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This paper discusses how biases and heuristics, e.g. the anchoring effect, affect consumer choices on the energy market. The first part is devoted to analysing the Dyson judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which concerned the EU vacuum cleaner energy label. It is submitted that the Dyson case provides a powerful illustration of how consumers’ choices can be affected by anchoring effect. The paper’s second part discusses, at a more abstract and theoretical level, in what manner biases and heuristics affect consumer choices. In particular, the paper analyses several strategies of categorisation, which are discernible in consumer decision-making.
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Judgment of 11 November 2015 (Case T-544/13), Dyson Ltd. vs. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:836.
OJ 2010 L 153, p. 1.
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Dyson Judgment, para. 46.
Dyson Judgment, para. 47.
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We draw here on the usage by Sunstein ( 2011), p. 1354.
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- Consumer Protection in Energy Markets: Selected Insights from Behavioural Law and Economics and Regulatory Practice
Mariusz J. Golecki
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