Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
Under conditions of growing interconnectedness of the global economy, more and more stakeholders are exposed to risks and costs resulting from business activities that are neither regulated nor compensated for by means of national governance. The changing distribution of risks poses a threat to the legitimacy of business firms that normally derive their legitimacy from operating in compliance with the legal rules of democratic nation states. However, during the process of globalization, the regulatory power of nation states has been weakened and many production processes have been shifted to states with weak regulatory frameworks where businesses operate outside the reach of the democratic nation state. As a result, business firms have to address the various legitimacy challenges of their operations directly and cannot rely upon the legitimacy of their regulatory environment. These developments challenge the dominant approach to corporate governance that regards shareholders as the only stakeholder group in need of special protection due to risks not covered by contracts and legal regulations. On the basis of these considerations, we argue for a democratization of corporate governance structures in order to compensate for the governance deficits in their regulatory environment and to cope with the changing allocation of risks and costs. By way of democratic involvement of various stakeholders, business firms may be able to mitigate the redistribution of individual risk and address the resulting legitimacy deficits even when operating under conditions of regulatory gaps and governance failure.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2009). Strenghtening international regulation through transnational new governance. Overcoming the orchestration deficit. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42, 501–578.
AccountAbility and Utopies. (2007). Critical friends— The emerging role of stakeholder panels in corporate governance, reporting and assurance. AccountAbility and Utopies, London.
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777–795.
Areva. (2007). Consultative process between Areva and a panel of stakeholders. Session 2. Summary. Retrieved November 30, 2012 from www.areva.com/mediatheque/liblocal/docs/pdf/develop-durable/hors-mediacenter/areva-pdf_stackholders-session-3_en.pdf.
Asher, C. C., Mahoney, J. M., & Mahoney, J. T. (2005). Towards a property rights foundation for a stakeholder theory of the firm. Journal of Management and Governance, 9, 5–32.
Bäckstrand, K. (2004). Scientisation vs. civic expertise in environmental governance: Eco-feminist, eco-modern and post-modern responses. Environmental Politics, 13, 695–714.
Banerjee, S. B. (2008). Corporate social responsibility: The good, the bad and the ugly. Critical Sociology, 34, 51–79.
Barley, S. R. (2007). Corporations, democracy, and the public good. Journal of Management Inquiry, 16, 201–215.
Beck, U. (1992). Risk society. Towards a new modernity. London: Sage.
Beck, U. (1997). The reinvention of politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (1999). World risk society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (2000). What is globalization?. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (2008). Reframing power in the globalized world. Organization Studies, 29, 793–804.
Berle, A. A. (1932). For whom corporate managers are trustees: A note. Harvard Law Review, 45, 1365–1372.
Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New Brunswick: Transaction.
Bhimani, A., & Soonawalla, K. (2005). From conformance to performance: The corporate responsibilities continuum. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24, 165–174.
Black, B., & Kraakman, R. (1996). A self-enforcing model of corporate law. Harvard Law Review, 109, 1911–1982.
Blair, M. (1995). Ownership and control: Rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Blair, M. (2003). Shareholder value, corporate governance, and corporate performance. A post-Enron reassessment of the conventional wisdom. In P. K. Cornelius & B. Kogut (Eds.), Corporate governance and capital flows in a global economy (pp. 53–82). Oxford: University Press.
Blair, M. (2005). Closing the theory gap: How the economic theory of property rights can help bring “stakeholders” back into theories of the firm. Journal of Management and Governance, 9, 33–39.
Boatright, J. (2004). Employee governance and the ownership of the firm. Business Ethics Quarterly, 14, 1–21.
Boatright, J. R. (2011). The implications of new governance for corporate governance. In I. Pies & P. Koslowski (Eds.), Corporate citizenship and new governance. The political role of the firm (pp. 133–146). Dordrecht: Springer.
BP. (2013). Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel website. Retrieved January 9, 2013 from http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9004751&contentId=7008791.
Bradley, M., Schipani, C. A., Sundaram, A. K., & Walsh, J. P. (1999). The purposes and accountability of the corporation in contemporary society: Corporate governance at a crossroads. Law and Contemporary Problems, 62, 9–86.
Chandler, A. D., & Mazlish, B. (Eds.). (2005). Leviathans: Multinational corporations and the new global history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
China Labor Watch. (2011). Tragedies of globalization: The truth behind electronics sweatshops. Retrieved August 9, 2011 from http://chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/20110712.pdf.
Clapham, A. (2006). Human rights obligations of non-state-actors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, J. M. (1916). The changing basis of economic responsibility. The Journal of Political Economy, 24, 209–229.
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405.
Coase, R. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.
Coglianese, C. (2009). Corporate governance and legitimacy. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 32, 159–167.
Crane, A. (2013). Modern slavery as a management practice: Exploring the conditions and capabilities for human exploitation. Academy of Management Review, 38, 49–69.
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Canella, A. A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review, 28, 371–382.
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22, 20–47.
den Hond, F., & de Bakker, F. G. A. (2007). Ideologically motivated activism: How activist groups influence corporate social change activities. Academy of Management Review, 32, 901–924.
Dodd, E. M. (1932). For whom are corporate managers trustees? Harvard Law Review, 45, 1145–1163.
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16, 49–64.
Dow Chemical. (2012). Company website. Retrieved November 24, 2012 from http://www.dow.com/sustainability/advisory_council/.
Driver, C., & Thompson, G. (2002). Corporate governance and democracy: The stakeholder debate revisited. Journal of Management and Governance, 6, 111–130.
Dryzek, J. S. (1999). Transnational democracy. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 7, 30–51.
Dryzek, J. S., & Niemeyer, S. (2008). Discursive representation. American Political Science Review, 102(4), 481–493.
Easterbrook, F. H., & Fischel, D. R. (1996). The economic structure of corporate law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
EDF. (2012). Company website. Retrieved November 24, 2012 from http://about-us.edf.com/strategy-and-sustainable-development/socially-responsible-investing/management-of-sustainable-development-43703.html.
Elhauge, E. (2005). Sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest. New York Universtiy Law Review, 80, 733–869.
Elms, H., & Phillips, R. A. (2009). Private security companies and institutional legitimacy: Corporate and stakeholder responsibility. Business Ethics Quarterly, 19, 403–432.
Evan, W. M., & Freeman, R. E. (1988). A stakeholder theory of the modern corpo-ration: Kantian capitalism. In T. L. Beauchamp & N. E. Bowie (Eds.), Ethical theory and business (pp. 97–106). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder perspective. Boston: Pitman.
Freeman, R. E., Harrison, J. S., Wicks, A. C., Parmar, B., & de Colle, S. (2010). Stakeholder theory. The state of the art. Cambridge: University Press.
Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. New York Times September 13, Section 6 (Magazine), pp. 32–33.
Gephard, R. P, Jr., Van Maanen, J., & Oberlechner, T. (2009). Organizations and risk in late modernity. Organization Studies, 30, 141–155.
Gomez, P.-Y., & Korine, H. (2005). Democracy and the evolution of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13, 739–752.
Gomez, P.-Y., & Korine, H. (2008). Entrepreneurs and democracy. A political theory of corporate governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Habermas, J. (1998). Three normative models of democracy. In J. Habermas (Ed.), The Inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory (pp. 239–252). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons. The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9, 193–206.
Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R. (2001). The end of history for corporate law. Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 439–468.
Haufler, V. (2001). A public role for the private sector: Industry self-regulation in a global economy. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Held, D. (2002). Law of states, law of peoples: Three models of sovereignty. Legal Theory, 8, 1–44.
Hertz, N. (2001). The silent takeover. Global capitalism and the death of democracy. London: Random House.
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependency perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28, 383–396.
Holcim. (2012). Mandate: Holcim external report review panel. Retrieved November 24, 2012 from www.holcim.com/fileadmin/templates/CORP/doc/SD12/ERP_mandate.pdf.
International Labour Organization. (2012). Summary of the ILO 2012 global estimate of forced labour. Retrieved January 23, 2012 from http://www.ilo.org/sapfl/Informationresources/ILOPublications/WCMS_181953/lang-en/index.htm.
Jamali, D., Safieddine, A. M., & Rabbath, M. (2008). Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility synergies and interrelationships. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16, 443–459.
Jensen, M. J. (2002). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function. Business Ethics Quarterly, 12, 235–256.
Jensen, M. J., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.
Judge, W. Q. (2009). Toward a global theory of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(2), iii–iv.
Jürgens, U., Naumann, K., & Rupp, J. (2000). Shareholder value in an adverse environment: The German case. Economy and Society, 29(1), 54–79.
Kemp, S. (2011). Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: Lessons from the land of OZ. Journal of Management and Governance, 15, 539–556.
Keohane, R. O. (2003). Global governance and democratic accountability. In D. Held & M. Koenig-Archibugi (Eds.), Taming globalization. Frontiers of governance (pp. 130–158). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kingfisher. (2012). Company website. Retrieved November 24, 2012 from www.kingfisher.com/netpositive/inde.asp?pageid=28.
Kinley, D., & Nolan, J. (2008). Human rights, corporations and the global economy: An international law perspective. In A. G. Scherer & G. Palazzo (Eds.), Handbook of research on global corporate citizenship. London: Edward Elgar.
Kobrin, S. J. (2001). Sovereignity@bay: Globalization, multinational enterprise, and the international political aystem. In A. M. Rugman & T. L. Brewer (Eds.), The oxford handbook of international business (pp. 181–205). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lan, L. L., & Heracleous, L. (2010). Rethinking agency theory. The view from law. Academy of Management Review, 35(2), 294–314.
Langtry, B. (1994). Stakeholders and the responsibilities of business. Business Ethics Quarterly, 4, 431–443.
Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. (2003). Misery loves companies: Rethinking social initiatives by business. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48, 268–305.
Matten, D. (2004). The impact of the risk society thesis on environmental politics and management in a globalizing economy—principles, proficiency, perspectives. Journal of Risk Research, 7, 377–398.
Matten, D., & Crane, A. (2005a). Corporate citizenship. Towards an extended theoretical conceptualization. Academy of Management Review, 30, 166–179.
Matten, D., & Crane, A. (2005b). What is stakeholder democracy? Perspectives and issues. Business Ethics: A European Review, 14, 6–13.
McBarnet, D. (2007). Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: The new corporate accountability. In D. McBarnet, A. Voiculescu, & T. Campbell (Eds.), The new accountability. Corporate social responsibility and the law (pp. 9–56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McSweeny, B. (2008). Maximizing shareholder-value. A panacea for economic growth or a recipe for economic and social disintegration? Critical Perspectives on International Business, 4, 55–74.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. The American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340–363.
Muchlinski, P. (2012). Implementing the new UN corporate human rights framework: Implications for corporate law, governance, and regulation. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22, 145–177.
Mythen, G. (2005). Employment, individualization and insecurity: Rethinking the risk society perspective. The Sociological Review, 53, 129–149.
OECD. (2004). OECD principles of corporate governance. Paris: OECD.
Osland, J. M. (2003). Broadening the debate. The pros and cons of globalization. Journal of Management Inquiry, 12, 137–154.
Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2006). Shareholders should welcome knowledge workers as directors. Journal of Management and Governance, 10, 325–345.
Palazzo, G., & Scherer, A. G. (2006). Corporate legitimacy as deliberation: A communicative framework. Journal of Business Ethics, 66, 71–88.
Parker, C. (2002). The open corporation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Pellizzoni, L. (2001). Democracy and the governance of uncertainty. The case of agricultural gene technologies. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 86, 205–222.
Peter, F. (2004). Choice, consent, and the legitimacy of market transactions. Economics and Philosophy, 20(1), 1–18.
Pigou, A. C. (1932). The economics of welfare. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Pirson, M., & Turnbull, S. (2011). Corporate governance, risk management, and the financial crisis: An information processing view. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19, 459–470.
Rhee, R. J. (2008). Corporate ethics, agency, and the theory of the firm. Journal of Business and Technology Law, 3, 1101–1124.
Rockström, J., et al. (2009). A safe operating space for humanity. Nature, 461, 472–475.
Romme, A. G. L., & Endenburg, G. (2006). Construction principles and design rules in the case of circular design. Organization Science, 17, 287–297.
Rose, J. M. (2007). Corporate directors and social responsibility: Ethics versus shareholder value. Journal of Business Ethics, 73, 319–331.
Scherer, A. G., Baumann-Pauly, D., & Schneider, A. (2013). Democratizing corporate governance: Compensating for the democratic deficit of corporate political activity and corporate citizenship. Business and Society, 52, 473–514.
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2007). Toward a political conception of corporate responsibility: Business and society seen from a habermasian perspective. Academy of Management Review, 32, 1096–1120.
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Baumann, D. (2006). Global rules and private actors: Toward a new role of the transnational corporation in global governance. Business Ethics Quarterly, 16, 505–532.
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Matten, D. (2009). Globalization as a challenge for business responsibilities. Business Ethics Quarterly, 19, 327–347.
Schreyögg, G., & Steinmann, H. (1987). Strategic control: A new perspective. Academy of Management Review, 12, 91–103.
Shell. (2012). Company website. Retrieved January 9, 2013 http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2011/ourperformance/externalreviewcommittee.html.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52, 737–783.
Spar, D. L., & La Mure, L. T. (2003). The power of activism. Assessing the impact of NGOs on global business. California Management Review, 45(3), 78–101.
Spitzeck, H., & Hansen, E. G. (2010). Stakeholder governance: How stakeholders influence corporate decision making. Corporate Governance, 10, 378–391.
Spitzeck, H., Hansen, E. G., & Grayson, D. (2011). Joint management-stakeholder committees: A new path to stakeholder governance? Corporate Governance, 11, 560–568.
Stout, L. A. (2002). Bad and not so bad arguments for shareholder primacy. Southern California Law Review, 75, 1189–1209.
Stout, L. A. (2008). Why we should stop teaching Dodge vs Ford. Virginia Law and Business Review, 3, 163–176.
Strange, S. (2000). The declining authority of states. In D. Held (Ed.), The global transformations reader. An introduction to the globalization debate (pp. 148–155). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20, 571–610.
Sundaram, A. K., & Inkpen, A. C. (2004). The corporate objective revisited. Organization Science, 15, 350–363.
Tirole, J. (2001). Corporate governance. Econometrica, 69, 1–35.
Tricker, B. (2011). Re-inventing the limited liability company. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19, 384–393.
Turnbull, S. (1994). Stakeholder democracy: Redesigning the governance of firms and bureaucracies. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 23, 321–360.
Turnbull, S. (2000). Corporate charters with competitive advantage. St. John’s Law Review, 74, 89–174.
Williams, C. A., & Conley, J. M. (2005). Is there an emerging fiduciary duty to consider human rights? University of Cincinnati Law Review, 74, 75–104.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Young, I. M. (2004). Responsibility and global labor justice. Journal of Political Philosophy, 12, 365–388.
- Corporate Governance in a Risk Society
Andreas Georg Scherer
- Springer Netherlands
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© BBL, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, Neuer Inhalt/© hww, digitale Transformation/© Maksym Yemelyanov | Fotolia