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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Comparative Law and Multicultural Legal Classes: Challenge or Opportunity?

verfasst von : Csaba Varga

Erschienen in: Comparative Law and Multicultural Legal Classes: Challenge or Opportunity?

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Our thoughts are products of our own culture, tradition, and ideal of order, so their understanding and development can only be based upon them. However, cultures, traditions and ideals vary from time to time and from people to people, as each of them has been created and developed to respond to challenges under their own conditions given. Consequently, they are both independent of each other in their genesis and also incommensurable in their historical set; they are not even classifiable but only taxonomisable in a strict sense. Each of us lives and interprets his own world; when comparing, we attempt at putting all of them in a common hat, while none of us can transcend the symbolic paradox of “I interpret your culture through my culture”. A way out, if at all, can only result from their individual parallel characterisation, when we build up some kind of abstract philosophical universality from the ideals of order concerned. In the context of the Self, on the one hand, and of You, on the other, we are expected not only to explain the Other, but also to recognise it by its own right. Accordingly, legal comparison aims at getting knowledge not only of ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ but about what is meant by law when it works in the mind. All in all, comparison comprises, in addition to the mere act of taking cognisance, also the acceptance of this Other by its own right, in which no entity involved is simply reduced to anything purely factual (“what is the law?”), but the actuality of the entire normative process leading to a legal statement (“how do we think in law?”) is considered. Getting to know any foreign law begins with the grouping of laws and, expressed in terms of belonging to legal families, by combining those which are similar and contrasting those which are dissimilar. Their interaction and mixing are part of their life, but establishing their occurrence cannot substitute to the didactic necessity and explanatory power of analysing them in term of legal families as well. When describing them, mere contrast or parallelism is to be completed by showing up the specific field and way of ingenuity each of them may have in comparison to others, as their individual contribution to the cultural production of the humanity.

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Nächstes Kapitel Comparative Law and Multicultural Classes: A Japanese Example

Following the original methodological way of thinking characteristic of autopoiesis, Varga (2012a) has, in the process, analysed the connectability of society-wide and individual understandings and language use, including both official and personal association with agents of formalised normativity, including law. His approach—in Varga (1991)—has already been considered to be autopoietic by Benseler (1987).

Cf. Varga (2012b), p. 270; referring to Cohn (1980), p. 199 and Medick (1987).

Sometimes it is made to seem as if recoursing to the idea of ‘legal family’ would/could equate to the “exoticization of legal cultures”. Watt (2006), p. 595.

As defined by Pawelzig (1970).

Moore and Sanders (2014).

Here we find new unresolved queries, since the aim of modern concert tours was at its original time, as far as a genuine mass of baroque musical pieces is concerned, only a background colouring, subservient to social occasions. In the case of ecclesiastical music, as related to the gist of transcendental events, rites, and the very meaning of the deliverance of the sacrament itself, it was not necessarily more than the church architecture, its interior/decorative artfulness, the ceremonial raiment and choreography taken together, all revolving around one purpose: to prepare or condition ourselves, our soul, our whole being for that “Sursum corda! Habemus ad Dominum.”/“We lift our hearts up to the Lord.”

At least the complexity of its demand can be divided into authorial intentions, choices of instruments, techniques of playing, and sounds (Young 2013; Edidin 2008, p. 3), while others (e.g., Kivy 1995) see it as dependent on a whole set of criteria.

Kivy (1995) does not simply deny its availability but, instead, defines antithetically, on the one hand, the requirement of authenticity drawn from outside of the score, and, on the other, the performer’s congeniality, supposing that the consideration of the former results in the latter being forced into a bind. This position is criticised by Jackson (1997).

“Because the composer’s score under-determines the sound of a faithful performance, the authenticity of any particular performance is judged against (the appropriate member(s) of) a set of ideally faithful performances.” Davies (1987), p. 39.

Edidin (2008), p. 5.

Cook (1999), p. 244.

Davies (1988), p. 373. But what is meant by faith is for Davies (1987) nothing but an impression of the world, one of habitudes and tastes; exemplified by, in the polarity of past and present, what sounds as dissonant/concordant, what instrument is too rustic, or what musical elaboration (in the case of many operas of the aged Händel) is “lacking in grace”.

Sherman (1998).

Kamp (2006).

While staging Bach as music in abstracto for a faith-free performance, Rilling (1995), p. 9, also acknowledges that the genuine context of this specific music was the church’s message mediated by services from Sunday to Sunday but newly contextualized.

It is not nearly by chance that Rosen (2012), pp. 85–86 notes that “the dichotomy of the particular and the universal is especially harmful to comparative studies, law included.”

For such a philosophical use of the terms ‘general’ and ‘particular’, as well as ‘type’, see Lukács (1967) and, as applied to legal philosophising, Peschka (1989).

Moore and Sanders (2014).

Sapir (1924) as well as Varga (1992a).

Geertz (1973), p. 89.

Husa (2009), p. 914 and Husa (2018). Valcke (2004a), p. 171 has termed it as the ‘cognitive structure of law’.

Yntema (1958), p. 499.

Husa (2009), p. 918; cf. also Hunter-Henin (2019).

de Laet (2012), pp. 424–425.

Wittgenstein (1953).

Rouse (1987), p. 62, quoting Hacking (1982), pp. 48–66.

It is in this sense that Husa (2009), p. 921—taken from Constantinesco (1974), p. 15—quotes the sarcastic observation of Paul Koschaker, according to which, if not leading to a genuine understanding, that is, a “bad comparative law is worse than none” [“Schlechte Rechtsvergleichung ist schlimmer als keine.”]. This is what can be opined with unchanged critical power by critics saying that “comparative law’s orthodoxy […] can only ever allow one to identify the foreign law in force rather than explain it in depth […addressing…] the question “why?””. Glanert and Legrand (2017), p. 710.

Northrop (1952, 1959), as well as Dorsey (1949, 1989–1993).

This is exactly what was satirised by the very first comparative journal’s inauguration: “Les études législatives, condamnées par je ne sais quel pédantisme national à s’arrêter aux limites d’un code, n’avaient osé franchir cette démarcation imaginaire, et s’étendre dans des études générales; comme si les productions étrangères avaient été des conceptions barbares dont il fallût éviter le contact; et auxquelles on dût refuser la terre et l’eau. La France surtout doit se reprocher cette faute.” Foelix (1834), pp. 1–2.

As to personal experience, I took part in the Session de Printemps at Strasbourg in 1968, then in the Sessions d’Été courses held at Trento in 1970 and in Amsterdam in 1971.

Richardson (1988).

Brand and Wes Rist (2009).

De Witte and Forder (1992) as well as Ancel (2013).

According to a Serbian legal historian, founder of an Alan Watson institute, Avramovic (2010), pp. 20–21, “In reality, nothing is as practical, particularly in a time of rapid social and technological change, as a clear appreciation of the historical, moral and ethical principles that form the basis of the modern legal order. […] The subject is now more oriented towards a better understanding of the roots of current legal doctrine and of the likely shape of future legal changes.”

Varga (2015).

Böhm et al. (2002), quoted by Maharg (2007), p. 6.

Jukier (2007), p. 1.

Kelsen (1934), p. 64.

Montoya (2010), p. 548, quoted by Parise (2018), para. I.

Juergensmeyer (2016). Or, in a most simplified formulation, “to understand the familiar and move from”. Jamal (2019), section 4.

Cf. note 11.

Frankenberg (2016), p. 6.

Ibid., 83.

Varga (2012c).

Parise (2018), para. III/B.

Ewald (1995), p. 1948. Or, as summarised by Valcke (2004b), p. 717, “law is more than just the sum of its facts […]. Law is also […] the ideas that underlie, animate, and tie these facts together”.

Varga (1992b).

Puchalska-Tych and Salter (1996), p. 181. It is to be remembered here that, for instance, in the plenary speech (Varga 1989) held at the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy world congress at Edinburgh in 1989, whilst developing an ontological exposition of law, I described its Soviet-type simulacrum, called Socialist law at the time and regarded as an independent legal family, as a ‘wreck law’ from the beginning, featuring—and based upon—something of a differing ontology, since, being overtly and directly a political instrument; also in its textuality it was a lie, or a deceptive form throughout.

Montesquieu (1951), p. 1025: “Ce n’est point le corps des lois que je cherche, mais leur âme.”

Puchalska-Tych and Salter (1996), pp. 181–183.

Fachin (2018), Part I.

The separation or separability of these is certainly not clear (Legrand 2003). Especially in American literature, authors are used to calling for so-called canons as well, often narratively, without genuine definition. According to Balkin and Levinson (2000), p. 9, “Every discipline, because it is a discipline, has a canon, a set of standard texts, approaches, problems, examples, or stories that its members repeatedly employ or invoke, and which help define the discipline as a discipline.”

Huntington (1996), p. 21.

Adding to a politicising fallacy concerning what kind of quality or qualification may be the result of a comparatio manifestly to be drawn, I found a fresh example in Whitman (2017), outlining the international historical debate on the far-off effects of American racial legislation—making, in facing relevant issues at its time, the United States the leading nation in the world—in a specific relationship with the National Socialist legislation at Nuremberg, having exerted a kind of influence without any doubt and in a documentable way, which was at the same time a kind of reinforcing, one related to both the suggesting of tools and serving with the practical experience of the use of certain instruments. It was the essence of this debate that such a situation was dreaded and horrified (in the vision of a final fight between some theus and antitheus, or angelus and diabolus) while rejecting even the imaginability of there having been any genuine legal effect or some near-to-borrow situation.

Varga (2010a).

Fachin (2018), part I.

Hunter-Henin (2018), para. 3.b.

In my own use, while arguing repeatedly for the appropriate weigh to be given also to theoretical and historical legal subjects in the curriculum, this expression is clearly a confirmation of the above mentioned Maastricht Conference conclusion, notably, that priority in the educational process should be granted—instead of the changing terms of “What does the law think?”—to answering and teaching the issue of “How do you think like a lawyer?”. In international literature, however, this fine term is often updated to a lesser extent by mere propedeutics, as in case of Schauer (2009). A variation to the above is offered by Ewald (1995), p. 2111, concluding with the quote: “what we need to understand is the ideas and the reasons for the behaviour. In other words, it seems that what we need to understand is neither law in books nor law in action, but law in minds.”

Who, among others, “saves himself from drowning by pulling on his own hair” (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baron_Munchausen>).

Heringa (2013), p. 107.

Glenn (2000).

Husa (2009).

Or, as formulated a quarter of a century ago, “The comparative study of law is not to be seen as a mere juxtaposition of discrete legal cultures. Rather it is a medium for undermining the pretensions of any tradition claiming to represent eternal verities rather than historical contingencies.” Varga (1992b), p. xx.

As a practicing French lawyer—Lepaulle (1922), p. 858—thanking his complete understanding of his own law for having in the meantime studied another law, ponders the need of the “sense of relativity” after having experienced that “To see things in their true light, we must see them from a certain distance, as strangers”, because “Where one is immersed in his own law, in his own country, unable to see things from without, he has a psychologically unavoidable tendency to consider as natural, as necessary, as given by God, things which are simply due to historical accident or temporary social situations.”

Jukier (2007), p. 3.

Parise (2018), para. III.

Samuel (2014), p. 36.

Thiessen (2018), ch. B recalls antecedants of multicultural legal classes in parts of Europe, learning and developing the once ius commune from the sixteenth century onwards, revealing that “Roman law itself changed due to the input of multicultural students, who eventually became scholars, lawyers or judges themselves.” As he continues in ch. D, today a similar multipolarity in interactions characterises the countries belonging to the European Union, where its law, as a graduate study, an apparently single subject, is taught, on the one hand, but this subject is understood in manners varying from nation to nation, on the other. This exemplification is, however, somewhat misleading. The multiculturalism it refers to is not even nearly the one meant by the present topic. At the same time, the genuine truism it sensitively covers draws us back to the basic autopoiesis backing all human commerce, i.e., exchange of meaning-and-understanding ventures, in general. As to the second example, it is specific in so far as its operation takes place in a bipolar structure from the beginning, given as the foundational setting of European law. Varga (2009).

Perelman (1962) as well as Varga (1973).

Van Rossum (2008), Foblets and Dundes Renteln (2009), Kuo (2018) and Songor (2018).

Kjær (2014), pp. 387–388.

In addition to the sanctified nature of some (e.g., Hebrew, Latin, etc.) languages, the in-built genius itself is praised by Dauzat (1943). However, this all gets lost in translation together with their own structures and ways of reasoning. Pozzo (2012), p. 102.

Kjær (2014), pp. 393 & 397.

Selznick (1968).

This global interplay may explain why, by now, all legal systems have become “both partners and competitors” to all others. Auby (2017), p. 143.

Parise (2018), para. I. There is a delusive nominal resemblence to the cosmopolitan movement of the Belgian-initiated Avocats Sans Frontières (1992) and the American-initiated Lawyers Without Borders (2003), pressing rule of law agendas on various elements of human rights respectively.

Hunter-Henin (2018), [introduction]; cf. Hunter-Henin (2019), section 2.

Hunter-Henin (2019), section 2.1.

Part of such practices is teaching, e.g., the innu legal order under the flag of “décoloniser l’enseignement”, certainly an increasingly general trend now in countries with heritage of indigeneous people(s). Fathally (2018), para. I/B/ii.

Ost and van Hoecke (2000); Pollock (1890), p. 108: quote by Valcke (2004a), p. 180, note 64.

Smits (2011).

Reisman (1996).

Blanc-Jouvan (2008), p. 1084.

Hupper (2015), p. 424; Varga (2007a).

In such a context, attention is also due to one of the new layers—degeneration—of today’s practice of international relations. “In international relations—holds, for instance, the publisher’s launching of Badie (2017)—some states often deny the legal status of others, stigmatising their practices or even their culture. Such acts of deliberate humiliation at the diplomatic level are common occurrences in modern diplomacy. In the period following the breakup of the famous ‘Concert of Europe’, many kinds of club-based diplomacy have been tried, all falling short of anything like inclusive multilateralism. Examples of this effort include the G7, G8, G20 and even the P5. Such ‘contact groups’ are put forward as if they were actual ruling institutions, endowed with the power to exclude and marginalise. Today, the effect of such acts of humiliation is to reveal the international system’s limits and its lack of diplomatic effectiveness. The use of humiliation as a regular diplomatic action steadily erodes the power of the international system. These actions appear to be the result of a botched mixture of a colonial past, a failed decolonisation, a mistaken vision of globalisation and a very dangerous post-bipolar reconstruction.”

Hiscock and Van Caenegem (2010), p. 288.

As, e.g., Leibniz (1710) may have arrived at such a constatation from his theological teleology: “le meilleur des mondes possibles”. Caro (2014).

Pringsheimʼs classical observation—(1961), p. 78—according to which “comparative law without the history of law is an impossible task” can be interpreted in this sense and manner as well.

The best approach to “initiation” is just to make students active under the teacher’s supervision in a manner such that they themselves can arrive at their own problem-solving, thanks to their own intellectual efforts, and thereby they may acquire the skill and knowledge in question with internal conviction, instead of a merely passive listening to or reading that which is taught ex cathedra to them.

As to my personal endeavour, I have been working for a quarter of a century towards free-choice small group seminars on topics treated upon the basis of the students’ own reading and debating a series of relevant papers from week to week. Students are only allowed to take part in these provided that they have actually studied the literature in question; one or two randomly selected students expostulate the subject in the light of their own critical or forward-looking perspectives, or with rather problem-oriented insights; and then each participant has his/her own turn to intervene in succession; and it is only then that I have my own turn, reflecting on what has been told or revisiting concepts if the students seem not to have noted them. After that, the issues are still open to debate for one and a half hours, with half a dozen or a dozen of students Q&A-ing the topic, moderated by me if necessary. It is so successful that even after decades, former participants are grateful for these intellectual and memorable experiences.

Today’s literature mostly recommends small group collective presentation; cf., e.g., Jarvis (2014).

Cf. in depth Petersen (2020) as well as Värv (2020) in the volume, Part II.

Fathally (2018).

This is named ‘parochialism’ by Jamin and van Caenegem (2016), p. 15.

This one-way process is named ‘commonlawisation’ by Jamin and van Caenegem (2016), p. 19.

Mercescu (2018).

TEMPUS Project No. 02114/1991–1994, with a network of some twenty-five European Economic Community universities in the background.

Varga (2010c).

It was an interesting lesson for me to follow the way of, for example, Professor Marie Sandström (1989, 2004) of the University of Stockholm who, responding to new educational challenges, changed from legal history proper (centred on positivistic description of the historical sequence of institutions mainly) to tracking the historical (intellectual) evolution of legal methodology, in order to save the value of historical investigations, setting it up as a new field of educational interest.

Varga (2010a).

As noted in a previously unpublished paper by your author around 1973—Varga (2001)—, the subjects of so-called “general theory of law”—contradictio in adiecto in itself, but cultivated particularly in the once Soviet-dominated world—are usually general within the given domestic law’s panoramic view exclusively, totally ignoring the rest of the world.

In my friendly conversation with H. Patrick Glenn at the 2002 Brussels Conference on Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law, he criticised my titling of my lecture using the expression ’legal culture’, claiming this not to be seen as correct in American usage. As he explained, the very word ‘culture’ (1) is rooted in German romanticism, which has become suspect, i.e., something is inherently wrong in terms of the influence it exerted on National Socialism; (2) is divisive, because by differentiating sides that turn out to be polarised, it is disintegrative; and (3) is unnecessary, as it does not express more than one aspect of ‘legal tradition’. I could only respond here that (1) the term is known to me as Voltaire’s teaching in Candide’s end-message, rooted in cultīvāre from colere/cultus (Abdi 2014); (2) ‘legal cultures’ and ‘legal traditions’ are not synonyms but cover differing directions/contents; because (3) ‘culture’ is within the womb of that which we interpret as ourselves and our world, whereas ‘tradition’ is only one form of culture, the one in and for which the past has strong significance for the acceptance—or, obliquely, the justification—of any direction/contents taken. As to the original presentations, see Glenn (2004) and Varga (2007b). As to mere etymological formation, the English culture in “[a] figurative sense of ‘cultivation through education’ is first attested c. 1500. Meaning ‘the intellectual side of civilization’ this being from 1805; that of ‘collective customs and achievements of a people’ is from 1867.” At the same time, as transformed into English from German, kultur, as spelled then, stood, in “1914, originally, [for] ‘ideals of civilization as conceived by the Germans,’ [as] a word from the First World War and in English always at first ironic” (<https://www.etymonline.com/word/>).

Dölemeyer (2010), p. 32, notes that such grouping is anyhow difficult, because both its object and taxonomisation are in a “constant flux”. Even though this is true, the root cause lies in the uncommensurability of the series of othernesses shown by the underlying phenomena of autochthonistic independence from each other. Varga (2012d) and Schenk (2013).

Ferreri (2020), section 2.

100

Varga (2010b).

101

Gordley (1993), Richard (2007), Spamann (2009), Pargendler (2012), Garoupa and Pargendler (2014), Siems (2018), p. 110.

102

Twining (2009), ch. 3, 63–87, reviewing the entire literary spectrum, evaluates Woodman’s (2003) idea on how the whole business falls to pieces at the very first moment because, he says, it is based on legal centralism, a characteristic property of one of the two hemispheres, the so-called West only. However, its reconsideration by Woodman and Bavinck (2009) makes it clear that the controversy is far from the issue of legal families; it is an effort to introduce a broad anthropological notion of law, dissolved by the proponents of legal pluralism in all-inclusive social normativity. Cf., e.g., Varga (2010d).

103

David (1964) as well as Zweigert and Kötz (1998).

104

Legrand (1996); Twining (2000), ch. 5, 163–168; Glenn (2001) and Kennedy (2003).

105

Kötz (1998).

106

Palmer (2001) as well as Örücü (2007, 2008).

107

Ferreri (2020), section 2.

108

Which in itself is not the same as Alan Watson’s theory (Varga 1979). His classical work (1974) may have been foreseen by Lowie’s—(1920), p. 441—observation, stating that “cultures develop mainly through borrowings due to chance contacts”.

109

Aoki (2020), section 4.1, as well as Ferreri (2020), section 4.

110

Aoki (2020), section 4.1, with reference to David (1964).

111

As confirmed by Hitoshi Aoki, national reporter from Japan, professor at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, in his e-mail to the author on February 13, 2018.

112

Igarashi (2003). Cf. also Aoki (2020), section 4.1, as well as Dölemeyer (2010).

113

It should be noted here that not even the realm of Civil Law as a legal family is necessarily unproblematic either. E.g., Mańko (2018), relating to our region and in replacement of the defunct Socialist legal family, separately proposes two independent families, a Central European one and an Eastern European (Eurasian) one. However, I doubt that anything like that could advantageously override the longstanding dualism of Civil Law and Common Law. At the most, and meaningfully, they could perhaps serve as sub-variants within the former, obviously far from being exclusive for possible subgrouping.

114

Ferreri (2020), section 4, note 26, referring to Sen (2005), Amin (1987), and Örücü (2006).

115

Paradoxically, the original idea to develop this search from the considerations above was given to me by the same David (1969).

116

Interestingly, this is exactly what René David’s classic work has done in processing his materials, albeit, as an infinitely sympathetic starting point, he himself also confessed that “Quoi qu’il en soit, je me méfie instinctivement des systèmes, des vues de théoriciens, de la pseudo-science. Il n’y a pas pour moi de modèle qui convienne à tous et en tous les temps; je hais tous ce qui est dogmatique, l’esprit de système et le fanatisme.” David (1982), p. 10.

117

This was not only the case with René David, but this was, too, about the disfiguring of the politically motivated Soviet-type Cold War denouncement of what was then called “American Fascism”, also filtering into legal historical and theoretical approaches. E.g., Eörsi (1953) and Peschka (1965); for the criticism of their misunderstanding of the very nature of law in Common Law tradition, Varga (1970).

118

Cf. Varga (1992b, 2013).

119

What is going to happen if you are to have a mass of borrowing? When, after the collapse of Communism, Hungary had already overcome a number of legal impositions that had started by questioning the continuity of her own traditions, I could mention two countries as a positive example, where whatever effect through pressure by or learning from modelling countries was suffered, all of this was nevertheless adapted and assimilated into local traditions (Japan) or where it has been balanced by most of the country’s huge off-centre area, tradition having been resuscitated extensively (Turkey). Varga (1995, 2008a).

120

A derivative of the Latin prīmus/prīmitīvus [’the first/earliest of its kind’].

121

Cf., e.g., Varga (1994a). For the striking difference between todayʼs position and the distinctions in the almost near past, see Bitterli (1976).

122

In a pioneering work—Gu (2006)—dedicated to a similar questioning, English law is characterised by “words of authority” (with boundaries of meaning, linear reasoning, and the separation of powers); Islamic law, by “words of interpretative authority” (with fluid meaning, correlative reasoning, and diverse jurisprudence); and Chinese law, by “words of legislative authority” (with boundless meaning, multidimensional reasoning, and boundless power).

123

The central role of what is called Rechtsdogmatik is concomitant to it. Nowadays its formal doctrine of the law is not simply preoccupied with the law as prevalent, but it forms the basis of what can in any case be thought of as a law from the beginning—or, in American terms, of what legal imaginability is—and thereby it provides a compositional and classificatory framework for any improvement or development in the future. Varga (2008b).

Varga (1994b).

Тихонравов (2010).

Varga (2007c).

Ferreri (2020), section 5, as well as Chromá (2007).

128

World Bank (2003).

129

Ferreri (2020), section 4, note 24, referring to Kerhuel and Fauvarque-Cosson (2010) and Société (2006).

130

Varga (1996).

131

Varga (2016).

132

Ferreri (2020), para. 3 refers to Abermann and Gehrke (2016) and exemplifies, among others, by the City University of New York, which shows that faculty members themselves may be differentiated according to racial, ethnic, gender and religious orientation. Edwards et al. (2008).

133

Woo (2001), p. 452; Hoffman (2011) and Emelyanova (2017).

134

Zhao (2007).

135

“Domestic students with existing networks and forms of social support can be indifferent to the needs of international students or perceive those students as self-ghettoizing with no interest in reaching out. International students can form into nationality groups which may appear exclusive and self-contained from the outside and fail to make meaningful connections with others.” Moreover, in cases of social events “an eye to the religious or cultural differences” is pre-advised, especially as to catering and alcohol, amongst others, by Evans (2016), pp. 71 & 72.

136

“If common ground is recognized in teaching both groups of students, and if differences are simultaneously respected and cultivated, legal educators will enrich their classrooms and be enriched as teachers.” Spanbauer (2007), p. 403.

137

Micklitz (2016), p. 59.

138

Varga (1996).

139

Glenn (2013), p. 36.

140

Girardi-Fachin (2019), section 3.2.

141

Femia (2015), pp. 13, 14–15 & 16 (with lex/ius added).

142

Smith (2010), p. 356.

143

Fauvarque-Cosson (2008).

144

Melkevik (2009).

145

Heuschling (2017).

146

Friedman and Teubner (1986).

Abdi A (2014) Sur la fameuse leçon morale de Candide de Voltaire “Il faut cultiver notre jardin”. La Revue de Teheran 98 http://www.teheran.ir/?article1843#gsc.tab=0. Accessed 22 Aug 2019

Abermann G, Gehrke I (2016) The multicultural classroom: a guaranteed intercultural learning space? Forschungsforum der österreichischen Fachhochschulen http://ffhoarep.fh-ooe.at/bitstream/123456789/643/1/115_291_Abermann_FullPaper_en_Final.pdf. Accessed 22 Aug 2019

Amin SA (1987) Classification of legal systems in the Muslim countries. Islamic Comp Law Q 7(2):93–102

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Titel: Comparative Law and Multicultural Legal Classes: Challenge or Opportunity?
verfasst von: Csaba Varga
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Comparative Law and Multicultural Legal Classes: Challenge or Opportunity?
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-46897-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-46898-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46898-9_1