Negotiating the Belfast Agreement

Abstract

By the end of 1997 the multi-party talks process had been going since 1996. In terms of progress it had gone, precisely, nowhere. The Northern Ireland peace process (basically a combination of the political process that began with the Brooke-Mayhew talks of 1991–92 combined with the process tempting the Republican movement away from armed struggle) was in danger of paralysis. There was not even an agenda for discussion. Downing Street decided to remedy the situation. A ‘Heads of Agreement’ paper was hammered out between the Prime Minister, Tony Blair; Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern; and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), David Trimble — over the weekend of 10–11 January 1998. This was somewhat difficult at times since Blair was in Japan. Nevertheless, a compromise was reached. The significance of the document was that, although devoid of detail, it set out for the first time the outlines of an agreement as a basis for discussion. Published on 12 January, ‘Propositions on Heads of Agreement’ read:

Balanced constitutional change, based on commitment to the principle of consent in all its aspects by both British and Irish governments to include both changes to the Irish Constitution and to British constitutional legislation.