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Erschienen in:
Introduction Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Climate Negotiation Factors: Design, Process and Tactics

verfasst von : Wytze van der Gaast

Erschienen in: International Climate Negotiation Factors

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

International climate negotiations take place in absence of an overarching authority to enforce compliance with the agreed objectives. As a consequence, negotiations need to motivate countries to join a climate coalition, both from an international climate and national socio-economic perspective. In order to arrive at an effective climate coalition, the process of negotiations needs to be flexible and focussed on win-win solutions. Tactical manoeuvres are needed to change the course of negotiations when needed. These tactics can take various forms such as new scientific insights or personalities of key negotiators.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Introduction
Nächstes Kapitel The First Phase—Negotiating the UN Climate Convention
Fußnoten
1
Nash formulated this aspect of game theory for the first time during the early 1950s, see among other publications Nash (1996).
 
2
Games in which players can enforce contracts through outside parties/authorities are termed cooperative games.
 
3
It must be noted that applying the theory of coalition building to climate change policy is complicated by the complexity of determining marginal benefits and costs of policy action. For instance, calculating costs and benefits from climate abatement actions is surrounded by several complexities and uncertainties (IPCC 2001, p. 200, Working Group I). In addition, the benefits and costs differ across countries.
 
4
Among these pledges was the EU target of 20 % emission reduction by 2020 as well as a number of individual EU Member State pledges. Therefore, the number of Parties with pledges after ‘Copenhagen’ is larger than the number of states listed in under the 80 % level in Fig. 2.2.
 
5
It must be noted that a strict distinction between ‘integrative/cooperative’ and ‘distributive/competitive’ may not exist in practice and parties, although aiming at a long-term cooperation and acting with an incentive to strive for a win-win outcome, could still to some extent try to introduce some elements of competitive negotiation in the talks (Wertheim n.d.; Barrett 1999, p. 2).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Climate Negotiation Factors: Design, Process and Tactics
verfasst von
Wytze van der Gaast
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Buch
International Climate Negotiation Factors

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-46797-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-46798-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46798-6_2