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Norms for What Preferences?

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Norms over Force

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Abstract

To grasp the meaning of European power, a normative approach is thus essential. But it must be realized that norms, especially constructed norms, reflect the economic, social, and cultural preferences that are at stake. Once again, globalization plays a fundamental role. For as long as we are moving in a global economy in which competition and trade relations are intensifying, the terms of the debate are altered. Unlike the practice of the past 40 years, it is no longer simply a matter of lowering tariff and nontariff barriers between countries to trade peacefully on the basis of well-understood mutual interests. The stakes are much higher than that. They involve exploring the possibility of harmonizing social systems. There is a risk of not understanding the real issues of globalization if it is not clear that what is now at stake is no longer simple competition between economies, but competition between social systems. For as soon as tariff barriers are lifted, the question posed becomes one of harmonizing the social conditions of trade.

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Notes

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© 2008 Zaki Laïdi

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Laïdi, Z. (2008). Norms for What Preferences?. In: Norms over Force. The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230614062_4

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