Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore), June 2, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid_/1681
- 3.
3. Kurt M. Campbell, “Why Taiwan Matters, Part II,” Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, US. Department of State, October 4, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/10/174980.htm
- 4.
4. Ibid.
- 5.
5. See, for example, Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security,” Foreign Affairs 89, no.1 (January/February 2010): 48–50; Paul V. Kane, “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan,” New York Times, November 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/opinion/to-save-our-economy-ditch-taiwan.html?_r=0; Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism?,” Foreign Affairs 90, (March/April 2011): 80–91.
- 6.
6. For example, in November 2011, Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, referred to Taiwan as “an important security and economic partner.” Such a reference in her capacity as Secretary of State is very crucial to Taiwan, meaning the “Ditch Taiwan” idea was a nonofficial whiff of concept. See Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”
- 7.
7. Chia-chen Hsien, Wen Kuei-hsiang, and Evelyn Kao, “Taiwan Renews Call for Peaceful Resolution of South China Sea Disputes,” Focus Taiwan, July 12, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201407120026.aspx
- 8.
8. Daniel R. Russel, “Maritime Disputes in East Asia,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, U.S. Department of State, February 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm
- 9.
9. Jeffrey A. Bader, “The U.S. and China’s Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity,” Brookings Institution, February 6, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-nine-dash-line-bader
- 10.
10. Bonnie S. Glaser, “A Role for Taiwan in Promoting Peace in the South China Sea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 15, 2014, http://csis.org/print/49442
- 11.
11. Ibid.
- 12.
12. Ibid.
- 13.
13. Ibid.
- 14.
14. Ibid.
- 15.
15. William Lowther, “Ma May Face Questions on China Stance: Academic,” Taipei Times, April 3, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/04/03/2003587180/1
- 16.
16. Ibid.
- 17.
17. Ibid.
- 18.
18. Michael Fuchs, “Fourth Annual South China Sea Conference,” U.S. Department of State, July 11, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229129.htm#.U8INqh3ZaMI.facebook
- 19.
19. Ibid.
- 20.
20. Ibid.
- 21.
21. Ibid.
- 22.
22. Taipei has expressed clearly that Taiwan expects to join the mechanism within 10 years, a period later reduced to 8 years.
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Li, DJ. (2016). US Rebalancing Strategy and Taiwan’s Responses. In: Huang, D. (eds) Asia Pacific Countries and the US Rebalancing Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-93453-9_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-93453-9_14
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