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4. Conclusion

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Erschienen in: The Dynamics of Judicial Independence

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter compares the case studies of judicial independence in Malaysia and Pakistan. As observed by Professor Anja Seibert-Fohr, the comparison of judicial independence across legal systems stands to shed light on the legal principle more generally. This chapter therefore aspires to offer insight into the idea of an independent judiciary and how it is likely to take shape and work in different legal systems. The second part analyses and compares judicial independence in Malaysia and Pakistan in contrast with England by looking at the evolution of judicial independence and the contextual factors that can be seen to have influenced this process. The third and fourth parts evaluate the competing universal and pragmatic and context-sensitive theories of judicial independence by comparing the results observed to the results expected under each of the two theories. The fifth part suggests some broader implications and lessons learned in terms of future judicial independence studies and judicial reform projects.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Judicial Independence in Pakistan

Seibert-Fohr (2012), p. 1280. See also Larkins (1996), p. 626.

Krygier (2012), pp. 236–237.

Larkins (1996), p. 614.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 626.

See discussion in Chaps. 2 and 3.

See, e.g., the discussion of the 2007 Lawyers’ Movement in Chap. 3.

Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42.

Tushnet (2012), p. 1255. See also Jacobsohn (2012) and Jackson (2012), pp. 71–72.

Tushnet (2012), p. 1256.

Razak (2011); but see Glenn (2013) for a critique of the notion of creating a single national identity through a nation-state.

Although the unifying force of the Privy Council should not be overstated as it remained sensitive to local needs in constitutional matters as demonstrated through its liberal interpretations of Commonwealth constitutions. For example, in Edwards v AG Canada, [1930] AC 123, the Privy Council held that the British North America Act, 1867, which established the Canadian constitutional framework, should be interpreted broadly. Lord Sankey wrote that the Act “planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. … Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board – it is certainly not their desire – to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation so that the Dominion to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, may be mistress in her own house”.

Wu (1999), pp. xvii, 94, 322–325. Rashid argued in 1978 that Malaysians have been “too much swayed” by British legal developments without appreciating the different context, especially the existence of Malaysia’s written constitution: Rashid (1978), p. 150. See also Thio (2006).

Stone Sweet (2000), p. 1.

Marshall (1984).

Ibid, p. 3.

Ibid, pp. 4, 210.

Ibid, p. 4.

Ibid, p. 210.

Ibid, p. 9.

Ibid, p. 217.

Heard (2014), p. 2.

Ibid.

Ibid, pp. 11–12, 19–21.

See, e.g., Provincial Judges Reference, [1997] 3 SCR 3, in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that the independence of the judiciary was an unwritten constitutional principle and legally required the executive and legislature to establish judicial salaries through a commission process as direct negotiations between the judiciary and the other branches of government would infringe perceptions of judicial independence.

McLachlin (2005).

Heard (2014), p. 2.

Ibid, pp. 178–204.

Ibid, pp. 164–165.

Act of Settlement 1701, 12 and 13 Will. c. 2. See also the Commissions and Salaries of Judges Act of 1760, 1 Geo. 3, c. 23.

Shetreet (1985), pp. 600–602.

Shapiro (1986), p. 100.

Frankenberg (2012), pp. 186–187.

Ibid, p. 187.

Newberg writes that the vice-regal tradition was incorporated into Pakistan’s earlier constitutions: Newberg (1995), pp. 10, 69.

North (1993). See also Glenn (2014), Chap. 1.

Tushnet (2012), p. 220.

See also Newberg (1995), p. 60.

Larkins (1996), pp. 614, 618–619.

Goldsworthy (2012), p. 690.

Ibid, p. 691.

Shapiro (1986), pp. 32–35.

Ibid, p. 32.

A (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56.

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24.

Council of Europe (1953).

Public Prosecutor v Dato Yap Peng, [1987] 2 MLJ 311.

The Internal Security Act 1960, 82 for example, was enacted pursuant to Art. 149(1) of the Constitution, which permits the legislation to infringe otherwise protected fundamental liberties. It has since been replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, 747, which has also been enacted under Art. 149(1).

Mydans (2008).

The News (2014).

Ibid.

International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace (2008). See discussion in Chap. 1.

See discussion in Chap. 1.

It may be argued by universal scholars that while judicial independence has a universal meaning it operates within local circumstances and therefore may be used in different ways. While it is possible to distil an abstract definition of judicial independence in this way, such as ‘measures take to promote the perception of impartiality’, this approach cannot be reconciled with the universal theory and its model rules. If context really matters for judicial independence, what is the purpose of the prescribed rules and what are they designed to accomplish? It appears that the rules of the universal theory seek to encourage a particular form of judicial institution, being one that enforces property rights and protects human rights.

See discussion in Chap. 1.

While Art. IV of the Basic Principles provides that “[t]here shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision”, the provision appears to target government variations of a particular judicial decree as opposed to a general change in the law that would overturn the legal effect of a judicial decision: United Nations (1985).

Guarnieri and Piana (2012).

For a discussion of judicial independence as an essentially contested concept see Levinson (2006) and MacDonald and Kong (2012).

Shapiro (1986).

Neudorf (2015).

Seibert-Fohr concludes that due process is the essential feature of judicial independence, which includes the perception of an impartial adjudicator.

See, e.g., conventions related to the English judiciary in Chap. 1.

See, e.g., Sindh High Court Bar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 879, para 12, where Pakistan’s Supreme Court set out a story about the judiciary’s struggle for independence, which benefited the citizens and secured their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court observed that Pakistan’s judiciary had “all along been under the wrath of adventurers imposing their dictatorial terms obviously for their ulterior designs”.

Shapiro (2004), p. 23.

Chang (2002), pp. 10–11, 135.

See Dyzenhaus (1997). These meanings also track different definitions of deference appearing in the Oxford English Dictionary where on the one hand deference refers to “[s]ubmission to the acknowledged superior claims, skill, judgement, or other qualities, of another” and “the manifestation of a disposition to yield to the claims or wishes of another”; while, on the other hand, deference refers to “respectful acknowledgement of the authority of, out of practical respect or regard to”: Oxford English Dictionary “deference”.

North (2003), pp. 6–7.

Chang (2002), pp. 70–71. See also Shapiro (2004), p. 23 who argues that a strong human rights enforcement role can cause legitimacy problems for a new court.

Chang HJ (2002) Kicking away the ladder: development strategy in historical perspective. Anthem Press, London

Council of Europe (1953) European Convention on Human Rights

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Heard A (2014) Canadian constitutional conventions: the marriage of law & politics, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Toronto

International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace (2008) Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence

Jackson VC (2012) Comparative constitutional law: methodologies. In: Rosenfeld M, Sajó A (eds) The Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Jacobsohn GJ (2012) The formation of constitutional identities. In: Rosenfeld M, Sajó A (eds) The Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

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Larkins CM (1996) Judicial independence and democratization: a theoretical and conceptual analysis. Am J Comp Law 44:605

Levinson S (2006) Identifying ‘independence’. Bost Univ Law Rev 86:1297

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North DC (1993) Economic performance through time. Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel. Available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html. Accessed 26 Aug 2016

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Titel: Conclusion
verfasst von: Lorne Neudorf
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Dynamics of Judicial Independence
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-49883-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-49884-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49884-3_4

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