Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
The paper has substantially benefited from the comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees.
This paper develops a simple principal-agent model to determine the occupational choice of some individuals between entering the labor market as workers and setting up a labor-managed firm. The start-up requires external credit, which is provided by a monopolistic lender. We show that the occupational choice depends on both the reservation utility of workers and the loan profitability of the bank.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Alchian, A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777–795.
Becchetti, L., Castriota, S., & Tortia, E. (2009). Productivity, wages and intrinsic motivation in social enterprises. Small Business Economics, 41, 379–399. CrossRef
Ben-Ner, A. (1988). The life cycle of worker-owned firms in market economies. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10, 297–313. CrossRef
Bonin, J., Jones, D., & Putterman, L. (1993). Theoretical and empirical studies of producer cooperatives: will ever the twain meet? Journal of Economic Literature, 31, 1290–1320.
Conte, M. and Jones, D. (1991). On the entry of employee-owned firms: theory and evidence from US manufacturing Industries, 1870–1960. Working paper.
Delbono, F., & Reggiani, C. (2013). Cooperative firms and the crisis: evidence from some Italian mixed oligopolies. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 84, 383–397. CrossRef
Dow, G., & Putterman, L. (2000). Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43, 319–336. CrossRef
Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324–340. CrossRef
Hueth, B., Marcoul, P. and Ginder, R. (2005). Cooperative formation and financial contracting in agricultural markets. Working Paper.
Jossa, B., & Casavola, P. (1993). The problem of under-investment in firms managed by workers. Alternatives to capitalism: the economics of partnership. Macmillan: London.
Laffont, J., & Martimort, D. (2009). The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model. Princeton University Press.
Meade, J. (1972). The theory of labor-managed firms and profit-sharing. Economic Journal, 82, 402–428. CrossRef
Pérotin, V. (2006). Entry, exit, and the business cycle: are cooperatives different? Journal of Comparative Economics, 34, 295–316. CrossRef
Podivinsky, J., & Stewart, G. (2007). Why is labour-managed firm entry so rare?: an analysis of UK manufacturing data. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 63, 177–192. CrossRef
Putterman, L., & Skillman, G. (1992). The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams. Journal of Comparative Economics, 16, 596–618. CrossRef
Rooney, P. (1992). Employee ownership and worker participation: effects on health and safety. Economics Letters, 39, 323–328. CrossRef
Russell, R., & Hanneman, R. (1992). Cooperatives and the business cycle: the Israeli case. Journal of Comparative Economics, 16, 701–715. CrossRef
Staber, U. (1993). Worker cooperatives and the business cycle: are cooperatives the answer to unemployment? American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 52, 129–143. CrossRef
Van Bekkum, O., & Bijman, J. (2006). Innovations in cooperative ownership: converted and hybrid listed cooperatives. In Paper presented in 7th International Conference of Management in AgriFood Chains and Networks. Netherlands: Ede.
Viganò, F., & Salustri, A. (2015). Matching profit and non-profit needs: How NPOs and cooperatives contribute to growth in time of crisis. A quantitative approach. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 86, 157–178. CrossRef
- Cooperative firms in hard times
- Springer US
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© BBL, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, Neuer Inhalt/© hww, Neuer Inhalt/© julien tromeur | Fotolia