4. Corruption for Family
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- 2026
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Abstract
This chapter explores the concept of corruption for family, in which individuals exploit their formal positions and organizational resources to benefit relatives, driven primarily by family norms and kinship obligations rather than personal gain. Drawing on cases from law enforcement, border control, and global bureaucracies, the chapter argues that such corruption is socially integrative, reinforcing family intimacy, reputation, and obligations. These actions often stem from deeply embedded family norms that override formal organizational rules and legal codes, reflecting a tension between universal values and particularistic loyalties. The chapter situates this phenomenon within a functionalist framework rooted in classical sociology and anthropology, showing how family corruption can serve latent social functions such as cohesion, solidarity, and symbolic capital. Ultimately, the analysis underscores how corruption for family blurs moral boundaries, presenting a powerful yet overlooked form of everyday corruption with deep social roots.
When Family Norms Override Formal Policies
The 2011 New York Police Department (NYPD) ticket-fixing scandal involved over a hundred NYPD officers accused of unlawfully “fixing” traffic citations for family members, friends, and fellow officers (Baker et al., 2011). The fraudulent scheme came to light accidentally during a wiretap investigation that was initially focused on police corruption linked to drug dealing. While monitoring a police officer suspected of selling drugs from his barbershop, investigators intercepted calls from individuals inquiring whether he could help them with their tickets, according to prosecutors. These conversations prompted further wiretaps that uncovered similar exchanges involving many other officers from various precincts, primarily in the Bronx but also in other boroughs. The officers exploited their connections to have tickets dismissed before reaching the courts. They employed three techniques for fixing citations: having a ranking official void them, ripping up the ticket before it reached court, or failing to appear on the day of the summons. Many officers defended this practice as a longstanding unofficial courtesy rather than an act of corruption. Patrick Lynch, president of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, the largest NYPD police union, stated, “Taking care of your family is not a crime,” and added, “To take a courtesy and turn it into a crime is wrong” (Long & Hays, 2011).
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His statement could serve as the motto for this chapter, which focuses on corrupt exchange that serves integrative functions within a family. Corruption for family, just like several other forms of corruption, is a mixture of instrumentality and sociability, but with a stronger emphasis on the social element. While this corruption may benefit the material interests of individual family members or even the entire family, its more significant function is to unite people into a shared system of family affairs, which subsequently regulates their behavior and interactions. This is a different pattern from family for corruption discussed in the previous chapter, where the financial dimension dominated corruption and both actors worked on the agent’s side of the deal, with one family member facilitating corruption and reducing the risk for another family member.
In corruption for family scenarios, the family operates on the client side, with one of its members acting as an agent, positioned in a formal role that enables them to allocate organizational resources to relatives or make decisions positively affecting family members. While these situations bear some resemblance to the survival networks discussed in the next chapter, the primary driving force here is a desire for family cohesion, rather than addressing broader institutional dysfunctions via family corruption as a survival strategy. Furthermore, the primary coordination mechanism facilitating these interactions is based on specific family norms rather than general external normative constraints. Family obligations pressure a corrupt agent to take actions that benefit one or more relatives, but at the same time, this action can also cement his/her position in the family. In these “clashing moral values” situations, there is a conflict between particularistic values and norms governing the behavior of family members and more universal values related to one’s official role (de Graaf, 2007). Individuals’ moral responsibilities to their families take precedence over their duties as employees, leading them to illegally divert organizational resources to family members. Therefore, formal policies governing bureaucracies are rendered illegitimate and subject to manipulation by an agent (Polese et al., 2018; Schweitzer, 2005).
In Chap. 2 several cases involving Customs and Border Protection (CBP) were discussed, highlighting how border agents leveraged family ties to reduce the high transaction costs associated with illegal exchanges with strangers. In the following example of corruption for family, the CBP agent’s motives were more societal than instrumental, using his official position just to help his family. In 2012, Thomas P. Silva, upon confirming that his brother-in-law was still a fugitive—he had been convicted of human smuggling and had subsequently escaped from a federal halfway house—failed to enter the necessary personal information into the CBP database when his brother-in-law presented himself for inspection at the San Ysidro (California) Port of Entry (FBI San Diego, 2012). Moreover, Silva knowingly recorded the license plate number of his brother-in-law’s vehicle in the CBP computer system inaccurately, further enabling his relative’s evasion of law enforcement. By that time, 33-year-old Silva had already gained 10 years of experience with the agency.
Functionalist Explanations of Corruption for Family
The general theoretical foundation I use here to explain corruption for family goes back to the classic functionalist argument in sociology and anthropology based on the notion of social equilibrium, which refers to a state of balance in society where all parts function together harmoniously (Turner & Maryanski, 1979, p. 5). This condition is characterized by a high degree of “social integration” or “social cohesion” within members of social groups. Many twentieth-century scholars analyzed social groups by using this perspective. For instance, in an early anthropological work, Malinowski (1922) examined the role of the Kula exchange within family and clan networks among the Trobriand Islanders of Papua New Guinea. In this ceremonial system, participants travel long distances to exchange shell necklaces and armbands in a circular network that fosters social bonds, prestige, and mutual obligations. Malinowski’s work highlighted how such exchanges reinforce social bonds and maintain relationships within and between kin-based clans.
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In his well-known study on the gift, anthropologist, Mauss (2002[1925]), along with the relational approach developed from his work, also argues that reciprocity is not just a result of self-interest or moral obligation, but a way of creating, maintaining, and renewing social bonds (Adloff & Mau, 2006). The acts of giving, receiving, and returning favors are crucial for sustaining and reinforcing group cohesion, trust, and shared belonging, beyond individual interests or moral considerations.
Another prominent anthropologist, Radcliffe-Brown (1922), emphasized the social function of ceremonial practices, particularly the peace-making ceremony, in his study of Andaman Islanders. He argued that such rituals served to restore and maintain social harmony within the clan, producing a positive change in the adverse feelings of the parties toward one another and acting as mechanisms for reinforcing social cohesion and solidarity.
The sociologist Merton (1968) distinguished between “manifest” and “latent” functions, suggesting that social actors may recognize or be unaware of the functional consequences of their actions. Manifest functions are the intended and recognized consequences of an action or social event. In contrast, latent functions have unintended and often unrecognized consequences. Merton’s example suggests that the obvious manifest purpose of a Hopi rain dance ceremony is to bring rain magically during times of drought. The ritual—while not directly causing rain—also has a latent function of reinforcing solidarity and group identity among the Hopi people, especially in times of hardship.
In a micro-sociological analysis, Collins (2004) developed the concept of interaction rituals, which refer to the everyday social interactions that, through shared focus and emotional energy, strengthen group solidarity, the feeling of membership, and group morality. In a family context, such rituals are powerful mechanisms for building emotional bonds and a sense of belonging. For example, exchange rituals—such as giving favors, gifts, or money—carry deep symbolic and emotional significance, thereby contributing to social cohesion within the family unit.
In the context of corruption for family, individual family members may personally benefit from certain transactions; however, a key element here is the corrupt association’s impact on the very essence of the family’s social fabric, which I believe encompasses three dimensions: intimacy, reputation, and particularistic norms. This fabric is intricately woven with countless threads that connect family members either within the immediate family or to the wider kinship network. It is important to note that family members engage in numerous informal exchanges on a daily basis, and at times, when one crosses the line into corruption—drawing on resources from an organization rather than one’s own private “pocket”—the participants may not even recognize the corrupt nature of their exchange.
Intimacy
The atmosphere of home is comprised of numerous small acts and gestures that convey affection, mutual interest, subtle preferences, and even minor grievances, all of which form the foundation of intimacy. Activities such as shared family meals, celebrations, gift-giving rituals, collective sports, and various other family gatherings and outings can enhance intimacy among family members. Many of these activities could intersect with corruption for family. For instance, consider a scenario where a mother takes a company car, filled with gas, to enjoy a family vacation without her employer’s knowledge. The list of similar instances of misusing organizational resources for family benefit—effectively strengthening family bonds—could be extensive, from minor to more serious cases. Many of these cases are borderline corruption, depending on the company’s actual policies that ban, permit, or informally tolerate them. Examples include having company staff run personal errands for family members (like picking up kids or cleaning personal vehicles); assigning employees to conduct home renovations or repairs; claiming travel reimbursements for trips that included family members; taking office supplies (such as paper, ink, laptops, etc.) for children’s school projects; using a company credit card for family expenses; permitting family members to stay in employer-paid accommodations; hosting a birthday party or a family wedding at an employer-owned facility; or building infrastructure (e.g., roads, parks, public transport access, commercial zones) close to the family home.
An illustrative case of blurred moral boundaries in the use of official resources for family benefit is that of Mailis Reps, former Minister of Education and Research in Estonia. Reps was convicted of serious misconduct for misusing public funds to support private and family activities. In September 2024, the Harju County Court found her guilty of embezzlement and fraud (Turovski, 2021; Whyte, 2021).
According to the court, Reps exploited her ministerial position and resources for personal benefit. She arranged a private birthday celebration at the ministry’s premises and hosted a second birthday event at the upscale Tallinn restaurant Mon Repos, using the ministry’s budget. Over an extended period, she also used a ministry vehicle to transport her children to and from school, as well as on a family holiday to Croatia. In addition, plane tickets for her children were purchased using ministry funds, and ministry employees were assigned to provide childcare and chauffeur services.
On appeal, the Tallinn Circuit Court largely upheld the convictions, though it modified some civil claims. While the court accepted that one birthday event could be classified as a morale-boosting function and thus acquitted Reps of that specific charge, it maintained her guilt for other misappropriations, including the restaurant expenses and misuse of official vehicles. Reps received a sentence of 1 year and 5 months’ imprisonment, suspended under a two-year probation period. The court also ordered partial restitution: she was required to repay approximately €6070 plus interest, while larger claims exceeding €100,000 were dismissed due to evidentiary uncertainty.
Another notable instance of such behavior occurred in 2005 involving Ann Reid, a councilor in York, England (The York Press, 2006). She orchestrated the switching of all traffic lights to green along the route of her daughter Hannah’s wedding procession, allowing the five-car convoy to navigate the city center without interruption. This action ignited controversy and drew widespread criticism as an abuse of public resources for personal (family) benefit.
Reputation
The family always serves as the epitome of virtue and its public manifestation, even when kinship ties are diffuse. As family encompasses the “whole” individual, a person’s identity is not viewed independently but as part of a familial unit (Wolf & Silverman, 2001). Individual members’ reputations affect the family as a whole; Therefore, praise or criticism directed at one member is often seen as praise or criticism of the entire family. In some cultural contexts, the family’s reputation within the local community or larger society can be highly influenced by the social status, the prestige of jobs of particular family members and by the monetary value of their possessions, including clothes, cars, and other products, as well as the size and location of their homes. For example, giving up a family house due to financial constraints may represent serious disgrace and downward mobility. It might give the feeling to the impacted family members of publicly losing the whole family’s “membership card” in certain social strata (Zelizer, 2005, p. 229). A key aspect of such virtue pertains to safeguarding a family’s reputation in relation to that of socially comparable families. This is about maintaining the family “name,” but the criteria for evaluating reputations vary across cultures (Wolf & Silverman, 2001).
On the other hand, a person’s affiliation with a family can define her/his social “credit rating” (Wolf & Silverman, 2001). The family’s status, reputation, and perceived honor or disgrace significantly influence how society evaluates individuals.
Thus, not surprisingly, using corruption to enhance or uphold their reputation in the eyes of many families is a viable means for many families. Covering up scandals involving one member to protect the family name is one key element of this pattern. This is particularly evident when someone holds a formal position within a government agency, which may allow her/him to suppress investigations or erase allegations or penalties related to the misconduct of a relative. This could range from minor issues such as traffic violations, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, to more serious charges, including harassment or fraud. On the other hand, awarding or recognizing academic achievements to relatives could be a way to enhance a family’s reputation. Examples include corrupt agents manipulating the admissions process for relatives at prestigious schools or bestowing honorary degrees, board positions, or awards upon family members. It could even be the family’s aspiration to put a member in a formal position from which this kind of corruption would be possible.
Obligations
The final and probably most essential dimension of corruption for family is the influential norm of “taking care of your family.” That often includes unconditional solidarity with relatives. Here, internal norms dictate expected behaviors among family members (Lomnitz, 1997). Each member adapts to the expectations of their relatives while anticipating reciprocal support. Core family obligations include providing economic assistance, participating in family rituals, and acknowledging each other socially. Additionally, members are expected to actively contribute to the maintenance or enhancement of the family’s status. This is a social obligation prioritizing the welfare of others in the family over the individual’s or non-family members’ interests (Smith, 2007, p. 24). Not all of these obligations imply corruption, but occasionally they may involve using corruption for the family. Just like any social norm, such obligations also comprise a range of enforcement mechanisms, from social disapproval to more direct, even physical threats (Sundström, 2016). Sometimes this requires minimal organizational resources. For instance, a public official may be under family pressure to provide services to relatives without collecting official fees (Smith, 2007, p. 61). Akhil Gupta (1995, p. 397) found such social expectations in postcolonial India: “For example, a highly placed official who fails to help a close relative or a fellow villager obtain a government position is often roundly criticized by people for not fulfilling his obligations to his kinsmen and village brothers. On the other hand, the same people often roundly condemn any official of another caste or village who has done precisely that as being ‘corrupt’ and as guilty of ‘nepotism.’”
Based on research in Nigeria, Smith, 2007, p. 63) claims that “few events bring more excitement to a family and community than the news that one of its own has been appointed to an important government position,” as this could provide access to the most lucrative form of that country’s infamous corruption: government contracts. Smith (2007, pp. 66–67) also provides examples of how such contracts work. Here is one of those. In 1996, Emeka Okpara, a 57-year-old father, lived in Ubakala, Nigeria, with his wife, Charity, and their six children. The couple operated a modest market stall selling everyday goods, while Charity also worked as a secretary for the local government. Eventually, Emeka secured a government contract to construct a school fence, despite lacking any masonry experience. Local community members believed that Charity influenced the deal through her boss, with some whispers even implying a potential sexual exchange. The proceeds from the contract enabled the family to begin building their own house and cover university tuition for their daughter, marking the first time anyone in the family attended university. Neighbors showed admiration for the couple for successfully accessing government resources, but some of them engaged in gossip, particularly regarding the rumored methods employed by Charity.
Nepotism
Many cases of corruption for family fall in the category of nepotism, a specific category of corruption when preference is given by one family member to another in a work context because of a kinship tie rather than merit (Schilpzand et al., 2024). This may include practices related to recruitment, hiring, career advancement and promotion, compensation and benefits, development opportunities, and task allocation. Similar to other forms of corruption, nepotism requires the individual to possess a degree of discretion over decisions and resources or to be able to influence the decisions of others in order to give preference to family members. Consequently, these individuals typically hold a relatively high hierarchical status (Schilpzand et al., 2024).
A survey conducted among 23,000 civil servants across 10 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America revealed that nepotism is a globally widespread phenomenon (Meyer-Sahling et al., 2018). According to these data, on average, 41% of civil servants secured their first job through personal connections, while 34% reported that such connections aided their promotions, and 22% indicated that they played a role in salary increases. Other quantitative empirical studies have focused on the impacts of nepotism across different countries. A study conducted among civil servants in Colombia discovered that from 2011 to 2017, 38% of them had a relative employed in public administration, while 18% had a familial connection to a manager or supervisor in the public sector (Riaño, 2021). Additionally, 11% were employed alongside a family member within the same agency. This research also revealed that a public sector worker is 40% more likely to achieve a hierarchical promotion and receive a salary increase of 2% to 5% when connected to a top bureaucrat through family ties. Furthermore, these advantages tend to be concentrated within extended family networks, which can be more challenging for regulatory agencies to identify.
Another study, using a large dataset from the Philippines collected between the 2007 and 2010 municipal elections, revealed robust evidence that relatives of current officeholders were more likely to secure higher-ranked and better-paying positions (Fafchamps & Labonne, 2017). Specifically, having family connections increased the probability of being hired for managerial roles by 19%. However, the researchers also found a gender disparity, as the impact of familial ties on obtaining a managerial position was 45% lower for women compared to men. Also, a connection to a mayor had the most significant influence on occupational outcomes, surpassing the effects of ties to a vice mayor or local councilor.
Certain areas and occupations, both in the public and private sectors, are particularly prone to nepotism due to the opportunity for discretionary hiring practices. While judicial organizations generally maintain independence from political influence, nepotism among judges is prevalent in many countries. They frequently have the authority to appoint individuals to various roles within their courts, including crucial positions such as judicial clerk. A report estimated that 51%of federal judges in Mexico have at least one relative employed within the federal judiciary and a remarkable 93% of these relatives were not selected based on merit (Ríos-Figueroa, 2018). Furthermore, an analysis of 458 cases within Mexico’s federal judiciary found a statistically significant relationship between the arrival of a judge at a circuit and the concurrence of that judge’s relatives among the staff of the corresponding judicial organization (Brassiolo et al., 2021). As a result of such high-level nepotism, Mexico recently decided to shift the judiciary from an appointment-based system to one where voters will choose their judges, making it the only country that elects all its judges (Mega, 2025).
Nepotism also exists in so-called highly developed democratic countries. A report by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (2013) found that 30% of federal employees perceived favoritism toward agency officials’ relatives. Recent cases from the United States uncovered by a Reuters investigation reveal a similar trend involving thousands of judges who have violated laws or oaths yet retained their positions (Berens & Shiffman, 2020). Among the numerous incidents, Judge Kim Chaney’s case stands out. The judge from the Cullman County (Alabama) District Court remained in office for 3 years after being accused of violating nepotism rules that he was responsible for enforcing on the oversight commission. Court records indicate that between 2015 and 2017, Judge Chaney assigned his own son as a court-appointed defense attorney for indigent clients in at least 200 cases. As a result, his son earned a minimum of $105,000 in fees over this two-year period. In February, following repeated inquiries from Reuters to both Chaney and the state judicial commission regarding these cases, he retired from the bench as part of an agreement with state authorities to conclude the investigation. Notably, despite these circumstances, the Cullman County Bar Association expressed its support for Judge Chaney by passing a resolution that highlighted his years of dedicated service and contributions to the community (Bullard, 2020). Furthermore, the Cullman County Commission unanimously approved renaming the local facility for juvenile offenders as the “Honorable Kim J. Chaney Juvenile Detention Center” (Bullard, 2024).
The world of sports is another area where nepotism is rampant. An analysis in 2021 revealed that among the 792 coaches in the U.S. employed by NFL teams, 111 were related either biologically or through marriage to current or former NFL coaches, which represents approximately 14% of all coaches (Kahler, 2022). A notable example is the case of Bill Belichick, head coach of the New England Patriots. Both of Bill Belichick’s sons transitioned directly from college to positions on their father’s coaching staff, with Steve serving as a coaching assistant and Brian taking on the role of scouting assistant. Neither of them coached at the high school or college levels before becoming NFL position coaches, unlike most people in these positions. Both played lacrosse, Brian at Trinity College and Steve at Rutgers University.
In 2023 another notable case of nepotism in sports emerged in Somalia (Close & Yeung, 2023). Nasra Abukar Ali, a 20-year-old runner without formal training, participated in the women’s 100-meter race at the World University Games in Chengdu, China. She finished last, with a massively substandard time of 21.81 seconds, significantly behind the Brazilian winner Gabriela Silva who crossed the finish line a full 10 seconds ahead of her. The situation escalated when it was revealed that Ali was the niece of Khadija Aden Dahir, the Chairwoman of the Somali Athletics Federation. Dahir had posted on social media a photo of Ali celebrating her graduation, which intensified scrutiny and led to allegations of nepotism. Consequently, in August 2023 the Somali Ministry of Youth and Sports suspended Khadija Aden Dahir.
Corruption for Family as a Burden
In certain societies, the heavy social obligation to engage in corruption for the benefit of one’s family can put significant weight on individuals. Those who manage to escape these expectations are often envied but might also be looked down upon for failing to meet the responsibilities that their families impose on them. As Jean-Francois Bayart (1993, p. 233) notes in his book on post-colonial African politics, “A man who succeeds in ‘making good’ without ensuring that his network partakes in his prosperity brings shame upon himself and earns the reputation of ‘eating’ others in the invisible world.” Smith (2007, p. 164) also explains in his study on everyday corruption in Nigeria that individuals with the opportunity to engage in corruption openly disregard their obligations to their extended family and are often “accused” of kidnapping and murdering innocent children with whom they have no connections.
Blundo and de Sardan (2006, pp. 115–116) quote a statement from a Senegalese doctor regarding how individuals try to escape social pressure from their families: “Just to show how difficult it is, I told my family that I no longer have a stamp, I lost my stamp [for validating medical certificates]. Simply to avoid having to stamp whatever…They make me sign everything; if I refuse, there are problems. My aunt will come or my sister will say that ‘you refuse things although it is nothing, you refuse, but your colleague will do it,’ etc. Honestly, I have so many problems that I said I had lost my stamp and now I am left in peace; I have the stamp at the bottom of my drawer.”
Discussion
In the case of corruption for family, agents participate in corruption for the benefit of their family. This suggests that the sociability elements in these relationships likely outweigh the instrumental aspect of economic self-interest (Ledeneva, 2018, p. 9). People exploit their formal positions and their organization’s resources to maintain and/or strengthen bonds and deepen intimacy within the family or to preserve and enhance the family’s reputation. They provide relatives “gifts” and favors that do not come from one’s own pocket but from an organization (Graycar & Jancsics, 2017). Misusing organizational resources, such as “borrowing” company cars for family vacations or hiring unqualified relatives, is a common practice worldwide.
Since these transactions are usually based on reciprocity, the agent can expect something in return from the family. While in family for corruption cases the participants benefit financially, when an agent commits corruption for her/his family the counter-transfer is often not material. It does not even need to be an object with physical properties (Larsen & Watson, 2001). It may take different forms of labor—for example, cooking for a parent or caring for children (Carrier, 1991; Graycar & Jancsics, 2017; Murcott, 1983). Moreover, the counter-gifts for serving the family through corruption do not always come from the original giftee or even any particular relative but from the entire family. These family rewards often manifest as symbolic capital, such as recognition, honor, prestige, or an elevation in status within the kinship network (Bourdieu, 1997). A latent function and often unrecognized consequence of these transactions is enhanced social cohesion among family members.
The literature suggests that individuals do not acquire their understanding of legal rules and policies solely by reading formal texts; rather, their knowledge is often shaped by their beliefs about what the law ought to be (Kim, 1999; Sanderson & Darley, 2002). Therefore, social norms derived from outside the organization significantly impact employees’ decisions on how to behave in situations presenting a high potential opportunity for corruption (Köbis et al., 2025). Corruption for family is typically coordinated by particularistic family norms that defeat the formal policies, laws, or even society-wide moral codes that are supposed to regulate the agent’s behavior. Sometimes this local informal network mechanism is called “clan control” in the literature (Ouchi, 1980). A Hungarian interviewee who participated in corruption explained how strong the obligation to support family could be (Jancsics, 2024, p. 54): “There is this economic part of the story [of corruption], so you may hesitate to get involved merely to get some benefits. But there is another thing, which overrides any moral inhibition. When it is about your family. I would do anything … anything to help them.”
This chapter suggests that corruption may have social functions beyond immediate financial benefits. It can serve as a means of social cohesion within the family. Of course, there are countless family customs, rituals, and informal exchanges that promote social integration, and it can be difficult to recognize when some of them cross the line into corruption. Family members may not even realize the corrupt nature of their act because they “just want to help a family member.” The particularistic norms facilitating their behavior blur the corrupt nature of their activity or make it morally justifiable. However, the resource exchange is real, and it always comes from a formal organization of a corrupt agent.
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