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2003 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Competition Among Servers

verfasst von : Refael Hassin, Moshe Haviv

Erschienen in: To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems

Verlag: Springer US

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This chapter deals with markets in which servers compete over the customers, usually by posting prices. Most of the models consider a game with two stages; servers act as leaders by announcing prices, and customers follow by selecting servers accordingly. Thus, the model computes customers’ equilibrium for any given set of prices, so that each customer optimizes his own welfare by choosing a server. Then, an equilibrium among the servers is computed, where each server sets a price that maximizes its profits, given the prices of the others. At this stage, the servers assume that for each set of prices, the arrival rates are determined by the corresponding customers’ equilibrium.

Metadaten
Titel
Competition Among Servers
verfasst von
Refael Hassin
Moshe Haviv
Copyright-Jahr
2003
Verlag
Springer US
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0359-0_7