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Erschienen in:
Models of Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets Under Network Constraints Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Compromise Scheduling of Bilateral Contracts in Electricity Market Environment

verfasst von : Sergey I. Palamarchuk

Erschienen in: Handbook of Networks in Power Systems I

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

The paper formulates an electricity delivery scheduling problem in accordance with the bilateral contracts in the competitive wholesale market. Bilateral forward contracts are generally used in electricity markets to stabilize prices and hedge risks of electricity shortage. A contract party is able to draw electricity from the contract and resell it to the day-ahead wholesale and retail markets. Contract parties schedule electricity deliveries over contract period to get the highest profit. The problem solution results in determination of a contract price acceptable for both parties. Normally the contract parties are interested in different delivery strategies during the contract period. A compromise in determination of the delivery strategy implies obtaining the equality of relative concessions from supplier and buyer.
Conclusion of bilateral contracts bears certain risks due to price and demand uncertainty. Both contract parties forecast price levels in the spot market and electricity demand. Both parties estimate expected profits (or losses) from caring out the contract and participation in the spot market. It is important to adjust the contract in time.
The paper formulates optimization problems for contract scheduling. A numerical example demonstrates the efficiency of the algorithm.
The sequence of actions to be performed for contract correction is considered. The statements of optimization problems are given for decision making on contract correction and cancellation. The statements take into account financial compensation to another party in the case of prescheduled contract correction or cancellation. A numerical example illustrates applicability of the proposed procedures for decision making.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Differentiated Reliability Pricing Model for Customers of Distribution Grids
Nächstes Kapitel Equilibrium Predictions in Wholesale Electricity Markets
Fußnoten
1
Superscripts “0” at variables are removed for simplicity of the problem statement.
 
2
Objective function (29) is written on the assumption that reduction and increase in delivery under BC is paid at the same price \( p_{{ovd}}^t \). Real contracts can provide other requirements.
 
3
It is assumed in objective function (39) that GC uses the price forecast \( \tilde{p}_{{sF}}^t,\quad t = {t_C},...,{T_N} \) updated by ESC. In real life it can obtain a new forecast itself.
 
4
Random character of prices and demand values is not taken into account in the example for simplicity.
 
Literatur
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Hunt S, Shuttleworth G (1996) Competition and choice in electricity. Wiley, Chichester
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Borenstein S (2001) The trouble with electricity markets (and some solutions). The University of California, the Energy Institute, Berkeley. Paper PWP-081
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Bjorgan R, Song H, Liu C-C et al (2000) Pricing flexible electricity contracts. IEEE Trans Power Syst 15(2):477–482CrossRef
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Carrion M, Conejo AJ, Arroyo JM (2007) Forward contracting and selling price determination for a retailer. IEEE Trans Power Syst 22(4):2105–2114CrossRef
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Palamarchuk SI (2003) Forward contracts for electricity and their correlation with spot markets. In: Proceedings of IEEE PowerTech conference, Bologna. Paper BPT03-223
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Carrion M, Philpott AB, Conejo AJ et al (2007) A stochastic programming approach to electric energy procurement for large consumers. IEEE Trans Power Syst 22(2):744–754CrossRef
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David AK, Wen FS (2001) Bilateral transaction bargaining between independent utilities under incomplete information. IEE Proc Gener Transm Distrib 148(5):448–454CrossRef
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Bompard E, Ma Y (2008) Modeling bilateral electricity markets: a complex network appoach. IEEE Trans Power Syst 23(4):1590–1600CrossRef
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Cheng JWM, Galiana FD, McGillis DT (1998) Studies of bilateral contracts with respect to steady-state security in a deregulated environment. IEEE Trans Power Syst 13(3):1020–1025CrossRef
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Shrestha GB, Pokharel BK, Lie TT et al (2005) Medium term power planning with bilateral contracts. IEEE Trans Power Syst 20(2):627–633CrossRef
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Palamarchuk S (2010) Dynamic programming approach to the bilateral contract scheduling. IET Gener Transm Distrib 4(2):211–220CrossRef
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Metadaten
Titel
Compromise Scheduling of Bilateral Contracts in Electricity Market Environment
verfasst von
Sergey I. Palamarchuk
Copyright-Jahr
2012
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Handbook of Networks in Power Systems I

Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23192-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-642-23193-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2012

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23193-3_9