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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Conclusion

verfasst von : Keith Dowding, Brad R. Taylor

Erschienen in: Economic Perspectives on Government

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This concluding chapter brings together the major lessons of the book to consider some major criticisms of economics as a discipline and its application to government. Although such criticisms are not without merit, the economic method remains a useful tool for the positive and normative analysis of government.

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Titel: Conclusion
verfasst von: Keith Dowding
Brad R. Taylor
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Economic Perspectives on Government
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-19706-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-19707-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19707-0_6