23 February 1983

Abstract

[…]* TODAY I WOULD LIKE to continue and end what I began to tell you about Letter VII. You recall that we picked out two sets of elements in Letter VII. [In the first place,] there are considerations concerning the activity which consists in a philosopher undertaking to give advice to a Prince, to someone who practices politics. These bore on the circumstances in which it was opportune to give advice, the reasons precisely why it was necessary to give advice. And through this question concerning the status of advice and the advisor, we were able to see a much more fundamental question being formulated involving nothing less than what could be called the reality of philosophy. Under what conditions can philosophy be other than logos, than pure and simple discourse? When and under what conditions can it affect reality? How can it become a real activity in reality? Well, on condition that it maintains a certain relationship with politics which is defined by the sumboulē (the advice). So what we saw last week was this relationship to politics as the test of reality for philosophy, for philosophical discourse.

The enigmatic blandness of Plato’s political advice. ∽ The advice to Dionysius.∽The diagnosis, practice of persuasion, proposal of a regime.∽ Advice to Dion’s friends.∽Study of Letter VIII. Parrēsia underpins political advice.