2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue
verfasst von : Jean-Sébastien Coron, Christophe Giraud, Emmanuel Prouff, Soline Renner, Matthieu Rivain, Praveen Kumar Vadnala
Erschienen in: Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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To guarantee the security of a cryptographic implementation against Side Channel Attacks, a common approach is to formally prove the security of the corresponding scheme in a model as pertinent as possible. Nowadays, security proofs for masking schemes in the literature are usually conducted for models where only the
manipulated data
are assumed to leak. However in practice, the leakage is better modeled encompassing the memory transitions as
e.g.
the Hamming distance model. From this observation, a natural question is to decide at which extent a countermeasure proved to be secure in the first model stays secure in the second. In this paper, we look at this issue and we show that it must definitely be taken into account. Indeed, we show that a countermeasure proved to be secure against second-order side-channel attacks in the first model becomes vulnerable against a first-order side-channel attack in the second model. Our result emphasize the issue of porting an implementation from devices leaking only on the manipulated data to devices leaking on the memory transitions.