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Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources

A Case Study from the Barents Sea Fisheries

verfasst von: Geir Hønneland

Verlag: Springer Netherlands

Buchreihe : Environment & Policy

Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive

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This book is the result of more than a decade's preoccupation with the issue of compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries, first as an interpreter in the Norwegian Coast Guard, then as a graduate student at the University of Troms0, and finally, as a PhD student at the University of Oslo and a research fellow at the FridtjofNansen Institute (FNI). Many of those who deserve a "thank you" in this preface have already been properly thanked on other occasions, among them my previous colleagues and superiors in the Norwegian Coast Guard. On the present occasion, I would particularly like to extend my thanks to the FNI leadership during my time here for giving me the trust and freedom to pursue my enthusiasm. Many other colleagues at the institute, from both the research and the administrative staff, have contributed to the present work. For fear of forgetting someone, I prefer not to mention names. There have to be a few exceptions though: From the administration, I would particularly like to thank Kari Lorentzen for her professional help in the library, and Ann Skarstad and Anne-Christine Thestrup for language assistance. Thanks to Claes Lykke Ragner for producing the map on page 7, and to Ivar M. Liseter for help in the preparation of camera-ready copy. Among the research staff, I would mention my long-standing fellow student and colleague both in the Coast Guard and at the FNI, Anne-Kristin J0rgensen.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

1. Introduction

Abstract

Since 1976, Norway and the Soviet Union/the Russian Federation have undertaken a common responsibility for the management of the Barents Sea fish resources. The management regime comprises co-operation in the fields of research, regulations and compliance control. In recent years, marine biologists have strived to develop ever more sophisticated methods to estimate the size of the fish stocks. Regulations, on their part, generally reflect the political will to establish quotas and other catch limitations in accordance with scientific recommendations. However, these efforts bring little gain if regulations are not complied with by fishermen.

Geir Hønneland

2. The Interaction of Research Programmes in Social Science Studies of the Commons

Abstract

The major topic of this chapter is the interaction of theoretical traditions in the social science study of common-pool resources (or the commons). One specific contribution to the more general philosophical debate on the growth of science will function as a background to an examination of the study of the commons as a field of theoretical and empirical investigation. In the first section, an introduction is given to Lakatos’s theory of scientific research programmes as a means of understanding and encouraging scientific progress. Then an account is given of two groups of leading theoretical perspectives in the study of common-pool resources, the tragedy of the commons and related models on the one hand, and theories of cooperative action on the other. In the concluding section, these two perspectives are treated as research programmes and evaluated according to Lakatos’s standards; it is discussed to what extent they have proven successful according to his criteria for progressive science and in furthering a general growth of scientific knowledge in the field.

Geir Hønneland

3. A Model of Compliance in Fisheries — Theoretical Foundations and Practical Application

Abstract

The concept of compliance has attracted increasing interest among political scientists in recent years.¹ However, the discussion focuses primarily on the international level, the object of study being state compliance with the prescriptions of international treaties and regimes.² Contributions on compliance on the part of individual actors are less common. Nevertheless, most of the social science literature on common-pool resources contains a more or less explicitly stated assumption of preconditions which have to be met in order for individuals to comply with established regulations. The aim of this chapter is to see major traditions within this debate in relation to the compliance literature.³ More specifically, the former’s inherent reasoning on compliance will be made explicit and incorporated into a model of how public authorities can make use of two categories of compliance mechanisms to induce compliance in individuals. On the one hand, contributions maintaining the basic assumptions of public choice theory have an innate image of individual compliance with regulations being the result of coercive measures on the part of public authorities. On the other hand, the emerging co-operative action or co-management literature would emphasise legitimacy or discursive measures as more effective in securing compliance with management regulations. Finally, the question is addressed as to which factors other than management initiatives may affect individuals’ choices concerning compliance vs. non-compliance.

Geir Hønneland

4. The Barents Sea Fisheries — Resources, Jurisdiction and Management

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the Barents Sea fisheries.¹ After an outline of the most important fish resources of this ocean area, their importance for Northern Norway and Northwestern Russia is briefly discussed. Next, a presentation follows of the jurisdiction of the Barents Sea and the regime set up to manage the fish stocks in question. The aim is to provide an outline of how the marine living resources of the Barents Sea are managed through the bilateral Norwegian-Russian regime, which has been in place since 1976, and through management efforts at the national level in both Norway and Russia.

Geir Hønneland

5. Compliance in the Barents Sea — a Preliminary Discussion

Abstract

This chapter provides a preliminary discussion of compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries. The main purpose is to present violation statistics from the Norwegian Coast Guard and discuss the observable level of compliance in relation to the model presented in Chapter 3.¹ By “preliminary” is here meant that the issue is sought discussed to the extent possible based on observation, statistics and other written material; a further discussion based on interviews with fishermen follows in the next chapter. A brief description of the fishing activity of the Barents Sea is first provided to give an indication of the level of activity under discussion.

Geir Hønneland

6. How Fishermen Account for Compliance

Abstract

As mentioned in Chapter 1, personal in-depth interviews were carried out with Norwegian and Russian fishermen in order to further test the preliminary conclusions arrived at through the study of statistical material and observation. The results of that investigation are rendered in the present chapter. The main issue is how fishermen perceive their relationship with the most important management bodies, and how they account for the largely compliant behaviour that statistics give evidence to (cf. Chapter 5). The answers are here structured thematically, and not categorised by type of interviewee (Norwegian fishermen; Norwegian fisher representatives; Russian fishermen).¹

Geir Hønneland

7. Co-management and Communities in the Barents Sea Fisheries

Abstract

The aim of the present chapter is to discuss the extent to which it proves meaningful to apply co-management theory in explaining compliance with regulations among fishermen in the Barents Sea.¹ Moreover, the results arrived at so far in the investigation are used to further study the relationship between the concepts of co-management, communities and compliance. An attempt is made to provide an explanation in line with McCay & Jentoft’s (1998) call for thicker descriptions in studies of the commons, taking into account the embeddedness of management systems in more general social systems.²

Geir Hønneland

8. Investigation revisited

Abstract

The objective of this chapter is partly to tie up some of the “loose ends” of the investigation, partly to sum up its major findings. First, the interview data are subjected to a further interpretation based on a leading perspective within qualitative interviewing. Although the data were certainly subjected to interpretation before being presented in Chapter 6, there seems to be a need to demonstrate more elaborately the context in which these statements should be interpreted. Moreover, the conclusions presented in Chapter 6 are discussed at some greater length in the second section of the present chapter. The conclusions are viewed in relation to the model of compliance in fisheries presented in Chapter 3. In the concluding section, the same conclusions are sought placed in an epistemological context, reflecting the epistemological quests of the theoretical perspectives or research programmes presented in Chapter 2. The question here is: Taking the stance of each research programme as a point of departure, to what extent do the conclusions of my investigation contribute to a growth of knowledge in the social science literature on CPRs?

Geir Hønneland

9. Concluding Remarks

Abstract

The discussion will be rounded off with some general remarks on the usefulness of the models employed in the current investigation. While these remarks are rather loosely coupled, they all relate to the epistemological status of the co-management perspective. First, the argument is made that co-management has proven less “progressive” in the sense of producing scientific “novelties” than the self-management perspective, which it was grouped together with in Chapter 2 as co-operative action theory. Second, the usefulness of the same perspective in a non-market economy is further discussed (following up the discussion in Chapter 6 on co-management in Northwest Russian fisheries). Finally, the applicability of the various perspectives and models employed in the study, as well as the implications of the methodological and epistemological choices underlying it, are discussed on a more general basis in the concluding section.

Geir Hønneland

Backmatter

Titel: Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources
verfasst von: Geir Hønneland
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Electronic ISBN: 978-94-011-4044-7
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5783-7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7

Springer Professional

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Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

1. Introduction

2. The Interaction of Research Programmes in Social Science Studies of the Commons

3. A Model of Compliance in Fisheries — Theoretical Foundations and Practical Application

4. The Barents Sea Fisheries — Resources, Jurisdiction and Management

5. Compliance in the Barents Sea — a Preliminary Discussion

6. How Fishermen Account for Compliance

7. Co-management and Communities in the Barents Sea Fisheries

8. Investigation revisited

9. Concluding Remarks

Backmatter