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Erschienen in:
2008 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Cores and Related Solution Concepts
Erschienen in: Models in Cooperative Game Theory
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In this chapter we consider payoff vectors
x
= (
x
i
)
i
∈
N
∈ ℝ
n
, with
x
i
being the payoff to be given to player
i
∈
N
, under the condition that cooperation in the grand coalition is reached. Clearly, the actual formation of the grand coalition is based on the agreement of all players upon a proposed payoff in the game. Such an agreement is, or should be, based on all other cooperation possibilities for the players and their corresponding payoffs.