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Erschienen in:
Information Sharing in Military and Security Operations Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

10. Conditions for Effective Intelligence and Information Sharing: Insights from Dutch–Japanese Cooperation in Iraq, 2003–2005

verfasst von : Chiyuki Aoi

Erschienen in: Information Sharing in Military Operations

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Dutch and Japanese forces were deployed together in Al Muthanna province in Iraq from 2003 to 2005. This chapter investigates intelligence and information sharing between the forces, including during the pre-deployment phase on the Japanese side. Dutch–Japanese intelligence and information sharing remained lopsided throughout the deployment, a situation that can be attributed to Japan’s lack of readiness to conduct operations in a region remote from its direct defense interests and to the likelihood that it was not producing security-related intelligence beyond its areas of mandate and operations. The inadequacy of the campaign authority that the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) received from its political masters was such that its own effectiveness, as well as the Dutch operation, depended on the “goodwill” of the Dutch forces tasked to assist the JSDF, especially with regard to information and intelligence.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Information Sharing Between U.S. and Japanese Forces Before, During, and After Operation Tomodachi
Nächstes Kapitel Information Sharing in Military Organizations: A Sociomaterial Perspective
Fußnoten
1
Although the concept derives from the British doctrine of Peace Support Operations, it remains relevant in stabilization. See Aoi (2011a).
 
2
This is from a letter from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence (June 6, 2003) cited in Ten Cate and Brocades Zaalberg (2015, p. 9), and from Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [Second Chamber of the States-General] (Dutch parliament) 2005, pp. 36–38.
 
3
Al Muthanna was one of the largest provinces in Iraq and was also sparsely populated (the population of the provincial capital, Samawah, was only 130,000). Also, the province was relatively poor, as were other Shia-held areas, having been neglected by the Baath regime.
 
4
For a detailed account of the Dutch military’s role in crisis management, see Brocades Zaalberg (2006).
 
5
The on-going legal revisions undertaken by the Abe administration would allow for limited JSDF security roles.
 
6
For a review of JSDF involvement in international missions, see Aoi (2009, 2011b).
 
7
Iraq Special Measures Law (Iraku ni okeru Jindo Fukko Katsudo oyobi Anzen Kakuho Sien Katudo no Jisshi ni Kansuru Tokubetu Sochi Ho), enacted on H. 15.7.26 (26 July 2003). The Basic Plan based upon the Iraq Special measures Law (Iraku Jindo Fuko Shien Tokuso Ho ni Motoduku Taio Sochi ni Kansuru Kihon Keikaku), enacted on H.15, 12.9 (9 December 2003). JASDF was mandated, under the same Special Measures Law, to provide logistical support for transport (of JSDF personnel and coalition troops, humanitarian and reconstruction goods, and later including UN humanitarian goods and personnel) from Kuwait to Iraq.
 
8
The Basic Plan stated that the GSDF would remain “within” (naka de) the multinational force.
 
9
In one case, a riot against the GSDF broke out (JGSDF 2007, pp. 92–119, at p. 106).
 
10
Although the GSDF was relatively spared of attacks by irregular elements, more than 10 attacks targeted its base, and some of these incidents resulted in physical damage to the base. The GSDF also endured attempts to attack its personnel using IEDs in later rotations.
 
11
Of this, about $2.7 million U.S. in CIMIC funds and over $1.8 million U.S. from the Peace Fund (later Stability Fund) were from Dutch sources.
 
12
For an analysis of Japanese ODA in Iraq and Afghanistan from a stabilization perspective, see Aoi (2011b). For an analysis from the ODA perspective, see Yasutomo (2014).
 
13
According to a press source, the GSDF completed the following reconstruction projects: total 277 treatments and medical technical assistance at four hospitals; provision of 53,500 tons of water; repair for 36 schools, 31 roads and bridges, 30 medical facilities (clinics, warehouses, etc.), 22 cultural facilities, 14 water provision facilities; total number of Iraqis employed were 488,020 (Sankei Shinbun Sha 2006). This record accords closely with the government’s response to a question in the Diet (i.e., parliament/congress).
 
14
I was unable to find out why and how this occurred, due to the lack of access to relevant personnel on the Japanese side. For example, the GSDF would hold press conferences or school visits (which routinely were held separately) 30 min prior to those of the Dutch, and often reveal information about CIMIC projects, thereby reducing the impact of Dutch information operations.
 
Literatur
Aoi, C. (2009). Beyond ‘activism-lite’? Issues in Japanese participation in peace operations. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 13(1/2), 72–100.CrossRef
Aoi, C. (2011a). Legitimacy and the use of armed force: Stability missions in the post-Cold War era. London: Routledge, Contemporary Security Studies Series.
Aoi, C. (2011b). Japan and stabilisation: Contributions and preparedness. RUSI Journal, 156(1), 52–57.CrossRef
Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2006). Soldiers and civil power: Supporting or substituting civil authorities in modern peace operations. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Japan Ground Self-Defence Force, Center for GSDF Lessons Learned (CGLL). (2007). Iraku jindō fukkō shien katsudō no kyōkun (Zenhen) [Lessons learned from Iraq: Humanitarian reconstruction assistance]. Shūshin (October), 92–119.
Sankei Shinbun Sha [Sankei Newspaper]. (2006). Dare mo kakanakatta Iraqu Jieitai no shinjitsu [The truth about the SDF in Iraq that no one wrote about]. Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun Sha.
Sato, M. (2007). Iraq Jieitai “Sento-ki” [An Iraq self-defense force “battle diary”]. Tokyo: Kodansha.
Ten Cate, A., & Brocades Zaalberg, T. (2015). A gentle occupation: Dutch military operations in Iraq. Leiden: Leiden University Press.
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2005). Vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 29 521, nr. 17, bijlage: Eindevaluatie van de Nederlandse deelname aan de Stabilisation Force in Irak, 2003–2005. [Second Chamber of the States-General [Dutch parliament], parliamentary year 2005–2006, 29 521, no. 17, Appendix: Final Evaluation of the Dutch Contribution to the Stabilisation Force in Iraq, 2003–2005].
UK Ministry of Defence. (2004). The military contribution to peace support operations (Joint Warfare Publication 3-50) (2nd ed.). Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.
Van de Meulen, J., & Kawano, H. (2008). Accidental neighbours: Japanese and Dutch troops in Iraq. In J. Soeters & P. Manigart (Eds.), Military cooperation in multinational peace operations: Managing cultural diversity and crisis response (pp. 166–179). London: Routledge.
Yanagisawa, K. (2013). Kensho: Kantei no Iraku Senso—Moto Boei Kanryo ni yoru Hihan to Jisei [Analysis: Critique and self-reflection by a former Defense Ministry bureaucrat]. Tokyo: Iwanami.
Yasutomo, D. T. (2014). Japan’s civil–military diplomacy on the banks of the Rubicon. London: Routledge.
Metadaten
Titel
Conditions for Effective Intelligence and Information Sharing: Insights from Dutch–Japanese Cooperation in Iraq, 2003–2005
verfasst von
Chiyuki Aoi
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Buch
Information Sharing in Military Operations

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-42817-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-42819-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42819-2_10

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