Islamists

Abstract

To the untrained eye, Libyan “Islamists”¹ appeared to function as a coherent group playing a coordinated role throughout the entire 2011 uprisings. In reality, however, there was no unified Islamist movement in Libya, but rather multiple competing factions which pursued entirely disconnected policies. Frequently at cross purposes to one another, Islamists cannot be described as catalysts for the revolution. Nonetheless, they became increasingly prominent as the military action against Qadhafi wore on; their power crested in the aftermath of the fall of Tripoli, when Islamists associated with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) appeared to be in control of the newly liberated capital. Yet, after that moment, the actual power of both the most theologically radical and the most militarily significant Islamist groups precipitously waned. These groups—epitomized by the Salafists and the LIFG, respectively—suffered a great defeat at the ballot box during the 7 July 2012 elections, while the more “moderate” Islamists, such as that of the Brotherhood, successfully integrated themselves into the larger Libyan political framework, albeit with a lackluster performance at the ballot box.