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Über dieses Buch

The two-volume set, LNCS 9326 and LNCS 9327 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 20th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2015, held in Vienna, Austria, in September 2015.

The 59 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 298 submissions. The papers address issues such as networks and Web security; system security; crypto application and attacks; risk analysis; privacy; cloud security; protocols and attribute-based encryption; code analysis and side-channels; detection and monitoring; authentication; policies; and applied security.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Privacy

Frontmatter

FP-Block: Usable Web Privacy by Controlling Browser Fingerprinting

Online tracking of users is used for benign goals, such as detecting fraudulent logins, but also to invade user privacy. We posit that for non-oppressed users, tracking within one website does not have a substantial negative impact on privacy, while it enables legitimate benefits. In contrast,

cross-domain

tracking negatively impacts user privacy, while being of little benefit to the user.

Existing methods to counter fingerprint-based tracking treat crossdomain tracking and regular tracking the same. This often results in hampering or disabling desired functionality, such as embedded videos. By distinguishing between regular and cross-domain tracking, more desired functionality can be preserved. We have developed a prototype tool,

FP-Block

, that counters cross-domain fingerprint-based tracking while still allowing regular tracking.

FP-Block

ensures that any embedded party will see a different, unrelatable fingerprint for each site on which it is embedded. Thus, the user’s fingerprint can no longer be tracked across the web, while desired functionality is better preserved compared to existing methods.

Christof Ferreira Torres, Hugo Jonker, Sjouke Mauw

Mind-Reading: Privacy Attacks Exploiting Cross-App KeyEvent Injections

Input Method Editor (IME) has been widely installed on mobile devices to help user type non-Latin characters and reduce the number of key presses. To improve the user experience, popular IMEs integrate personalized features like reordering suggestion list of words based on user’s input history, which inevitably turn them into the vaults of user’s secret. In this paper, we make the first attempt to evaluate the security implications of IME personalization and the back-end infrastructure on Android devices. In the end, we identify a critical vulnerability lying under the Android KeyEvent processing framework, which can be exploited to launch cross-app KeyEvent injection (CAKI) attack and bypass the app-isolation mechanism. By abusing such design flaw, an adversary is able to harvest entries from the personalized user dictionary of IME through an ostensibly innocuous app only asking for common permissions. Our evaluation over a broad spectrum of Android OSes, devices, and IMEs suggests such issue should be fixed immediately. All Android versions and most IME apps are vulnerable and private information, like contact names, location, etc., can be easily exfiltrated. Up to hundreds of millions of mobile users are under this threat. To mitigate this security issue, we propose a practical defense mechanism which augments the existing KeyEvent processing framework without forcing any change to IME apps.

Wenrui Diao, Xiangyu Liu, Zhe Zhou, Kehuan Zhang, Zhou Li

Enabling Privacy-Assured Similarity Retrieval over Millions of Encrypted Records

Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) has been studied extensively for its full potential in enabling exact-match queries on encrypted records. Yet, situations for similarity queries remain to be fully explored. In this paper, we design privacy-assured similarity search schemes over millions of encrypted high-dimensional records. Our design employs locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) and SSE, where the LSH hash values of records are treated as keywords fed into the framework of SSE. As direct combination of the two does not facilitate a scalable solution for large datasets, we then leverage a set of advanced hash-based algorithms including multiple-choice hashing, open addressing, and cuckoo hashing, and craft a high performance encrypted index from the ground up. It is not only space efficient, but supports secure and sufficiently accurate similarity search with constant time. Our designs are proved to be secure against adaptive adversaries. The experiment on 10 million encrypted records demonstrates that our designs function in a practical manner.

Xingliang Yuan, Helei Cui, Xinyu Wang, Cong Wang

Privacy-Preserving Link Prediction in Decentralized Online Social Networks

We consider the privacy-preserving link prediction problem in decentralized online social network (OSNs).We formulate the problem as a sparse logistic regression problem and solve it with a novel decentralized two-tier method using alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). This method enables end users to collaborate with their online service providers without jeopardizing their data privacy. The method also grants end users fine-grained privacy control to their personal data by supporting arbitrary public/private data split. Using real-world data, we show that our method enjoys various advantages including high prediction accuracy, balanced workload, and limited communication overhead. Additionally, we demonstrate that our method copes well with link reconstruction attack.

Yao Zheng, Bing Wang, Wenjing Lou, Y. Thomas Hou

Privacy-Preserving Observation in Public Spaces

One method of privacy-preserving accounting or billing in cyber-physical systems, such as electronic toll collection or public transportation ticketing, is to have the user present an encrypted record of transactions and perform the accounting or billing computation securely on them. Honesty of the user is ensured by spot checking the record for some selected surveyed transactions. But how much privacy does that give the user, i.e. how many transactions need to be surveyed? It turns out that due to collusion in mass surveillance

all

transactions need to be observed, i.e. this method of spot checking provides no privacy at all. In this paper we present a cryptographic solution to the spot checking problem in cyber-physical systems. Users carry an authentication device that authenticates only based on fair random coins. The probability can be set high enough to allow for spot checking, but in all other cases privacy is perfectly preserved. We analyze our protocol for computational efficiency and show that it can be efficiently implemented even on platforms with limited computing resources, such as smart cards and smart phones.

Florian Kerschbaum, Hoon Wei Lim

Privacy-Preserving Context-Aware Recommender Systems: Analysis and New Solutions

Nowadays, recommender systems have become an indispensable part of our daily life and provide personalized services for almost everything. However, nothing is for free – such systems have also upset the society with severe privacy concerns because they accumulate a lot of personal information in order to provide recommendations. In this work, we construct privacy-preserving recommendation protocols by incorporating cryptographic techniques and the inherent data characteristics in recommender systems. We first revisit the protocols by Jeckmans et al. and show a number of security issues. Then, we propose two privacy preserving protocols, which compute predicted ratings for a user based on inputs from both the user’s friends and a set of randomly chosen strangers. A user has the flexibility to retrieve either a predicted rating for an unrated item or the Top-N unrated items. The proposed protocols prevent information leakage from both protocol executions and the protocol outputs. Finally, we use the well-known MovieLens 100k dataset to evaluate the performances for different parameter sizes.

Qiang Tang, Jun Wang

Cloud Security

Frontmatter

Rich Queries on Encrypted Data: Beyond Exact Matches

We extend the searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) protocol of [Cash et al., Crypto’13] adding support for range, substring, wildcard, and phrase queries, in addition to the Boolean queries supported in the original protocol. Our techniques apply to the basic singleclient scenario underlying the common SSE setting as well as to the more complex Multi-Client and Outsourced Symmetric PIR extensions of [Jarecki et al., CCS’13]. We provide performance information based on our prototype implementation, showing the practicality and scalability of our techniques to very large databases, thus extending the performance results of [Cash et al., NDSS’14] to these rich and comprehensive query types.

Sky Faber, Stanislaw Jarecki, Hugo Krawczyk, Quan Nguyen, Marcel Rosu, Michael Steiner

Extended Proxy-Assisted Approach: Achieving Revocable Fine-Grained Encryption of Cloud Data

Attribute-based encryption has the potential to be deployed in a cloud computing environment to provide scalable and fine-grained data sharing. However, user revocation within ABE deployment remains a challenging issue to overcome, particularly when there is a large number of users. In this work, we introduce an extended proxy-assisted approach, which weakens the trust required of the cloud server. Based on an all-or-nothing principle, our approach is designed to discourage a cloud server from colluding with a third party to hinder the user revocation functionality.We demonstrate the utility of our approach by presenting a construction of the proposed approach, designed to provide efficient cloud data sharing and user revocation. A prototype was then implemented to demonstrate the practicality of our proposed construction.

Yanjiang Yang, Joseph K. Liu, Kaitai Liang, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Jianying Zhou

Batch Verifiable Computation of Polynomials on Outsourced Data

Secure outsourcing of computation to cloud servers has attracted much attention in recent years. In a typical outsourcing scenario, the client stores its data on a cloud server and later asks the server to perform computations on the stored data. The verifiable computation (VC) of Gennaro, Gentry, Parno (Crypto 2010) and the homomorphic MAC (HomMAC) of Backes, Fiore, Reischuk (CCS 2013) allow the client to verify the server’s computation with substantially less computational cost than performing the outsourced computation. The existing VC and HomMAC schemes that can be considered practical (do not required heavy computations such as computing fully homomorphic encryptions), are limited to compute linear and quadratic polynomials on the outsourced data. In this paper, we introduce a

batch verifiable computation

(BVC) model that can be used when the computation of the same function on multiple datasets is required, and construct two schemes for computing polynomials of high degree on the outsourced data. Our schemes allow

efficient client verification

,

efficient server computation

, and

composition

of computation results. Both schemes allow new elements to be added to each outsourced dataset. The second scheme also allows new datasets to be added. A unique feature of our schemes is that the storage required at the server for storing the authentication information, stays the same as the number of outsourced datasets is increased, and so the

server storage overhead

(the ratio of the server storage to the total size of the datasets) approaches 1. In all existing schemes this ratio is ≥ 2. Hence, our BVC can effectively halve the required server storage.

Liang Feng Zhang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini

CloudBI: Practical Privacy-Preserving Outsourcing of Biometric Identification in the Cloud

Biometric identification has been incredibly useful in the law enforcement to authenticate an individual’s identity and/or to figure out who someone is, typically by scanning a database of records for a close enough match. In this work, we investigate the privacy-preserving biometric identification outsourcing problem, where the database owner outsources both the large-scale encrypted database and the computationally intensive identification job to the semi-honest cloud, relieving itself from data storage and computation burden. We present new privacy preserving biometric identification protocols, which substantially reduce the computation burden on the database owner. Our protocols build on new biometric data encryption, distance-computation and matching algorithms that novelly exploit inherent structures of biometric data and properties of identification operations. A thorough security analysis shows that our solutions are practically-secure, and the ultimate solution offers a higher level of privacy protection than the-state-of-the-art on biometric identification outsourcing.We evaluate our protocols by implementing an efficient privacy-preserving fingerprint-identification system, showing that our protocols meet both the security and efficiency needs well, and they are appropriate for use in various privacy-preserving biometric identification applications.

Qian Wang, Shengshan Hu, Kui Ren, Meiqi He, Minxin Du, Zhibo Wang

Protocols and Attribute-based Encryption

Frontmatter

Typing and Compositionality for Security Protocols: A Generalization to the Geometric Fragment

We integrate, and improve upon, prior relative soundness results of two kinds. The first kind are typing results showing that any security protocol that fulfils a number of sufficient conditions has an attack if it has a well-typed attack. The second kind considers the parallel composition of protocols, showing that when running two protocols in parallel allows for an attack, then at least one of the protocols has an attack in isolation. The most important generalization over previous work is the support for all security properties of the geometric fragment.

Omar Almousa, Sebastian Mödersheim, Paolo Modesti, Luca Viganò

Checking Trace Equivalence: How to Get Rid of Nonces?

Security protocols can be successfully analysed using formal methods. When proving security in symbolic settings for an unbounded number of sessions, a typical technique consists in abstracting away fresh nonces and keys by a bounded set of constants. While this abstraction is clearly sound in the context of secrecy properties (for protocols without else branches), this is no longer the case for equivalence properties.

In this paper, we study how to soundly get rid of nonces in the context of equivalence properties. We show that nonces can be replaced by constants provided that each nonce is associated to two constants (instead of typically one constant for secrecy properties). Our result holds for deterministic (simple) protocols and a large class of primitives that includes

e.g.

standard primitives, blind signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs.

Rémy Chrétien, Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune

Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption with Short Ciphertext and Decryption Key

Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (ABBE) is a combination of Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) and Broadcast Encryption (BE). It allows a broadcaster (or encrypter) to broadcast an encrypted message that can only be decrypted by the receivers who are within a predefined user set

and

satisfy the access policy specified by the broadcaster. Compared with normal ABE, ABBE allows direct revocation, which is important in many real-time broadcasting applications such as Pay TV. In this paper, we propose two novel ABBE schemes that have distinguishing features: the first scheme is key-policy based and has short ciphertext and constant size decryption key; and the second one is ciphertext-policy based and has constant size ciphertext and short decryption key. Both of our schemes allow access policies to be expressed using AND-gate with positive, negative, and wildcard symbols, and are proven secure under the Decision

n

-BDHE assumption without random oracles.

Tran Viet Xuan Phuong, Guomin Yang, Willy Susilo, Xiaofeng Chen

Accountable Authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption with White-Box Traceability and Public Auditing in the Cloud

As a sophisticated mechanism for secure fine-grained access control, ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a highly promising solution for commercial applications such as cloud computing. However, there still exists one major issue awaiting to be solved, that is, the prevention of key abuse. Most of the existing CP-ABE systems missed this critical functionality, hindering the wide utilization and commercial application of CP-ABE systems to date. In this paper, we address two practical problems about the key abuse of CP-ABE: (1) The key escrow problem of the semi-trusted authority; and, (2) The malicious key delegation problem of the users. For the semi-trusted authority, its misbehavior (i.e., illegal key (re-)distribution) should be caught and prosecuted. And for a user, his/her malicious behavior (i.e., illegal key sharing) need be traced.We affirmatively solve these two key abuse problems by proposing the first accountable authority CP-ABE with whitebox traceability that supports policies expressed in any monotone access structures. Moreover, we provide an auditor to judge publicly whether a suspected user is guilty or is framed by the authority.

Jianting Ning, Xiaolei Dong, Zhenfu Cao, Lifei Wei

Code Analysis and Side-Channels

Frontmatter

DexHunter: Toward Extracting Hidden Code from Packed Android Applications

The rapid growth of mobile application (or simply app) economy provides lucrative and profitable targets for hackers. Among OWASP’s top ten mobile risks for 2014, the lack of binary protections makes it easy to reverse, modify, and repackage Android apps. Recently, a number of packing services have been proposed to protect Android apps by hiding the original executable file (i.e.,

dex

file). However, little is known about their effectiveness and efficiency. In this paper, we perform the first systematic investigation on such services by answering two questions: (1) what are the major techniques used by these services and their effects on apps? (2) can the original

dex

file in a packed app be recovered? If yes, how? We not only reveal their techniques and evaluate their effects, but also propose and develop a novel system, named

DexHunter

, to extract

dex

files protected by these services. It is worth noting that

DexHunter

supports both the Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) and the new Android Runtime (ART). The experimental results show that

DexHunter

can extract

dex

files from packed apps effectively and efficiently.

Yueqian Zhang, Xiapu Luo, Haoyang Yin

Identifying Arbitrary Memory Access Vulnerabilities in Privilege-Separated Software

Privilege separation is a widely used technique to secure complex software systems. With privilege separation, software components are divided into several partitions and these partitions can only communicate through limited interfaces. However, the interfaces still provide a channel for one partition to influence code in other partitions. As a result, certain memory access patterns can be leveraged by attackers to perform arbitrary memory access. We refer to this type of memory access errors by the acronym

DUI (Dereference Under the Influence)

. In this paper, we present a systematic method to detect vulnerabilities leading to DUI through binary analysis, and to estimate the capability attackers can obtain through DUI exploits. The evaluation shows that our approach can accurately identify vulnerable code that leads to arbitrary memory access in real-world software components and programs, when they are transformed to privilege-separated designs.

Hong Hu, Zheng Leong Chua, Zhenkai Liang, Prateek Saxena

vBox: Proactively Establishing Secure Channels Between Wireless Devices Without Prior Knowledge

Establishing secure channels between two wireless devices without any prior knowledge is challenging, especially when such devices only have very simple user interface. Most existing authentication and key negotiation solutions leverage the received signal strength (RSS) of wireless signals, and the security guarantees depend on the environments too much; in a static environment of less motion, the adversaries could control or predict the RSS of legitimate devices. We propose

vBox

in this paper, a

proactive

method to establish secure channels between wireless devices, without the assumption on environments. By holding and waving two devices to communicate, the owner creates a virtual “shield box”. The adversaries outside the box cannot send signals with stable RSS into the box, so the legitimate devices can easily be authenticated based on the variation of RSS. At the same time, the adversaries cannot correctly measure or detect the RSS of wireless signals transmitted between the in-box devices, and then they can directly transmit secret keys in plaintext. Then, after the simple operation by the owner for a few seconds, the authenticated nodes will securely communicate using the shared secret key. We implement the vBox prototype on commercialoff- the-shelf ZigBee devices, and evaluate it with extensive experiments under the normal case and several attack scenarios. The experiment results and security analysis show that, vBox establishes secure channels handily against various attacks and is suitable for different environments.

Wei Wang, Jingqiang Lin, Zhan Wang, Ze Wang, Luning Xia

Detection and Monitoring

Frontmatter

Accurate Specification for Robust Detection of Malicious Behavior in Mobile Environments

The need to accurately specify and detect malicious behavior is widely known. This paper presents a novel and convenient way of accurately specifying malicious behavior in mobile environments by taking Android as a representative platform of analysis and implementation. Our specification takes a sequence-based approach in declaratively formulating a malicious action, whereby any two consecutive securitysensitive operations are connected by either a control or taint flow. It also captures the invocation context of an operation within an app’s component type and lifecycle/callback method. Additionally, exclusion of operations that are invoked from UI-related callback methods can be specified to indicate an action’s stealthy execution portions. We show how the specification is sufficiently expressive to describe malicious patterns that are commonly exhibited by mobile malware. To show the usefulness of the specification, and to demonstrate that it can derive stable and distinctive patterns of existing Android malware, we develop a static analyzer that can automatically check an app for numerous securitysensitive actions written using the specification. Given a target app’s uncovered behavior, the analyzer associates it with a collection of known malware families. Experiments show that our obfuscation-resistant analyzer can associate malware samples with their correct family with an accuracy of 97.2%, while retaining the ability to differentiate benign apps from the profiled malware families with an accuracy of 97.6%. These results positively show how the specification can lend to robust mobile malware detection.

Sufatrio, Tong-Wei Chua, Darell J. J. Tan, Vrizlynn L. L. Thing

A Bytecode Interpreter for Secure Program Execution in Untrusted Main Memory

Physical access to a system allows attackers to read out RAM through cold boot and DMA attacks. Thus far, counter measures protect only against attacks targeting disk encryption keys, while the remaining memory content is left vulnerable. We present a bytecode interpreter that protects code and data of programs against memory attacks by executing them without using RAM for sensitive content. Any program content within memory is encrypted, for which the interpreter utilizes TRESOR [1], a cold boot resistant implementation of the AES cipher. The interpreter was developed as a Linux kernel module, taking advantage of the CPU instruction sets AVX for additional registers, and AESNI for fast encryption. We show that the interpreter is secure against memory attacks, and that the overall performance is only a factor of 4 times slower than the performance of Python. Moreover, the performance penalty is mostly induced by the encryption.

Maximilian Seitzer, Michael Gruhn, Tilo Müller

Learning from Others: User Anomaly Detection Using Anomalous Samples from Other Users

Machine learning is increasingly used as a key technique in solving many security problems such as botnet detection, transactional fraud, insider threat, etc. One of the key challenges to the widespread application of ML in security is the lack of labeled samples from real applications. For known or common attacks, labeled samples are available, and, therefore, supervised techniques such as multi-class classification can be used. However, in many security applications, it is difficult to obtain labeled samples as each attack can be unique. In order to detect novel, unseen attacks, researchers used unsupervised outlier detection or one-class classification approaches, where they treat existing samples as benign samples. These methods, however, yield high false positive rates, preventing their adoption in real applications.

This paper presents a local outlier factor (LOF)-based method to automatically generate both benign and malicious training samples from unlabeled data. Our method is designed for applications with multiple users such as insider threat, fraud detection, and social network analysis. For each target user, we compute LOF scores of all samples with respect to the target user’s samples. This allows us to identify (1) other users’ samples that lie in the boundary regions and (2) outliers from the target user’s samples that can distort the decision boundary. We use the samples from other users as malicious samples, and use the target user’s samples as benign samples after removing the outliers.

We validate the effectiveness of our method using several datasets including access logs for valuable corporate resources, DBLP paper titles, and behavioral biometrics of user typing behavior. The evaluation of our method on these datasets confirms that, in almost all cases, our technique performs significantly better than both one-class classification methods and prior two-class classification methods. Further, our method is a general technique that can be used for many security applications.

Youngja Park, Ian M. Molloy, Suresh N. Chari, Zenglin Xu, Chris Gates, Ninghi Li

Authentication

Frontmatter

Towards Attack-Resistant Peer-Assisted Indoor Localization

Peer-assisted smartphone localization, which leverages pairwise acoustic ranging among nearby peer phones to refine location estimation, significantly pushes the accuracy limit of WiFi-based indoor localization. Unfortunately, this technique is designed for non-adversarial settings. Dishonest peers may cheat in their distance measurements. Outside attackers may interfere with the acoustic ranging by continually broadcasting interference signals. In this paper, we propose countermeasures against each of these attacks. We first present an algorithm that can identify peers that are not cheating in the current localization, by searching for devices that can be embedded into the same plane according to their pairwise distances. We also design a robust acoustic ranging method exploiting signal modulation, which can defend effectively against intentional interference of outside attackers. Experimental results demonstrate that our countermeasures can greatly improve the robustness of peer-assisted localization.

Jingyu Hua, Shaoyong Du, Sheng Zhong

Leveraging Real-Life Facts to Make Random Passwords More Memorable

User-chosen passwords fail to provide adequate security. System-assigned random passwords are more secure but suffer from memorability problems. We argue that the system should remove this burden from users by assisting with the memorization of randomly assigned passwords. To meet this need, we aim to apply the scientific understanding of long-term memory. In particular, we examine the efficacy of augmenting a system-assigned password scheme based on textual recognition by providing users with

verbal

cues

-real-life facts corresponding to the assigned keywords. In addition, we explore the usability gain of including images related to the keywords along with the verbal cues. We conducted a multi-session in-lab user study with 52 participants, where each participant was assigned three different passwords, each representing one study condition. Our results show that the textual recognition-based scheme offering verbal cues had a significantly higher login success rate (94%) as compared to the control condition, i.e., textual recognition without verbal cues (61%). The comparison between textual and graphical recognition reveals that when users were provided with verbal cues, adding images did not significantly improve the login success rate, but it did lead to faster recognition of the assigned keywords. We believe that our findings make an important contribution to understanding the extent to which different types of cues impact the usability of system-assigned passwords.

Mahdi Nasrullah Al-Ameen, Kanis Fatema, Matthew Wright, Shannon Scielzo

The Emperor’s New Password Creation Policies: An Evaluation of Leading Web Services and the Effect of Role in Resisting Against Online Guessing

An Evaluation of Leading Web Services and the Effect of Role in Resisting Against Online Guessing

While much has changed in Internet security over the past decades, textual passwords remain as the dominant method to secure user web accounts and they are proliferating in nearly every new web services. Nearly every web services, no matter new or aged, now enforce some form of password creation policy. In this work, we conduct an extensive empirical study of 50 password creation policies that are currently imposed on high-profile web services, including 20 policies mainly from US and 30 ones from mainland China. We observe that no two sites enforce the same password creation policy, there is little rationale under their choices of policies when changing policies, and Chinese sites generally enforce more lenient policies than their English counterparts.

We proceed to investigate the effectiveness of these 50 policies in resisting against the primary threat to password accounts (i.e. online guessing) by testing each policy against two types of weak passwords which represent two types of online guessing. Our results show that among the total 800 test instances, 541 ones are accepted: 218 ones come from trawling online guessing attempts and 323 ones come from targeted online guessing attempts. This implies that, currently, the policies enforced in leading sites largely fail to serve their purposes, especially vulnerable to targeted online guessing attacks.

Ding Wang, Ping Wang

Policies

Frontmatter

A Theory of Gray Security Policies

This paper generalizes traditional models of security policies, from specifications of

whether

programs are secure, to specifications of

how

secure programs are. This is a generalization from qualitative, black-and-white policies to quantitative, gray policies. Included are generalizations from traditional definitions of safety and liveness policies to definitions of gray-safety and gray-liveness policies. These generalizations preserve key properties of safety and liveness, including that the intersection of safety and liveness is a unique allow-all policy and that every policy can be written as the conjunction of a single safety and a single liveness policy. It is argued that the generalization provides several benefits, including that it serves as a unifying framework for disparate approaches to security metrics, and that it separates–in a practically useful way–specifications of how secure systems are from specifications of how secure users require their systems to be.

Donald Ray, Jay Ligatti

Factorization of Behavioral Integrity

We develop a bisimulation-based nonintereference property that describes the allowed dependencies between communication behaviors of different integrity levels. The property is able to capture all possible combinations of integrity levels for the “presence” and “content” of actual communications. Channels of low presence integrity and high content integrity can be used to model the effect of Message Authentication Codes or the consequence of Denial of Service Attacks. In case the distinction between “presence” and “content” is deliberately blurred, the noninterference property specialises to a classical process-algebraic property (called SBNDC). A compositionality result is given to facilitate a structural approach to the analysis of concurrent systems.

Ximeng Li, Flemming Nielson, Hanne Riis Nielson

Checking Interaction-Based Declassification Policies for Android Using Symbolic Execution

Mobile apps can access a wide variety of secure information, such as contacts and location. However, current mobile platforms include only coarse access control mechanisms to protect such data. In this paper, we introduce

interaction-based declassification policies

, in which the user’s interactions with the app constrain the release of sensitive information. Our policies are defined extensionally, so as to be independent of the app’s implementation, based on sequences of security-relevant events that occur in app runs. Policies use LTL formulae to precisely specify which secret inputs, read at which times, may be released. We formalize a semantic security condition,

interaction-based noninterference

, to define our policies precisely. Finally, we describe a prototype tool that uses symbolic execution of Dalvik bytecode to check interaction-based declassification policies for Android, and we show that it enforces policies correctly on a set of apps.

Kristopher Micinski, Jonathan Fetter-Degges, Jinseong Jeon, Jeffrey S. Foster, Michael R. Clarkson

Applied Security

Frontmatter

Enhancing Java Runtime Environment for Smart Cards Against Runtime Attacks

Smart cards are mostly deployed in security-critical environments in order to provide a secure and trusted access to the provisioned services. These services are delivered to a cardholder using the Service Provider’s (SPs) applications on his or her smart card(s). These applications are at their most vulnerable state when they are executing. There exist a variety of runtime attacks that can circumvent the security checks implemented either by the respective application or the runtime environment to protect the smart card platform, user and/or application. In this paper, we discuss the Java Runtime Environment and a potential threat model based on runtime attacks. Subsequently, we discussed the counter-measures that can be deployed to provide a secure and reliable execution platform, along with an evaluation of their effectiveness, incurred performance-penalty and latency.

Raja Naeem Akram, Konstantinos Markantonakis, Keith Mayes

Making Bitcoin Exchanges Transparent

Bitcoin exchanges are a vital component of the Bitcoin ecosystem. They are a gateway from the classical economy to the cryptocurrency economy, facilitating the exchange between fiat currency and bitcoins. However, exchanges are also single points of failure, operating outside the Bitcoin blockchain, requiring users to entrust them with their funds in order to operate. In this work we present a solution, and a proof-of-concept implementation, that allows exchanges to prove their solvency, without publishing any information of strategic importance.

Christian Decker, James Guthrie, Jochen Seidel, Roger Wattenhofer

Web-to-Application Injection Attacks on Android: Characterization and Detection

Vulnerable Android applications (or apps) are traditionally exploited via malicious apps. In this paper, we study an underexplored class of Android attacks which do not require the user to install malicious apps, but merely to visit a malicious website in an Android browser. We call them web-to-app injection (or W2AI) attacks, and distinguish between different categories ofW2AI side-effects. To estimate their prevalence, we present an automated W2AIScanner to find and confirm W2AI vulnerabilities. We analyze real apps from the official Google Play store and found 286 confirmed vulnerabilities in 134 distinct applications. This findings suggest that these attacks are pervasive and developers do not adequately protect apps against them. Our tool employs a novel combination of static analysis, symbolic execution and dynamic testing. We show experimentally that this design significantly enhances the detection accuracy compared with an existing state-of-the-art analysis.

Behnaz Hassanshahi, Yaoqi Jia, Roland H. C. Yap, Prateek Saxena, Zhenkai Liang

All Your Voices are Belong to Us: Stealing Voices to Fool Humans and Machines

In this paper, we study voice impersonation attacks to defeat humans and machines. Equipped with the current advancement in automated speech synthesis, our attacker can build a very close model of a victim’s voice after learning only a

very limited

number of samples in the victim’s voice (e.g., mined through the Internet, or recorded via physical proximity). Specifically, the attacker uses

voice morphing

techniques to transform its voice - speaking any arbitrary message - into the victim’s voice. We examine the aftermaths of such a voice impersonation capability against two important applications and contexts: (1) impersonating the victim in a

voice-based user authentication

system, and (2) mimicking the victim in

arbitrary speech

contexts (e.g., posting fake samples on the Internet or leaving fake voice messages).

We develop our voice impersonation attacks using an off-the-shelf voice morphing tool, and evaluate their feasibility against state-of-theart

automated

speaker verification algorithms (application 1) as well as

human

verification (application 2). Our results show that the automated systems are largely ineffective to our attacks. The average rates for rejecting fake voices were under 10-20% for most victims. Even human verification is vulnerable to our attacks. Based on two online studies with about 100 users, we found that only about an average 50% of the times people rejected the morphed voice samples of two

celebrities

as well as

briefly familiar users

.

Dibya Mukhopadhyay, Maliheh Shirvanian, Nitesh Saxena

Balloon: A Forward-Secure Append-Only Persistent Authenticated Data Structure

We present Balloon, a forward-secure append-only persistent authenticated data structure. Balloon is designed for an initially trusted author that generates events to be stored in a data structure (the Balloon) kept by an untrusted server, and clients that query this server for events intended for them based on keys and snapshots. The data structure is persistent such that clients can query keys for the current or past versions of the data structure based upon snapshots, which are generated by the author as new events are inserted. The data structure is authenticated in the sense that the server can verifiably prove all operations with respect to snapshots created by the author. No event inserted into the data structure prior to the compromise of the author can be modified or deleted without detection due to Balloon being publicly verifiable. Balloon supports efficient (non-)membership proofs and verifiable inserts by the author, enabling the author to verify the correctness of inserts without having to store a copy of the Balloon. We formally define and prove that Balloon is a secure authenticated data structure.

Tobias Pulls, Roel Peeters

On the Fly Design and Co-simulation of Responses Against Simultaneous Attacks

The growth of critical information systems in size and complexity has driven the research community to propose automated response systems. These systems must cope with the steady progress of the attacks’ sophistication, coordination and effectiveness. Unfortunately, existing response systems still handle attacks independently, suffering thereby from (i) efficiency issues against coordinated attacks (e.g. DDoS), (ii) conflicts between parallel responses, and (iii) unexpected side effects of responses on the system. We, thus, propose in this paper a new response model against simultaneous threats. Our response is dynamically designed based on a new definition of capability-aware logic anticorrelation, and modeled using the Situation Calculus (SC) language. Even though a response can prevent or reduce an attack scenario, it may also have side effects on the system and unintentionally ease one of the attackers to progress on its scenario. We address this issue by proposing a response co-simulator based on SC planning capabilities. This co-simulator considers each response candidate apart and reasons, from the current system’s and attackers’ state, to assess the achieved risk mitigation on the protected system. Experimentations were led to highlight the benefits of our solution.

Léa Samarji, Nora Cuppens-Boulahia, Frédéric Cuppens, Serge Papillon, Waël Kanoun, Samuel Dubus

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