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Erschienen in:
Introduction: Democracy and Financial Order – Legal Perspectives Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Constitutional and Administrative Pluralism in the EU System of Banking Supervision

verfasst von : Matej Avbelj

Erschienen in: Democracy and Financial Order: Legal Perspectives

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between the developing European Union (EU) system of banking supervision and the theories of constitutional pluralism. It questions the remaining epistemic, explanatory, and normative value of these theories with regard to the EU system of banking supervision. The argument is broken down into three sections. First, the chapter briefly describes the system of banking supervision in the European Union and the pluralist challenges that it spurs. Second, it schematically maps out the leading theories of constitutional pluralism to test, by way of their application to the field of EU banking supervision, their epistemic, explanatory, and normative value. Finally, to the extent that this value has diminished, the chapter offers another pluralist theory, not a constitutional one, which could supplement the identified epistemic, explanatory, and normative gaps. This is a theory of administrative pluralism.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Rational Choice and Its Limits
Nächstes Kapitel Debt, Default, and Two Liberal Theories of Justice
Fußnoten
1
Buras (2013), p. 2.
 
2
For a detailed report, see the IMF (2013).
 
3
Ferran (2014); Speyer (2013).
 
4
European Banking Authority (2016).
 
5
European Securities and Markets Authority (2016).
 
6
European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (2016).
 
7
European Systematic Risk Board (2016).
 
8
IMF (2013), p. 9.
 
9
For a more detailed discussion, see Howarth and Quaglia (2013), p. 103.
 
10
European Central Bank (2014), pp. 6–9.
 
11
Id.
 
12
See also Moloney (2014), pp. 1609, 1618 who also observed that “the allocation of supervisory power under the SSM is specific and enumerated.”
 
13
European Central Bank (2014), p. 7.
 
14
Id.
 
15
Id., pp. 7–8.
 
16
Id., p. 10. A bank is considered significant if it meets any of the following conditions: (a) The total value of its assets exceeds €30 billion or—unless the total value of its assets is below €5 billion—exceeds 20 % of national GDP; (b) it is one of the three most significant credit institutions established in a Member State; (c) it is a recipient of direct assistance from ESM; and (d) the total values of its assets exceeds €5 billion and the ratio of its cross-border assets and/or liabilities in more than one other participating Member State to its total assets and/or liabilities is above 20 %. Notwithstanding the fulfillment of these criteria, the SSM may declare a bank significant to ensure the consistent application of high-quality supervisory standards.
 
17
See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1024/2013 of 15 Oct. 2013, art. 6, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63–89 9 [hereinafter Council Regulation No. 1024/2013].
 
18
Id., at art. 6(2).
 
19
Id., at art. 6(1).
 
20
Id., at art. 6(3).
 
21
Moloney (2014).
 
22
Id.
 
23
European Commission Memo (2014)
 
24
Id.
 
25
Id.
 
26
Schoenmaker (2014), p. 4.
 
27
The SRM Regulation provides that the prescribed contributions of national banks to the SRF are levied by the respective Member States and transferred by them to the SRF, following the special Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualization of Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (Council of Europe 2016).
 
28
The build-up of SRM started in January 2016.
 
29
Moloney (2014), p. 1640.
 
30
Id.
 
31
See the fears expressed in the British Parliament “that the Single Supervisory Mechanism proposals may seriously undermine the authority of the EBA in its relations with the ECB.” (UK Parliament 2016).
 
32
See generally, Fahey (2011), p. 581.
 
33
Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v. High Auth. of the European Coal and Steel Cmty., 1958 E.C.R. 133.
 
34
Howarth and Quaglia (2013), p. 25.
 
35
See Statement by the Council on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the Conferral of Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank Pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, Council of Europe (2016). For details, see Regulation 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 Amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority—European Banking Authority—regarding the Conferral of Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 20–22 (EU).
 
36
See Council Regulation No. 1024/2013, supra note 17, at para. 32.
 
37
Id.
 
38
Moloney (2014), p. 1665.
 
39
What follows draws closely on Avbelj and Komárek (2012), pp. 2-9.
 
40
MacCormick (1995), pp. 259, 265.
 
41
Id., p. 265.
 
42
MacCormick (1999), p. 104.
 
43
MacCormick (2001).
 
44
Walker (2002), p. 333.
 
45
Most recently, see generally Walker (2014).
 
46
See Avbelj and Komárek (2012), p. 4.
 
47
The ensuing paragraphs draw directly on Avbelj (2008), pp. 1, 11–22.
 
48
Weiler (2003), p. 23.
 
49
Walker (2000), p. 14.
 
50
Walker (2002), p. 338.
 
51
Walker (2005), p. 398.
 
52
Kumm (2009), p. 258.
 
53
Kumm (2005), pp. 262, 292.
 
54
Maduro (2003).
 
55
Id., p. 525.
 
56
Pernice (2002), pp. 511, 514.
 
57
Id., pp. 518–519.
 
58
Gerstenberg and Sabel (2002), pp. 289, 292.
 
59
See generally, Marks et al. (1996a, b).
 
60
See generally, e.g., Martinico and Pollicino (2012).
 
61
See, e.g., Avbelj (2013), pp. 191, 191–212.
 
62
Halberstam (2012), p. 85.
 
63
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13, 134 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 366 (14 Jan. 2014), paras. 1–24 [hereinafter Judgment of Jan. 14, 2014].
 
64
Halberstam (2012).
 
65
Id., p. 109.
 
66
Id., p. 110.
 
67
Kingsbury et al. (2005), pp. 15–61.
 
68
See, e.g., Peters (2009), p. 397.
 
69
Kingsbury et al. (2005).
 
70
Krisch (2006), p. 278.
 
71
Id., p. 278.
 
72
See generally, de Graaf et al. (2012).
 
73
de Lucia (2012), pp. 17, 17–45.
 
74
See generally Hartmann (2013), p. 695.
 
75
Id., p. 704.
 
76
Id., p. 705.
 
77
Id., p. 706.
 
78
Id., p. 709.
 
79
Id.
 
80
Id., p. 708.
 
81
Id.
 
82
Id.; Krisch (2006).
 
83
Judgment of Jan. 14 (2014), supra note 63.
 
84
Hartmann (2013), p. 706.
 
85
On the need to distinguish between pluralism and plurality, see generally Walker (2008), p. 336.
 
86
For a more in-depth discussion, see Avbelj (2012).
 
87
See, e.g., Dawson et al. (2015), p. 151, in observing many potential strains in the relationship between the ECB and the EBA, as well as between the participating and non-participating Member States, but simultaneously noting “a series of governance safeguards to both protect the cooperative nature of EBA-ECB relations and to address the concerns of … all Member States.” Id.
 
88
Council Regulation 1024/2013, art. 3, 2013 O.J. (L 287) (EC).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Constitutional and Administrative Pluralism in the EU System of Banking Supervision
verfasst von
Matej Avbelj
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Democracy and Financial Order: Legal Perspectives

Print ISBN: 978-3-662-55567-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-55568-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55568-2_5