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Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptology 1/2015

01.01.2015

Confined Guessing: New Signatures From Standard Assumptions

verfasst von: Florian Böhl, Dennis Hofheinz, Tibor Jager, Jessica Koch, Christoph Striecks

Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptology | Ausgabe 1/2015

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Abstract

We put forward a new technique to construct very efficient and compact signature schemes. Our technique combines several instances of only a mildly secure signature scheme to obtain a fully secure scheme. Since the mild security notion we require is much easier to achieve than full security, we can combine our strategy with existing techniques to obtain a number of interesting new (stateless and fully secure) signature schemes. Concretely, we get (1) A scheme based on the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption in pairing-friendly groups. Signatures contain \(\mathbf {O}(1)\) and verification keys \(\mathbf {O}(\log k)\) group elements, where \(k\) is the security parameter. Our scheme is the first fully secure CDH-based scheme with such compact verification keys. (2) A scheme based on the (nonstrong) RSA assumption in which both signatures and verification keys contain \(\mathbf {O}(1)\) group elements. Our scheme is significantly more efficient than existing RSA-based schemes. (3) A scheme based on the Short Integer Solutions (SIS) assumption. Signatures contain \(\mathbf {O}(\log (k)\cdot m)\) and verification keys \(\mathbf {O}(n\cdot m) {\mathbb {Z}}_p\)-elements, where \(p\) may be polynomial in \(k\), and \(n,m\) denote the usual SIS matrix dimensions. Compared to state-of-the-art SIS-based schemes, this gives very small verification keys, at the price of slightly larger signatures. In all cases, the involved constants are small, and the arising schemes provide significant improvements upon state-of-the-art schemes. The only price we pay is a rather large (polynomial) loss in the security reduction. However, this loss can be significantly reduced at the cost of an additive term in signature and verification key size.

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Fußnoten
1
There are cleverer ways of embedding a computational problem into a signature scheme (e.g., partitioning [9, 34]). These techniques, however, usually require special algebraic features such as homomorphic properties or pairing-friendly groups. For instance, partitioning is not known to apply in the (standard-model) RSA setting.
 
2
Since we guess \(t^*\) from a small set of possible tags, we call our technique “confined guessing.”
 
3
This neglects a subtlety: \(A\)must specify the messages to be signed for the \(i^*\)-th instance in advance, while \(B\)expects to make adaptive signing queries. This difference can be handled using standard techniques (i.e., chameleon hashing [23]).
 
4
It will become clear in the security proof that actually a function with weaker security properties than a fully secure PRF is sufficient for our application. However, we stick to standard PRF security for simplicity. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
 
5
There is a subtlety here, since we assume to know \(\varepsilon (k)\). To obtain a black-box reduction, we can guess \(\lfloor \log _2(\varepsilon (k))\rfloor \) which would result in an additional security loss of a factor \(k\) in the reduction.
 
6
Technically, [20, Lemma 2.3] assumes an EUF-naCMA secure scheme (i.e., one which is secure against non-adaptive attacks with not necessarily distinct signed messages). However, it is easy to see that the corresponding reduction to EUF-naCMA security actually leads to a distinct-message attack with overwhelming probability. (In a nutshell, the EUF-naCMA secure scheme is used to sign honestly and independently generated chameleon hash images, resp. signature verification keys. The probability for a collision of two such keys must be negligible by the security of these building blocks).
 
7
Similar to footnote 5, here, we assume to know the number of signature queries \(q\ge 0\).
 
8
\(\mathsf {P}_{(\kappa ,b)}(t)\) can be computed in expected polynomial time but not in strict polynomial time. However, one can simply pick an upper bound \(\overline{\mu }\) and set \(\mathsf {P}_{(\kappa ,b)}(t) = p\) for some arbitrary but fix prime \(p\) if \(\mu _t> \overline{\mu }\) for the resolving index of \(t\) \(\mu _t\). For a proper \(\overline{\mu }\) the event \(\mu _t> \overline{\mu }\) will only occur with negligible probability (see Theorem 5.6, Game 3).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Confined Guessing: New Signatures From Standard Assumptions
verfasst von
Florian Böhl
Dennis Hofheinz
Tibor Jager
Jessica Koch
Christoph Striecks
Publikationsdatum
01.01.2015
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Journal of Cryptology / Ausgabe 1/2015
Print ISSN: 0933-2790
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-1378
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-014-9183-z

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