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Erschienen in: Social Indicators Research 2/2018

30.10.2017

Corruption and the ‘Paradox of Redistribution’

Erschienen in: Social Indicators Research | Ausgabe 2/2018

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Abstract

The existing literature on the determinants of income redistribution has identified a ‘paradox’. Namely, that countries with a high degree of market income inequality redistribute little, which is in disagreement with the median voter theorem. In a first step, this paper outlines several mechanisms that explain why government corruption might be partially responsible for this ‘paradox’. In a second step, different corruption perception indices and an instrumental variable approach are used to provide empirical evidence that indicates a significant negative impact of corruption on redistribution levels for a sample of 148 developing and developed countries. This finding suggests that, next to political and need factors, government corruption explains to some extent the ‘paradox of redistribution’. This is especially true for many developing countries, given that they typically have relatively high degrees of corruption and low levels of redistribution.

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Fußnoten
1
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 indicating no corruption. Relative redistribution is the percentage reduction in the market income Gini coefficient when taxes and transfers are considered, i.e. (Gini market  − Gini net )/Gini market ) * 100.
 
2
Please note that lobbying often is seen as a special form of bribery (see e.g. Coate and Morris 1999; Grossman and Helpman 2001).
 
3
The reason why these studies concentrate on developed countries is that they rely on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) dataset that comprises mainly OECD countries.
 
4
Damania et al. (2003) and Mauro (2004) recognize that one reason why corruption is highly persistent may be that when corruption is widespread, it does not make any sense for individuals to attempt to fight it; once corruption is entrenched, it is difficult to eliminate. With respect to redistribution, Iversen and Soskice (2009) show that the patterns of redistribution across countries can be traced back to the nineteenth century. With our data, we found, for example, that the correlation between the redistribution in 1995 and 2012 is 93%.
 
5
Some studies argue that the absolute amount of redistribution is a more suitable measure than relative redistribution (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Mahler and Jesuit 2006). To ensure that these results are not influenced by employing a relative measure, regressions with an absolute measure (Gmarket − Gnet) instead of the relative one were run. The main results stay robust when this absolute redistribution measure is used.
 
6
See, for example, Fox and Hoelscher (2012), Agnello and Sousa (2014), Herzer et al. (2014), Chon (2016), and Goda and Torres García (2017).
 
7
Please note that the main results of Regression (i)–(iii) also stay robust when the IVs are used for these specifications.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Corruption and the ‘Paradox of Redistribution’
Publikationsdatum
30.10.2017
Erschienen in
Social Indicators Research / Ausgabe 2/2018
Print ISSN: 0303-8300
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0921
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-017-1781-3

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