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This book deconstructs a series of myths surrounding China’s economic rise. The first myth is that globalization led directly to China’s rise; the second is that China is another East Asian developmental state; the third that China’s market reform had been implemented in an incremental way; and fourth that China’s ‘resilient authoritarianism’ has been effective in ensuring the country’s economic and political transformation.

Yue argues that the China model is one of ‘crony comprador capitalism’ that has hindered the country’s attempts at economic and political modernity. It is argued that the United States’ strategy of integrating China into the international system is self-defeating in the long run; not because such an approach has created a 'restless empire' capable of challenging US primacy, but because the Chinese 'miracle' has subsequently backfired on the liberal order created after World War Two. Covering the entire reform period from the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 to the present day, the author calls for readers to rethink globalization and leave more policy space for China and the developing nations to pursue national development through internal integration, which is more conducive to democratic transition and global peace.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

1. Introduction

Abstract
Has China risen? And if so, has the West created a Frankenstein? Why has the widely perceived economic success of China been followed not by a democratic transition but by a totalitarian turn? The author challenges the conventional wisdom that takes the “rise of China” as a given. Refuting both market liberals and market skeptics, the author argues that China’s deep integration into the global economy has led to dependent development. Such an end result was not preordained. The alternative pathway of autonomous development not only exists but also is available for China, even in the age of liberal globalization. This book sheds intense critical light on China’s “reform and opening” process from a multidisciplinary perspective.
Jianyong Yue

2. Process of China’s WTO Accession: A Questionable Integration

Abstract
It took China 15 years to join the WTO—from 1986 until 2001—the period that witnessed the flourishing of hyperglobalization. Its membership stands for the country’s full integration into the international system of global capitalism. Joining the WTO at all costs was a momentous decision made by China’s top leadership at the turn of the millennium. China made extensive commitments on market access during the accession talks. Its humiliating economic diplomacy and reckless quest for membership on harsh “anti-developmental” terms raise a series of doubts about the rationale of the accession.
Jianyong Yue

3. Chinese Reform and Development in the 1980s

Abstract
China’s embrace of globalization can be traced back to the 1980s. For the post-Mao leadership, reform was a necessity whose aim was upholding the Communist regime through “self-perfection of socialism.” This gave rise to Deng Xiaoping’s approach of “perestroika without glasnost.” The political balance of power between Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun confined the market-oriented reform within the “birdcage” of state socialism. The reform achieved only limited success and came to a stalemate by the late 1980s, which drove Zhao Ziyang, the de facto chief architect of China’s reform, to neoliberal solutions. He managed to undermine central planning through fiscal decentralization and parochial external integration, both of which served to erode national economic reintegration, thereby inclining the Chinese economy toward greater “external orientation.”
Jianyong Yue

4. From Tiananmen to Shenzhen: Transition to Capitalism

Abstract
Deng Xiaoping saved the regime from collapse in the summer of 1989 and played an equally important role in stabilizing it in the critical three years that ensued. He drew three major lessons from Tiananmen: no democracy, no appeasing the people, and appeasing the West. The impact of the Global 1989 and eagerness to make his reform legacy irreversible prompted Deng to embrace (global) capitalism in a more radical way. Underscoring high growth as the source of political legitimacy, Deng opened the door for market Leninist reforms at the expense of social justice. 1992 marked the beginning of the party state’s transformation from a left-wing dictatorship to a right-wing dictatorship.
Jianyong Yue

5. The 1990s: Washington Consensus in China?

Abstract
The 1990s, especially the years after 1992, saw the regime’s abandoning of socialism and self-reliance. Radical market Leninist reforms were implemented in conjunction with deeper external integration. The nomenclatura privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) created a huge income disparity, leading to substantial underconsumption. Meanwhile, wider access to foreign investment undercut domestic enterprises, bringing China’s industrialization to a standstill. The interaction of reform and opening under the worst conditions therefore reinforced China’s dependence on overseas markets and foreign investment to maintain high growth rate, and set China on the path of dependent development. The declining economic momentum at the turn of the millennium drove China for a WTO membership in a bid to resume an export-led, FDI-driven high growth to address the regime’s overriding concern for legitimacy.
Jianyong Yue

6. USA, Global Capitalism and “Drawing China Out”

Abstract
“Drawing China out” and integrating China into the international system has been the hard core of US–China policy since Nixon in the early 1970s. It was only after the end of the Cultural Revolution that such a grand strategy started to function with the onset of China’s “reform and opening.” The USA alternated inducement with coercion to foster China’s deep integration, allowing China to bandwagon with the liberal order whereby to achieve export-led high growth, on the condition that it relinquish economic nationalism. However, the USA has never intended to make China another Germany or Japan in economic or strategic terms. The strategy paid off as evidenced by China’s unprecedented opening to global capitalism and its entrenched dependencies on global capitalist system politically and economically.
Jianyong Yue

7. After the WTO: Rise or New Dependency?

Abstract
Globalization has had a twofold effect on China’s economic development after its WTO entry, by stimulating a Ricardian growth miracle but inhibiting China’s catching up. “Growth without development,” which characterizes China’s model of development, did not make China another Germany or Germany, but rather reinforced its dependent development. China’s peaceful rise rhetoric precisely highlighted its developmental quagmire in the age of globalization, and hence its inability to challenge the “fundamental order of the international system.” The unholy alliance between Chinese crony capitalism and global capitalism, nonetheless, has made any effort of the regime to seek an “alternative” extremely difficult.
Jianyong Yue

8. Conclusion

Abstract
Far from being an economic success story, China’s “growth without development” under crony comprador capitalism has instead produced a quagmire and in turn prompted the Communist regime’s recent “totalitarian turn.” That development, and the illusory global power shift toward China, has undercut the prospect of lasting peace, the country’s democratic transition and China’s modernization. These developments were not foreordained, but they nevertheless reflect the character of the Chinese Communist state and the leadership’s acute myopia in the age of liberal globalization.
Jianyong Yue

Backmatter

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