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Über dieses Buch

The two-volume set, LNCS 9326 and LNCS 9327 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 20th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2015, held in Vienna, Austria, in September 2015.

The 59 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 298 submissions. The papers address issues such as networks and Web security; system security; crypto application and attacks; risk analysis; privacy; cloud security; protocols and attribute-based encryption; code analysis and side-channels; detection and monitoring; authentication; policies; and applied security.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Networks and Web Security

Frontmatter

Towards Security of Internet Naming Infrastructure

Abstract
We study the operational characteristics of the server-side of the Internet’s naming infrastructure. Our findings discover common architectures whereby name servers are ‘hidden’ behind server-side caching DNS resolvers. We explore the extent and the scope of the name servers that use server-side caching resolvers, and find such configurations in at least \(38\,\%\) of the domains in a forward DNS tree, and higher percents of the domains in a reverse DNS tree. We characterise the operators of the server-side caching resolvers and provide motivations, explaining their prevalence.
Our experimental evaluation indicates that the caching infrastructures are typically run by third parties, and that the services, provided by the third parties, often do not deploy best practices, resulting in misconfigurations, vulnerabilities and degraded performance of the DNS servers in popular domains.
Haya Shulman, Michael Waidner

Waiting for CSP – Securing Legacy Web Applications with JSAgents

Abstract
Markup Injection (MI) attacks, ranging from classical Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and DOMXSS to Scriptless Attacks, pose a major threat for web applications, browser extensions, and mobile apps. To mitigate MI attacks, we propose JSAgents, a novel and flexible approach to defeat MI attacks using DOM meta-programming. Specifically, we enforce a security policy on the DOM of the browser at a place in the markup processing chain “just before” the rendering of the markup. This approach has many advantages: Obfuscation has already been removed from the markup when it enters the DOM, mXSS attack vectors are visible, and, last but not least, the (client-side) protection can be individually tailored to fit the needs of web applications.
JSAgents policies look similar to CSP policies, and indeed large parts of CSP can be implemented with JSAgents. However, there are three main differences: (1) Contrary to CSP, the source code of legacy web applications needs not be modified; instead, the policy is adapted to the application. (2) Whereas CSP can only apply one policy to a complete HTML document, JSAgents is able, through a novel cascading enforcement, to apply different policies to each element in the DOM; this property is essential in dealing with JavaScript event handlers and URIs. (3) JSAgents enables novel features like coarse-grained access control: e.g. we may block read/write access to HTML form elements for all scripts, but human users can still insert data (which may be interesting for password and PIN fields).
Mario Heiderich, Marcus Niemietz, Jörg Schwenk

Analyzing the BrowserID SSO System with Primary Identity Providers Using an Expressive Model of the Web

Abstract
BrowserID is a complex, real-world Single Sign-On (SSO) System for web applications recently developed by Mozilla. It employs new HTML5 features (such as web messaging and web storage) and cryptographic assertions to provide decentralized login, with the intent to respect users’ privacy. It can operate in a primary and a secondary identity provider mode. While in the primary mode BrowserID runs with arbitrary identity providers, in the secondary mode there is one identity provider only, namely Mozilla’s default identity provider.
We recently proposed an expressive general model for the web infrastructure and, based on this web model, analyzed the security of the secondary identity provider mode of BrowserID. The analysis revealed several severe vulnerabilities, which have been fixed by Mozilla.
In this paper, we complement our prior work by analyzing the even more complex primary identity provider mode of BrowserID. We do not only study authentication properties as before, but also privacy properties. During our analysis we discovered new and practical attacks that do not apply to the secondary mode: an identity injection attack, which violates a central authentication property of SSO systems, and attacks that break the privacy promise of BrowserID and which do not seem to be fixable without a major redesign of the system. Interestingly, some of our attacks on privacy make use of a browser side channel that, to the best of our knowledge, has not gained a lot of attention so far.
For the authentication bug, we propose a fix and formally prove in a slight extension of our general web model that the fixed system satisfies all the authentication requirements we consider. This constitutes the most complex formal analysis of a web application based on an expressive model of the web infrastructure so far.
As another contribution, we identify and prove important security properties of generic web features in the extended web model to facilitate future analysis efforts of web standards and web applications.
Daniel Fett, Ralf Küsters, Guido Schmitz

System Security

Frontmatter

A Practical Approach for Adaptive Data Structure Layout Randomization

Abstract
Attackers often corrupt data structures to compromise software systems. As a countermeasure, data structure layout randomization has been proposed. Unfortunately, existing techniques require manual designation of randomize-able data structures without guaranteeing the correctness and keep the layout unchanged at runtime. We present a system, called SALADS, that automatically translates a program to a DSSR (Data Structure Self-Randomizing) program. At runtime, a DSSR program dynamically randomizes the layout of each security-sensitive data structure by itself autonomously. DSSR programs regularly re-randomize a data structure when it has been accessed several times after last randomization. More importantly, DSSR programs automatically determine the randomizability of instances and randomize each instance independently. We have implemented SALADS based on gcc-4.5.0 and generated DSSR user-level applications, OS kernels, and hypervisors. Our experiments show that the DSSR programs can defeat a wide range of attacks with reasonable performance overhead.
Ping Chen, Jun Xu, Zhiqiang Lin, Dongyan Xu, Bing Mao, Peng Liu

Trustworthy Prevention of Code Injection in Linux on Embedded Devices

Abstract
We present MProsper, a trustworthy system to prevent code injection in Linux on embedded devices. MProsper is a formally verified run-time monitor, which forces an untrusted Linux to obey the executable space protection policy; a memory area can be either executable or writable, but cannot be both. The executable space protection allows the MProsper’s monitor to intercept every change to the executable code performed by a user application or by the Linux kernel. On top of this infrastructure, we use standard code signing to prevent code injection. MProsper is deployed on top of the Prosper hypervisor and is implemented as an isolated guest. Thus MProsper inherits the security property verified for the hypervisor: (i) Its code and data cannot be tampered by the untrusted Linux guest and (ii) all changes to the memory layout is intercepted, thus enabling MProsper to completely mediate every operation that can violate the desired security property. The verification of the monitor has been performed using the HOL4 theorem prover and by extending the existing formal model of the hypervisor with the formal specification of the high level model of the monitor.
Hind Chfouka, Hamed Nemati, Roberto Guanciale, Mads Dam, Patrik Ekdahl

Practical Memory Deduplication Attacks in Sandboxed Javascript

Abstract
Page deduplication is a mechanism to reduce the memory footprint of a system. Identical physical pages are identified across borders of virtual machines and programs and merged by the operating system or the hypervisor. However, this enables side-channel information leakage through cache or memory access time. Therefore, it is considered harmful in public clouds today, but it is still considered safe to use in a private environment, i.e., private clouds, personal computers, and smartphones.
We present the first memory-disclosure attack in sandboxed Javascript which exploits page deduplication. Unlike previous attacks, our attack does not require the victim to execute an adversary’s program, but simply to open a website which contains the adversary’s Javascript code. We are not only able to determine which applications are running, but also specific user activities, for instance, whether the user has specific websites currently opened. The attack works on servers, personal computers and smartphones, and across the borders of virtual machines.
Daniel Gruss, David Bidner, Stefan Mangard

Cryptography

Frontmatter

Computational Soundness for Interactive Primitives

Abstract
We present a generic computational soundness result for interactive cryptographic primitives. Our abstraction of interactive primitives leverages the Universal Composability (UC) framework, and thereby offers strong composability properties for our computational soundness result: given a computationally sound Dolev-Yao model for non-interactive primitives, and given UC-secure interactive primitives, we obtain computational soundness for the combined model that encompasses both the non-interactive and the interactive primitives. Our generic result is formulated in the CoSP framework for computational soundness proofs and supports any equivalence property expressible in CoSP such as strong secrecy and anonymity.
In a case study, we extend an existing computational soundness result by UC-secure blind signatures. We obtain computational soundness for blind signatures in uniform bi-processes in the applied \(\pi \)-calculus. This enables us to verify the untraceability of Chaum’s payment protocol in ProVerif in a computationally sound manner.
Michael Backes, Esfandiar Mohammadi, Tim Ruffing

Verifiably Encrypted Signatures: Security Revisited and a New Construction

Abstract
In structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes (SPS-EQ-\(\mathcal {R}\)), introduced at \(\textsc {Asiacrypt}\) 2014, each message M in \((\mathbb {G}^*)^\ell \) is associated to its projective equivalence class, and a signature commits to the equivalence class: anybody can transfer the signature to a new, scaled, representative.
In this work, we give the first black-box construction of a public-key encryption scheme from any SPS-EQ-\(\mathcal {R}\) satisfying a simple new property which we call perfect composition. The construction does notinvolve any non-black-box technique and the implication is that such SPS-EQ-\(\mathcal {R}\) cannot be constructed from one-way functions in a black-box way. The main idea of our scheme is to build a verifiable encrypted signature (VES) first and then apply the general transformation suggested by Calderon et al. (CT-RSA 2014).
The original definition of VES requires that the underlying signature scheme be correct and secure in addition to other security properties. The latter have been extended in subsequent literature, but the former requirements have sometimes been neglected, leaving a hole in the security notion. We show that Calderon et al.’s notion of resolution independence fills this gap.
Christian Hanser, Max Rabkin, Dominique Schröder

Interleaving Cryptanalytic Time-Memory Trade-Offs on Non-uniform Distributions

Abstract
Cryptanalytic time-memory trade-offs (TMTO) are famous tools available in any security expert toolbox. They have been used to break ciphers such as A5/1, but their efficiency to crack passwords made them even more popular in the security community. While symmetric keys are generated randomly according to a uniform distribution, passwords chosen by users are in practice far from being random, as confirmed by recent leakage of databases. Unfortunately, the technique used to build TMTOs is not appropriate to deal with non-uniform distributions. In this paper, we introduce an efficient construction that consists in partitioning the search set into subsets of close densities, and a strategy to explore the TMTOs associated to the subsets based on an interleaved traversal. This approach results in a significant improvement compared to currently used TMTOs. We experimented our approach on a classical problem, namely cracking 7-character NTLM Hash passwords using an alphabet with 34 special characters. This resulted in speedups ranging from 16 to 76 (depending on the input distribution) over rainbow tables, which are considered as the most efficient variant of time-memory trade-offs.
Gildas Avoine, Xavier Carpent, Cédric Lauradoux

Efficient Message Authentication Codes with Combinatorial Group Testing

Abstract
Message authentication code, MAC for short, is a symmetric-key cryptographic function for authenticity. A standard MAC verification only tells whether the message is valid or invalid, and thus we can not identify which part is corrupted in case of invalid message. In this paper we study a class of MAC functions that enables to identify the part of corruption, which we call group testing MAC (GTM). This can be seen as an application of a classical (non-adaptive) combinatorial group testing to MAC. Although the basic concept of GTM (or its keyless variant) has been proposed in various application areas, such as data forensics and computer virus testing, they rather treat the underlying MAC function as a black box, and exact computation cost for GTM seems to be overlooked. In this paper, we study the computational aspect of GTM, and show that a simple yet non-trivial extension of parallelizable MAC (PMAC) enables \(O(m+t)\) computation for m data items and t tests, irrespective of the underlying test matrix we use, under a natural security model. This greatly improves efficiency from naively applying a black-box MAC for each test, which requires O(mt) time. Based on existing group testing methods, we also present experimental results of our proposal and observe that ours runs as fast as taking single MAC tag, with speed-up from the conventional method by factor around 8 to 15 for \(m=10^4\) to \(10^5\) items.
Kazuhiko Minematsu

Symmetric-Key Based Proofs of Retrievability Supporting Public Verification

Abstract
Proofs-of-Retrievability enables a client to store his data on a cloud server so that he executes an efficient auditing protocol to check that the server possesses all of his data in the future. During an audit, the server must maintain full knowledge of the client’s data to pass, even though only a few blocks of the data need to be accessed. Since the first work by Juels and Kaliski, many PoR schemes have been proposed and some of them can support dynamic updates. However, all the existing works that achieve public verifiability are built upon traditional public-key cryptosystems which imposes a relatively high computational burden on low-power clients (e.g., mobile devices).
In this work we explore indistinguishability obfuscation for building a Proof-of-Retrievability scheme that provides public verification while the encryption is based on symmetric key primitives. The resulting scheme offers light-weight storing and proving at the expense of longer verification. This could be useful in apations where outsourcing files is usually done by low-power client and verifications can be done by well equipped machines (e.g., a third party server). We also show that the proposed scheme can support dynamic updates. At last, for better assessing our proposed scheme, we give a performance analysis of our scheme and a comparison with several other existing schemes which demonstrates that our scheme achieves better performance on the data owner side and the server side.
Chaowen Guan, Kui Ren, Fangguo Zhang, Florian Kerschbaum, Jia Yu

DTLS-HIMMO: Achieving DTLS Certificate Security with Symmetric Key Overhead

Abstract
Billions of devices are being connected to the Internet creating the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT not only requires strong security, like current Internet applications, but also efficient operation. The recently introduced HIMMO scheme enables lightweight and collusion-resistant identity-based key sharing in a non-interactive way, so that any pair of Internet-connected devices can securely communicate.
This paper firstly reviews the HIMMO scheme and introduces two extensions that e.g. enable implicit credential verification without the need of traditional digital certificates. Then, we show how HIMMO can be efficiently implemented even in resource-constrained devices, enabling combined key agreement and credential verification more efficiently than using ECDH-ECDSA. We further explain how HIMMO helps to secure the Internet and IoT by introducing the DTLS-HIMMO operation mode. DTLS, the datagram version of TLS, is becoming the standard security protocol in the IoT, although it is very frequently discussed that it does not offer the right performance for IoT scenarios. Our design, implementation, and evaluation show that DTLS-HIMMO operation mode achieves the security properties of the DTLS-Certificate security suite while exhibiting the overhead of symmetric-key primitives without requiring changes in the DTLS standard.
Oscar Garcia-Morchon, Ronald Rietman, Sahil Sharma, Ludo Tolhuizen, Jose Luis Torre-Arce

Short Accountable Ring Signatures Based on DDH

Abstract
Ring signatures and group signatures are prominent cryptographic primitives offering a combination of privacy and authentication. They enable individual users to anonymously sign messages on behalf of a group of users. In ring signatures, the group, i.e. the ring, is chosen in an ad hoc manner by the signer. In group signatures, group membership is controlled by a group manager. Group signatures additionally enforce accountability by providing the group manager with a secret tracing key that can be used to identify the otherwise anonymous signer when needed. Accountable ring signatures, introduced by Xu and Yung (CARDIS 2004), bridge the gap between the two notions. They provide maximal flexibility in choosing the ring, and at the same time maintain accountability by supporting a designated opener that can identify signers when needed.
We revisit accountable ring signatures and offer a formal security model for the primitive. Our model offers strong security definitions incorporating protection against maliciously chosen keys and at the same time flexibility both in the choice of the ring and the opener. We give a generic construction using standard tools. We give a highly efficient instantiation of our generic construction in the random oracle model by meticulously combining Camenisch’s group signature scheme (CRYPTO 1997) with a generalization of the one-out-of-many proofs of knowledge by Groth and Kohlweiss (EUROCRYPT 2015). Our instantiation yields signatures of logarithmic size (in the size of the ring) while relying solely on the well-studied decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In the process, we offer a number of optimizations for the recent Groth and Kohlweiss one-out-of-many proofs, which may be useful for other applications.
Accountable ring signatures imply traditional ring and group signatures. We therefore also obtain highly efficient instantiations of those primitives with signatures shorter than all existing ring signatures as well as existing group signatures relying on standard assumptions.
Jonathan Bootle, Andrea Cerulli, Pyrros Chaidos, Essam Ghadafi, Jens Groth, Christophe Petit

Updatable Hash Proof System and Its Applications

Abstract
To tackle with physical attacks to real world cryptosystems, leakage resilient cryptography was developed. In this setting, the adversary is allowed to have access to the internal state of a cryptographic system, thus violates the black-box reduction used in cryptography. Especially when considering continual memory leakage (CML), i.e., there is no predetermined bound on the leakage of the internal information, the task is extremely tough.
In this paper, we solve this problem by introducing a new primitive called updatable hash proof system (UHPS). A UHPS can be viewed as a special Hash proof system (HPS), which served as a fundamental tool in constructing public key encryption (PKE) schemes in both leakage-free and leaky settings. A remarkable property of UHPS is that by simply substituting the HPS component with a UHPS component in a PKE scheme, one obtains a new PKE scheme secure in the CML setting. Moreover, the resulting PKE scheme enjoys the same advantage of the original HPS-based PKE, for instance, still “compatible” with known transforms [8, 20, 24, 32]. We then give instantiations of UHPS from widely-accepted assumptions, including the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption and the d-linear assumption. Interestingly, we notice that when instantiated with concrete assumptions, the resulting chosen-ciphertext secure PKE scheme is by far the most efficient.
Rupeng Yang, Qiuliang Xu, Yongbin Zhou, Rui Zhang, Chengyu Hu, Zuoxia Yu

Server-Aided Revocable Identity-Based Encryption

Abstract
Efficient user revocation in Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) has been a challenging problem and has been the subject of several research efforts in the literature. Among them, the tree-based revocation approach, due to Boldyreva, Goyal and Kumar, is probably the most efficient one. In this approach, a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) periodically broadcasts a set of key updates to all (non-revoked) users through public channels, where the size of key updates is only \(O(r\log \frac{N}{r})\), with N being the number of users and r the number of revoked users, respectively; however, every user needs to keep at least \(O(\log N)\) long-term secret keys and all non-revoked users are required to communicate with the KGC regularly. These two drawbacks pose challenges to users who have limited resources to store their secret keys or cannot receive key updates in real-time.
To alleviate the above problems, we propose a novel system model called server-aided revocable IBE. In our model, almost all of the workloads on users are delegated to an untrusted server which manages users’ public keys and key updates sent by a KGC periodically. The server is untrusted in the sense that it does not possess any secret information. Our system model requires each user to keep just one short secret key and does not require users to communicate with either the KGC or the server during key updating. In addition, the system supports delegation of users’ decryption keys, namely it is secure against decryption key exposure attacks. We present a concrete construction of the system that is provably secure against adaptive-ID chosen plaintext attacks under the DBDH assumption in the standard model. One application of our server-aided revocable IBE is encrypted email supporting lightweight devices (e.g., mobile phones) in which an email server plays the role of the untrusted server so that only non-revoked users can read their email messages.
Baodong Qin, Robert H. Deng, Yingjiu Li, Shengli Liu

Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Commitments from Learning with Errors over Rings

Abstract
We extend a commitment scheme based on the learning with errors over rings (\(\mathsf{RLWE}\)) problem, and present efficient companion zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. Our scheme maps elements from the ring (or equivalently, n elements from \(\mathbb F_q\)) to a small constant number of ring elements. We then construct \(\varSigma \)-protocols for proving, in a zero-knowledge manner, knowledge of the message contained in a commitment. We are able to further extend our basic protocol to allow us to prove additive and multiplicative relations among committed values.
Our protocols have a communication complexity of \(\mathcal {O}(Mn\log q)\) and achieve a negligible knowledge error in one run. Here M is the constant from a rejection sampling technique that we employ, and can be set close to 1 by adjusting other parameters. Previously known \(\varSigma \)-protocols for LWE-related languages only achieved a noticeable or even constant knowledge error (thus requiring many repetitions of the protocol), or relied on “smudging” out the error (which necessitates working over large fields, resulting in poor efficiency).
Fabrice Benhamouda, Stephan Krenn, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Krzysztof Pietrzak

Making Any Identity-Based Encryption Accountable, Efficiently

Abstract
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) provides a compelling solution to the PKI management problem, however it comes with the serious privacy consideration that a trusted party (called the PKG) is required to generate (and hence also know) the secret keys of all users. This inherent key escrow problem is considered to be one of the major reasons hindering the wider utilization of IBE systems. In order to address this problem, Goyal [20] introduced the notion of accountable authority IBE (A-IBE), in which a judge can differentiate the PKG from the user as the source of a decryption software. Via this “tracing” mechanism, A-IBE deters the PKG from leaking the user’s secret key and hence offers a defense mechanism for IBE users against a malicious PKG.
All previous works on A-IBE focused on specialized constructions trying to achieve different properties and efficiency enhancements. In this paper for the first time we show how to add accountability to any IBE scheme using oblivious transfer (OT), with almost the same ciphertext efficiency as the underlying IBE. Furthermore, we extend our generic construction to support identity reuse without losing efficiency. This property is desirable in practice as users may accidentally lose their secret keys and they -naturally- prefer not to abandon their identities. How to achieve this property was open until our work. Along the way, we first modify the generic construction and develop a new technique to provide public traceability generically.
Aggelos Kiayias, Qiang Tang

Practical Threshold Password-Authenticated Secret Sharing Protocol

Abstract
Threshold password-authenticated secret sharing (TPASS) protocols allow a client to secret-share a secret s among n servers and protect it with a password \(\mathsf {pw}\), so that the client can later recover s from any subset of t of the servers using the password \(\mathsf {pw}\), but so that no coalition smaller than t learns anything about s or can mount an offline dictionary attack on the password \(\mathsf {pw}\). Some TPASS protocols have appeared in the literature recently. The protocol by Bagherzandi et al. (CCS 2011) leaks the password if a client mistakenly executes the protocol with malicious servers. The first t-out-of-n TPASS protocol for any \(n>t\) that does not suffer from this shortcoming was given by Camenisch et al. (CRYPTO 2014). This protocol, proved to be secure in the UC framework, requires the client to involve in many communication rounds so that it becomes impractical for the client. In this paper, we present a practical TPASS protocol which is in particular efficient for the client, who only needs to send a request and receive a response. In addition, we have provided a rigorous proof of security for our protocol in the standard model.
Xun Yi, Feng Hao, Liqun Chen, Joseph K. Liu

On Security of Content-Based Video Stream Authentication

Abstract
Content-based authentication (CBA) schemes are used to authenticate multimedia streams while allowing content-preserving manipulations such as bit-rate transcoding. In this paper, we survey and classify existing transform-domain CBA schemes for videos into two categories, and point out that in contrary to CBA for images, there exists a common design flaw in these schemes. We present the principles (based on video coding concept) on how the flaw can be exploited to mount semantic-changing attacks in the transform domain that cannot be detected by existing CBA schemes. We show attack examples including content removal, modification and insertion attacks. Noting that these CBA schemes are designed at the macroblock level, we discuss, from the attacker’s point of view, the conditions in attacking content-based authenticated macroblocks.
Swee-Won Lo, Zhuo Wei, Robert H. Deng, Xuhua Ding

Oblivious Maximum Bipartite Matching Size Algorithm with Applications to Secure Fingerprint Identification

Abstract
The increasing availability and use of biometric data leads to situations when sensitive biometric data is to be handled by entities who may not be fully trusted or otherwise are not authorized to have full access to such data. This calls for mechanisms of provably protecting biometric data while still allowing the computation to take place. Our focus is on privacy-preserving matching of two fingerprints (authentication or identification purposes) using traditional minutia-based representation of fingerprints that leads to the most discriminative fingerprint comparisons. Unlike previous work in the security literature, we would like to focus on algorithms that are guaranteed to find the maximum number of minutiae that can be paired together between two fingerprints leading to more accurate comparisons. To address this problem, we formulate it as a flow network problem and reduce it to finding maximum matching size in bipartite graphs. The resulting problem is in turn reduced to computing the rank of a (non-invertible) matrix, formed as a randomized adjacency matrix of the bipartite graph. We then provide data-oblivious algorithms for matrix rank computation and consecutively finding maximum matching size in a bipartite graph and also extend the algorithms to solve the problem of accurate fingerprint matching. These algorithms lead to their secure counterparts using standard secure two-party or multi-party techniques. Lastly, we implement secure fingerprint matching in the secure two-party computation setting using garbled circuit evaluation. Our experimental results demonstrate that the techniques are efficient, leading to performance similar to that of other fastest secure fingerprint matching techniques, despite higher complexity of our solution that higher accuracy demands.
Marina Blanton, Siddharth Saraph

Practical Invalid Curve Attacks on TLS-ECDH

Abstract
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is based on cyclic groups, where group elements are represented as points in a finite plane. All ECC cryptosystems implicitly assume that only valid group elements will be processed by the different cryptographic algorithms. It is well-known that a check for group membership of given points in the plane should be performed before processing.
However, in several widely used cryptographic libraries we analyzed, this check was missing, in particular in the popular ECC implementations of Oracle and Bouncy Castle. We analyze the effect of this missing check on Oracle’s default Java TLS implementation (JSSE with a SunEC provider) and TLS servers using the Bouncy Castle library. It turns out that the effect on the security of TLS-ECDH is devastating. We describe an attack that allows to extract the long-term private key from a TLS server that uses such a vulnerable library. This allows an attacker to impersonate the legitimate server to any communication partner, after performing the attack only once.
Tibor Jager, Jörg Schwenk, Juraj Somorovsky

Crypto Applications and Attacks

Frontmatter

Challenging the Trustworthiness of PGP: Is the Web-of-Trust Tear-Proof?

Abstract
The OpenPGP protocol provides a long time adopted and widespread tool for secure and authenticated asynchronous communications, as well as supplies data integrity and authenticity validation for software distribution. In this work, we analyze the Web-of-Trust on which the OpenPGP public key authentication mechanism is based, and evaluate a threat model where its functionality can be jeopardized. Since the threat model is based on the viability of compromising an OpenPGP keypair, we performed an analysis of the state of health of the global OpenPGP key repository. Despite the detected amount of weak keypairs is rather low, our results show how, under reasonable assumptions, approximately 70 % of the Web-of-Trust strong set is potentially affected by the described threat. Finally, we propose viable mitigation strategies to cope with the highlighted threat.
Alessandro Barenghi, Alessandro Di Federico, Gerardo Pelosi, Stefano Sanfilippo

Transforming Out Timing Leaks, More or Less

Abstract
We experimentally evaluate program transformations for removing timing side-channel vulnerabilities wrt. security and overhead. Our study of four well-known transformations confirms that their performance overhead differs substantially. A novelty of our work is the empirical investigation of channel bandwidths, which clarifies that the transformations also differ wrt. how much security they add to a program. Interestingly, we observe such differences even between transformations that have been proven to establish timing-sensitive noninterference. Beyond clarification, our findings provide guidance for choosing a suitable transformation for removing timing side-channel vulnerabilities. Such guidance is needed because there is a trade-off between security and overhead, which makes choosing a suitable transformation non-trivial.
Heiko Mantel, Artem Starostin

Small Tweaks Do Not Help: Differential Power Analysis of MILENAGE Implementations in 3G/4G USIM Cards

Abstract
Side-channel attacks are an increasingly important concern for the security of cryptographic embedded devices, such as the SIM cards used in mobile phones. Previous works have exhibited such attacks against implementations of the 2G GSM algorithms (COMP-128, A5). In this paper, we show that they remain an important issue for USIM cards implementing the AES-based MILENAGE algorithm used in 3G/4G communications. In particular, we analyze instances of cards from a variety of operators and manufacturers, and describe successful Differential Power Analysis attacks that recover encryption keys and other secrets (needed to clone the USIM cards) within a few minutes. Further, we discuss the impact of the operator-defined secret parameters in MILENAGE on the difficulty to perform Differential Power Analysis, and show that they do not improve implementation security. Our results back up the observation that physical security issues raise long-term challenges that should be solved early in the development of cryptographic implementations, with adequate countermeasures.
Junrong Liu, Yu Yu, François-Xavier Standaert, Zheng Guo, Dawu Gu, Wei Sun, Yijie Ge, Xinjun Xie

Risk Analysis

Frontmatter

Should Cyber-Insurance Providers Invest in Software Security?

Abstract
Insurance is based on the diversifiability of individual risks: if an insurance provider maintains a large portfolio of customers, the probability of an event involving a large portion of the customers is negligible. However, in the case of cyber-insurance, not all risks are diversifiable due to software monocultures. If a vulnerability is discovered in a widely used software product, it can be used to compromise a multitude of targets until it is eventually patched, leading to a catastrophic event for the insurance provider. To lower their exposure to non-diversifiable risks, insurance providers may try to influence the security of widely used software products in their customer population, for example, through vulnerability reward programs.
We explore the proposal that insurance providers should take a proactive role in improving software security, and provide evidence that this approach is viable for a monopolistic provider. We develop a model which captures the supply and demand sides of insurance, provide computational complexity results on the provider’s investment decisions, and propose different heuristic investment strategies. We demonstrate that investments can reduce non-diversifiable risks and can lead to a more profitable cyber-insurance market. Finally, we detail the relative merits of the different heuristic strategies with numerical results.
Aron Laszka, Jens Grossklags

Lightweight and Flexible Trust Assessment Modules for the Internet of Things

Abstract
In this paper we describe a novel approach to securely obtain measurements with respect to the integrity of software running on a low-cost and low-power computing node autonomously or on request. We propose to use these measurements as an indication of the trustworthiness of that node. Our approach is based on recent developments in Program Counter Based Access Control. Specifically, we employ Sancus, a light-weight hardware-only Trusted Computing Base and Protected Module Architecture, to integrate trust assessment modules into an untrusted embedded OS without using a hypervisor. Sancus ensures by means of hardware extensions that code and data of a protected module cannot be tampered with, and that the module’s data remains confidential. Sancus further provides cryptographic primitives that are employed by our approach to enable the trust management system to verify that the obtained trust metrics are authentic and fresh. Thereby, our trust assessment modules can inspect the OS or application code and securely report reliable trust metrics to an external trust management system. We evaluate a prototypic implementation of our approach that integrates Sancus-protected trust assessment modules with the Contiki OS running on a Sancus-enabled TI MSP430 microcontroller.
Jan Tobias Mühlberg, Job Noorman, Frank Piessens

Confidence Analysis for Nuclear Arms Control: SMT Abstractions of Bayesian Belief Networks

Abstract
How to reduce, in principle, arms in a verifiable manner that is trusted by two or more parties is a hard but important problem. Nations and organisations that wish to engage in such arms control verification activities need to be able to design procedures and control mechanisms that capture their trust assumptions and let them compute pertinent degrees of belief. Crucially, they also will need methods for reliably assessing their confidence in such computed degrees of belief in situations with little or no contextual data. We model an arms control verification scenario with what we call constrained Bayesian Belief Networks (cBBN). A cBBN represents a set of Bayesian Belief Networks by symbolically expressing uncertainty about probabilities and scenario-specific constraints that are not represented by a BBN. We show that this abstraction of BBNs can mitigate well against the lack of prior data. Specifically, we describe how cBBNs have faithful representations within a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver, and that these representations open up new ways of automatically assessing the confidence that we may have in the degrees of belief represented by cBBNs. Furthermore, we show how to perform symbolic sensitivity analyses of cBBNs, and how to compute global optima of under-specified probabilities of particular interest to decision making. SMT solving also enables us to assess the relative confidence we have in two cBBNs of the same scenario, where these models may share some information but express some aspects of the scenario at different levels of abstraction.
Paul Beaumont, Neil Evans, Michael Huth, Tom Plant

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