Coalition Building on the Federal and on the Länder Level in Germany

For a better understanding of coalition formation processes, researchers question whether or not coalitions on the national and sub-national levels are congruent and, if not, which factors trigger incongruence. This work aims to test the congruence hypothesis for the case of Germany. Germany is an important case for different reasons. First, the Länder chamber, the Bundesrat, is important also for a good part of the federal legislation. In order to avoid gridlock situations, Länder parties are confronted with strong incentives to form coalitions congruent to the federal level. Second, party systems in the Länder are largely similar to that on the federal level what is a precondition to form congruent governments. Third, on the other hand, also minor variation in party sizes can lead to very different structures. Given that, in Germany, minimal winning coalitions only are common, this variation is very likely to shrink congruence. Fourth, also policy factors might limit congruence. As different policy fields do matter to different degrees on the different levels, policy oriented parties should make different choices in the federal and the sub-national coalition games. This chapter seeks to investigate whether, empirically, the arguments for or against congruence prevail and what the results imply for the political system.