Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
SLX-Digitalkonferenz: Zukunftswerkstatt 2024

Mehr Umsatz mit Top-Kontakten

Am 7. Mai erfahren Sie, wie Vertriebsteams Leadgenerierung, Leadnurturing und Leadstrategien effizient steuern können.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Management International Review
Erschienen in: Management International Review 5/2017

07.03.2017 | Research Article

Corruption and Private Participation Projects in Central and Eastern Europe

verfasst von: Alfredo Jiménez, Marcello Russo, Johannes Marcelus Kraak, Guoliang Frank Jiang

Erschienen in: Management International Review | Ausgabe 5/2017

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of host-country corruption in private participation projects in emerging markets. Privatization activities, especially in infrastructure development, were traditionally inaccessible to multinational enterprises, but they are nowadays encouraged in many countries. Prior literature on corruption finds two contradictory (“grease” and “sand”) results when examining the consequences of corruption on investments. Drawing on a sample of 1185 projects from 1997 to 2013 in 18 Central and Eastern European Countries, our results show that higher levels of host-country corruption are associated with greater probabilities of failure. Our results also show that including local investors in the ownership structure of the project weakens the negative effect of corruption by reducing the liability of foreignness. In contrast, being a publicly traded project has no moderating effect in the effect of corruption in this region. Therefore, our results highlight that not all common strategies to deal with corruption are equally effective in this region.
Vorheriger Artikel Learning from Political Change and the Development of MNCs’ Political Capabilities: Evidence from the Global Mining Industry

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Management International Review

MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL REVIEW is a double-blind refereed journal that aims at the advancement and dissemination of research in the fields of International Management.

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Fußnoten
1
The private sector can exit in one of the following ways: (1) selling or transferring its economic interest back to the government before fulfilling the contract terms, (2) removing all management and personnel from the concern, or (3) ceasing operation, service provision, or construction for 15% or more of the license or concession period, following the revocation of the license or repudiation of the contract.
 
2
As opposed to informal corruption, which refers to petty, routine corruption citizens experience in their daily lives, formal corruption refers to larger-sum transactional activities embedded in institutional structures related to public/private sector actors operating from positions of power (Keig et al. 2015, p. 90). Unfortunately, data availability for informal corruption measures is limited and only covers about a half of the years and countries included in our sample.
 
3
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
 
4
Results available from the corresponding author upon request.
 
Literatur
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1997). National champions and corruption: Some unpleasant interventionist arithmetic. The Economic Journal, 107(443), 1023–1043.CrossRef
Agbiboa, D. E. (2012). The political economy of state robbery. Journal of Business Ethics, 108(3), 325–345.CrossRef
Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters, 80(1), 123–129.CrossRef
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury Park: Sage.
Alesina, A., & Weder, B. (2002). Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? American Economic Review, 92(4), 1126–1137.CrossRef
Anechiarico, F., & Jacobs, J. (1996). The pursuit of absolute integrity: How corruption control makes government ineffective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Argandoña, A. (2005). Corruption and companies: The use of facilitating payments. Journal of Business Ethics, 60(3), 251–264.CrossRef
Arikan, I., & Shenkar, O. (2013). National animosity and cross-border alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 56(6), 1516–1544.CrossRef
Bell, R. G., Filatotchev, I., & Rasheed, A. A. (2011). The liability of foreignness in capital markets: Sources and remedies. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(2), 107–122.CrossRef
Bevan, A. A., & Estrin, S. (2004). The determinants of foreign direct investment into European transition economies. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(4), 775–787.CrossRef
Boellis, A., Mariotti, S., Minichilli, A., & Piscitello, L. (2016). Family involvement and firms’ establishment mode choice in foreign markets. Journal of International Business Studies. doi:10.​1057/​jibs.​2016.​23.
Brada, J. C., Drabek, Z., & Perez, M. F. (2012). The effect of home-country and host-country corruption on foreign direct investment. Review of Development Economics, 16(4), 640–663.CrossRef
Brouthers, L. E., Gao, Y., & McNicol, J. P. (2008). Corruption and market attractiveness influences on different types of FDI. Strategic Management Journal, 29(6), 673–680.CrossRef
Busse, M., & Hefeker, C. (2005). Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment. HWWA Discussion Paper 315.
Chen, C., Ding, Y., & Kim, C. (2010). High-level politically connected firms, corruption and analyst forecast accuracy around the world. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(9), 1502–1524.CrossRef
Collins, J. D., Uhlenbruck, K., & Rodriguez, P. (2008). Why firms engage in corruption: A top management perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 87(1), 89–108.CrossRef
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2008). Better the devil you don’t know: Types of corruption and FDI in transition economies. Journal of International Management, 14(1), 12–27.CrossRef
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2016). Corruption in international business. Journal of World Business, 51(1), 35–49.CrossRef
Damijan, J. P., Majcen, B., Rojec, M., & Knell, M. (2003). The role of FDI, R&D accumulation and trade in transferring technology to transition countries: Evidence from firm panel data for eight transition countries. Economic Systems, 27(2), 189–204.CrossRef
Djankov, S. (1999). Ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly independent states. Comparative Economic Studies, 41(1), 75–95.CrossRef
Doh, J. P. (2000). Entrepreneurial privatization strategies. Academy of Management Review, 25(3), 551–571.
Doh, J. P., Teegen, H., & Mudambi, R. (2004). Balancing private and state ownership in emerging markets’ telecommunications infrastructure: Country, industry, and firm influences. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(3), 232–250.CrossRef
Dow, D., Cuypers, I. R. P., & Ertug, G. (2016). The effects of within-country linguistic and religious diversity on foreign acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies, 47(3), 319–346.CrossRef
Eden, L., & Miller, S. (2004). Distance matters: Liability of foreignness, institutional distance and ownership strategy. Advances in International Management, 16, 187–221.CrossRef
Egger, P., & Winner, H. (2005). Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment. European Journal of Political Economy, 21(4), 932–952.CrossRef
Eren, T. M., & Jiménez, A. (2015). Institutional quality similarity, corruption distance and inward FDI in Turkey. Journal for East European Management Studies, 20(1), 88–101.CrossRef
Gelbuda, M., Sørensen, O. J., Meyer, K. E., & Andersson, U. (2006). Guest Editors’ introduction to the focused issue: International business in Central and Eastern Europe. Management International Review, 46(2), 139–142.CrossRef
Godinez, J. R., & Liu, L. (2015). Corruption distance and FDI flows into Latin America. International Business Review, 24(1), 33–42.CrossRef
Guillén, M. F. (2002). Structural inertia, imitation, and foreign expansion: South Korean firms and business groups in China, 1987–95. Academy of Management Journal, 45(3), 509–525.CrossRef
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. (1999). Análisis multivariante (5th ed.). Madrid: Prentice Hall.
Henisz, W. J. (2002). The institutional environment for infrastructure investment. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(2), 355–389.CrossRef
Henisz, W. J., & Delios, A. (2002). Learning about the institutional environment. In P. Ingram & B. Silverman (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Strategic Management, Advances in International Management (Vol. 19, pp. 339–372). New York: JAI Press.
Henisz, W. J., Zelner, B. A., & Guillen, M. (2005). The worldwide diffusion of market-oriented infrastructure reform, 1977–1999. American Sociological Review, 70(6), 871–897.CrossRef
Hodge, G. A., & Greve, C. (2007). Public–private partnerships: an international performance review. Public Administration Review, 67(3), 545–558.CrossRef
Holland, D., Sass, M., Benacek, V., & Gronicki, M. (2000). The determinants and impact of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe: A comparison of survey and econometric evidence. Transnational Corporations, 9(3), 163–213.
Inoue, C., Lazzarini, S., & Musacchio, A. (2013). Leviathan as a minority shareholder: Firm-level implications of state equity purchases. Academy of Management Journal, 56(6), 1775–1801.CrossRef
Jiang, Y., Peng, M. W., Yang, X., & Mutlu, C. (2015). Privatization, governance, and survival: MNE investments in private participation projects in emerging economies. Journal of World Business, 50(2), 294–301.CrossRef
Jiménez, A., Durán, J. J., & de la Fuente, J. M. (2011). Political risk as a determinant of investment by Spanish multinational firms in Europe. Applied Economic Letters, 18(8), 789–793.CrossRef
Jiménez, A., Durán, J. J., & de la Fuente, J. M. (2013). The role of psychic distance stimuli on the East-West FDI location structure in the EU. Evidence from Spanish MNEs. Journal for East European Management Studies, 18(1), 36–65.
Jiménez, A., Luis-Rico, I., & Benito-Osorio, D. (2014). The influence of political risk on the scope of internationalization of regulated companies: Insights from a Spanish sample. Journal of World Business, 49(3), 301–311.CrossRef
Kafourus, M., & Aliyev, M. (2016). Institutional development and firm profitability in transition economies. Journal of World Business, 51(1), 369–378.CrossRef
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2003). Governance matters III: governance indicators 1996–2002. World Bank Working Paper 3106, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Keig, D. L., Brouthers, L. E., & Marshall, V. B. (2015). Formal and informal corruption environments and multinational enterprise social irresponsibility. Journal of Management Studies, 52(1), 89–116.CrossRef
Kennedy, P. A. (1992). Guide to econometrics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Klijn, E. H., Edelenbos, J., Kort, M., & van Twist, M. (2008). Facing management choices: an analysis of managerial choices in 18 complex environmental public–private partnership projects. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(2), 251–282.CrossRef
Kostova, T., & Zaheer, S. (1999). Organizational legitimacy under conditions of complexity: The case of the multinational enterprise. Academy of Management Review, 24(1), 64–81.
Lee, S. H., Oh, K., & Eden, L. (2010). Why do firms bribe? Management International Review, 50(6), 775–796.CrossRef
Lee, S. H., & Weng, D. H. (2013). Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports? Strategic Management Journal, 34(12), 1472–1487.CrossRef
Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. The American Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8–14.CrossRef
Manea, J., & Pearce, R. (2006). MNEs’ strategies in Central and Eastern Europe: Key elements of subsidiary behaviour. Management International Review, 46(2), 235–255.CrossRef
Mata, J., & Freitas, E. (2012). Foreignness and exit over the life cycle of firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(7), 615–630.CrossRef
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 681–712.CrossRef
Mezias, J. M. (2002). Identifying liabilities of foreignness and strategies to minimize their effects: The case of labor lawsuit judgments in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 23(3), 229–244.CrossRef
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1993). Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth. American Economic Review, 83(2), 409–414.
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1985). Applied linear statistical models: Regression, analysis of variance and experimental designs (2nd ed.). Homewood: Irwin.
Newman, S. (2000). Nationalism in postindustrial societies: Why states still matter. Comparative Politics, 33(1), 21–41.CrossRef
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 567–576.CrossRef
Peneder, M., & Stehrer, R. (2007). Neighbours in transition. National Institute Economic Review, 200(1), 96–104.CrossRef
Peng, M., Wang, D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(5), 920–936.CrossRef
Ramamurti, R. (2003). Can governments make credible promises? Journal of International Management, 9(3), 253–269.CrossRef
Ramamurti, R., & Doh, J. P. (2004). Rethinking foreign infrastructure investment in developing countries. Journal of World Business, 39(2), 151–167.CrossRef
Resmini, L. (2000). The determinants of foreign direct investment into the CEECs: New evidence from sectoral patterns. Economics of Transition, 8(3), 665–689.CrossRef
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2006). International handbook on the economics of corruption. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.CrossRef
Schmidt, T., & Sofka, W. (2009). Liability of foreignness as a barrier to knowledge spillovers: Lost in translation? Journal of International Management, 15(4), 460–474.CrossRef
Sharma, P. (2015). Consumer ethnocentrism: Reconceptualization and cross-cultural validation. Journal of International Business Studies, 46(3), 381–389.CrossRef
Shi, W., Hoskisson, R. E., & Zhang, Y. A. (2016). A geopolitical perspective into the opposition to globalizing state-owned enterprises in target states. Global Strategy Journal, 6(1), 13–30.CrossRef
Smarzynska, B. K. (2002). Composition of foreign direct investment and protection of intellectual property rights: Evidence from transition economies. Policy Research Working Paper 1786, World Bank, Washington.
Studenmund, A. H. (1992). Using econometrics: A practical guide. New York: HarperCollins.
Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 19–42.CrossRef
Wei, S. (2000a). How taxing is corruption on international investors? Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(1), 1–11.CrossRef
Wei, S. (2000b). Local corruption and global capital flows. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 303–354.CrossRef
Wheeler, D., & Mody, A. (1992). International investment location decisions: the case of US firms. Journal of International Economics, 33(1–2), 57–76.CrossRef
Wieserma, M. F., & Bowen, H. P. (2009). The use of limited dependent variable techniques in strategy research: issues and methods. Strategic Management Journal, 30(6), 679–692.CrossRef
World Bank (2000). Helping countries combat corruption: progress at the World Bank since 1997. Washington DC.
Zaheer, S. (1995). Overcoming the liability of foreignness. Academy of Management Journal, 38(2), 341–363.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Corruption and Private Participation Projects in Central and Eastern Europe
verfasst von
Alfredo Jiménez
Marcello Russo
Johannes Marcelus Kraak
Guoliang Frank Jiang
Publikationsdatum
07.03.2017
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Management International Review / Ausgabe 5/2017
Print ISSN: 0938-8249
Elektronische ISSN: 1861-8901
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11575-017-0312-4

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 5/2017

Management International Review 5/2017 Zur Ausgabe

Research Article

30 Years of Research on Entry Mode and Performance Relationship: A Meta-Analytical Review

Research Article

Learning from Political Change and the Development of MNCs’ Political Capabilities: Evidence from the Global Mining Industry

Research Article

Corporate Reputation Effects Across Nations: The Impact of Country Distances and Firm-Specific Resources

Research Article

Conformity or Nonconformity in Multinationality? Performance Implications for the Italian Ceramic Tile Manufacturers