2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Collusion-Preserving Computation
verfasst von : Joël Alwen, Jonathan Katz, Ueli Maurer, Vassilis Zikas
Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
In
collusion-free
protocols, subliminal communication is impossible and parties are thus unable to communicate any information “beyond what the protocol allows.” Collusion-free protocols are interesting for several reasons, but have specifically attracted attention because they can be used to reduce trust in game-theoretic mechanisms. Collusion-free protocols are impossible to achieve (in general) when all parties are connected by point-to-point channels, but exist under certain physical assumptions (Lepinksi et al., STOC 2005) or when parties are connected in specific network topologies (Alwen et al., Crypto 2008).
We provide a “clean-slate” definition of the stronger notion of collusion
preservation
. Our goals in revisiting the definition are:
To give a definition with respect to
arbitrary
communication resources (including as special cases the communication models from prior work). We can then, in particular, better understand what types of resources enable collusion-preserving protocols.
To construct protocols that allow no
additional
subliminal communication when parties
can
communicate via other means. (This property is
not
implied by collusion-freeness.)
To support
composition
, so protocols can be designed in a modular fashion using sub-protocols run among subsets of the parties.
In addition to proposing the definition, we explore implications of our model and show a general feasibility result for collusion-preserving computation of arbitrary functionalities. We formalize a model for concurrently playing multiple extensive-form, mediated games while preserving many important equilibrium notions.