Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
SLX-Digitalkonferenz: Zukunftswerkstatt 2024

Mehr Umsatz mit Top-Kontakten

Am 7. Mai erfahren Sie, wie Vertriebsteams Leadgenerierung, Leadnurturing und Leadstrategien effizient steuern können.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Journal of Chinese Political Science
Erschienen in: Journal of Chinese Political Science 2/2023

04.08.2022 | Research Article

Cosmetic Responsiveness: Why and How Local Authorities Respond to Mundane Online Complaints in China

verfasst von: Yuan Wang, Rongbin Han

Erschienen in: Journal of Chinese Political Science | Ausgabe 2/2023

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This article explores authoritarian responsiveness in the digital era using data from China’s most popular Internet forum. In addition to some limited evidence of the nature of the complaints and the public attention they attract affecting responsiveness, we find that government responsiveness in China depends more on local leadership style and bureaucratic factors such as when the complaints are posted and the specific agencies that deliver the responses. Our findings suggest that, when responding to citizens, the Chinese government is often driven not only by concerns over threats such as collective action or legitimacy erosion, but by cosmetic needs to project a responsive image to please superiors or appease the public. The cosmetic nature of such responsiveness explains why local authorities respond to mundane complaints that are not particularly threatening and why bureaucratic dynamics across regions, sectors and levels of government agencies significantly shape delivery.
Nächster Artikel Viewing Persistent Individual Complainants in China Through the Lens of Everyday Politics

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Anhänge
Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich
Fußnoten
1
The task is likely still a marginalized one given the numerous competing mandates local cadres have to deal with. See [21].
 
2
The original dataset contains 2259 cases. Here we have removed the duplicates. Also, to protect user privacy, we use the data mostly at the aggregated level and provide only case IDs when citing the threads.
 
3
We randomly selected 45 per cent cases of civil disputes and 25 per cent of cases from the rest categories for analysis. We oversampled civil disputes to ensure more balanced distribution of cases across these categories.
 
4
All of the six outliers are environmental complaints (two about square dancing noises, two about construction noises, one about air pollution and one about the decay of a tourist spot). It was likely that local authorities did not respond promptly because such complaints were actually quite difficult to address.
 
5
Clicks and pre-response replies are highly correlated in our sample (coefficient = 150, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.288). This is logical as most threads have a discussion life-span of a day or two, after which they will gain few clicks. For concerns about the collinearity, a multicollinearity VIF test shows acceptable collinearity (VIF < 5). See [54]. Models without total click counts show highly similar results (See Tables 2, 3, 4 and 8 in the Appendices).
 
6
For the ratio of first and last responses based on account types and the distribution of complaints across issue areas grouped by the type of official accounts, see Figs. 2 and 3 in the Appendices.
 
7
Case #4.
 
8
Officials in democracies can be driven by career purposes and deliver superficial responses to citizens. But for elected officials, the pressure is more from the voters, and they are clearly not subject to a cadre evaluation system like their counterparts in China. Thus, their motives and behavior are shaped by a different set of institutional mechanisms and principal-agent dynamics. While this is an intriguing topic, pursuing it is beyond the scope of this article.
 
Literatur
1.
Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess. 2001. Political Agency, Government Responsiveness and the Role of the Media. European Economic Review 45 (4–6): 629–640.CrossRef
2.
Boix, Carles, and W Svolik Milan. 2013. The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. The Journal of Politics 75 (2): 300–316.CrossRef
3.
Breusch, T. S., and A. R. Pagan. 1979. A Simple Test for Heteroscedasticity and Random Coefficient Variation. Econometrica 47 (5): 1287.CrossRef
4.
Cai, Yongshun. 2004. Irresponsible State: Local Cadres and Image-Building in China. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20 (4): 20–41.CrossRef
5.
Cai, Yongshun. 2010. Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed Or Fail. Stanford University Press.
6.
Cai, Yongshun, and Titi Zhou. 2019. Online Political Participation in China: Local Government and Differentiated Response. The China Quarterly 238: 331–352.CrossRef
7.
8.
Castells, Manuel. 2009. Communication Power. Oxford University Press.
9.
Chen, Dan. 2020. Convenient Criticism: Local Media and Governance in Urban China. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
10.
Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu. 2016. Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China. American Journal of Political Science 60 (2): 383–400.CrossRef
11.
Chen, Xi. 2008. “Collective Petitioning and Institutional Conversion.” In Popular Protest in China, ed. Kevin J. O’Brien. Harvard University Press, 54–70.
12.
Chen, Xi. 2012. Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China. Cambridge University Press.
13.
Chu, Yun-han. 2013. Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate over the Chinese Model. China Review 13 (1): 1–42.
14.
Cook, Brian J., and B. Dan Wood. 1989. Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy. The American Political Science Review 83 (3): 965–978.CrossRef
15.
Distelhorst, Greg. 2012. MIT Political Science Department Research Paper Working Paper 2012-24 Publicity-Driven Accountability in China: Qualitative and Experimental Evidence.
16.
Distelhorst, Greg, and Yue Hou. 2014. Ingroup Bias in Official Behavior: A National Field Experiment in China. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9 (2): 203–230.CrossRef
17.
Distelhorst, Greg, and Yue Hou. 2017. Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China. The Journal of Politics 79 (3): 1024–1040.CrossRef
18.
Edin, Maria. 2003. State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective. The China Quarterly 173: 35–52.CrossRef
19.
Esarey, Ashley. 2015. Winning Hearts and Minds? Cadres as Microbloggers in China. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 44 (2): 69–103.CrossRef
20.
Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. Comparative Political Studies 40 (11): 1279–1301.CrossRef
21.
22.
Goffman, Erving. 1990. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin.
23.
Han, Rongbin. 2017. Supervising Authoritarian Rule Online: Citizen Participation and State Responses in China. Journal of Comparative Law 12 (2): 397–416.
24.
Han, Rongbin. 2018. Contesting Cyberspace in China: Online Expression and Authoritarian Resilience. New York: Columbia University Press.CrossRef
25.
Han, Rongbin, and Linan Jia. 2018. Governing by the Internet: Local Governance in the Digital Age. Journal of Chinese Governance 3 (1): 67–85.CrossRef
26.
Hartford, Kathleen. 2005. Dear Mayor: Online Communications with Local Governments in Hangzhou and Nanjing. China Information 19 (2): 217–260.CrossRef
27.
Heilmann, Sebastian., and Elizabeth J. Perry. 2011. Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China. Harvard University Asia Center.
28.
Heilmann, Sebastian. 2008. Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise. Studies in Comparative International Development 43: 1–26.CrossRef
29.
Jarque, Carlos M., and Anil K. Bera. 1980. Efficient Tests for Normality, Homoscedasticity and Serial Independence of Regression Residuals. Economics Letters 6 (3): 255–259.CrossRef
30.
Jiang, Junyan, and Yu Zeng. 2020. Countering Capture: Elite Networks and Government Responsiveness in China’s Land Market Reform. The Journal of Politics 82 (1): 13–28.CrossRef
31.
Kennedy, John James, and Yaojiang Shi. 2015. “Rule by Virtue, the Mass Line Model and Cadre-Mass Relations.” In East Asian Development Model: The 21st Century Perspectives, ed. Shiping Hua. Routledge, 217–33.
32.
King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. American Political Science Review 107 (2): 1–18.CrossRef
33.
King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2017. How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument. American Political Science Review 111 (3): 484–501.CrossRef
34.
Lagerkvist, Johan. 2008. Internet Ideotainment in the PRC: National Responses to Cultural Globalization. Journal of Contemporary China 17 (54): 121–140.CrossRef
35.
Lee, Ching Kwan, and Yonghong Zhang. 2013. The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of Bargained Authoritarianism in China. American Journal of Sociology 118 (6): 1475–1508.CrossRef
36.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
37.
Li, Lianjiang, Mingxing Liu, and J. Kevin, and O’Brien. 2012. Petitioning Beijing: The High Tide of 2003–2006. The China Quarterly 210: 313–334.CrossRef
38.
Lieberthal, Kenneth, and David M. Lampton. 1992. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China. eds. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton. Berkeley: University of California Press.
39.
Lollar, Xia Li. 2006. Assessing China’s E-Government: Information, Service, Transparency and Citizen Outreach of Government Websites. Journal of Contemporary China 15 (46): 31–41.CrossRef
40.
Lorentzen, Peter. 2013. Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8 (2): 127–158.CrossRef
41.
Lorentzen, Peter. 2014. China’s Strategic Censorship. American Journal of Political Science 58 (2): 402–414.CrossRef
42.
Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2006. Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan. Democratization 13 (3): 456–471.CrossRef
43.
Ma, Liang. 2013. The Diffusion of Government Microblogging. Public Management Review 15 (2): 288–309.CrossRef
44.
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule. Comparative Political Studies 41 (4–5): 715–741.CrossRef
45.
Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. 2010. Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament. American Political Science Review 104 (03): 482–502.CrossRef
46.
Meng, Tianguang, and Jennifer Pan, and Ping Yang. 2017. Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation: Evidence From a Survey Experiment in China. Comparative Political Studies 50 (4): 399–433.CrossRef
47.
Meng, Tianguang, and Zesen Yang. 2020. Variety of Responsive Institutions and Quality of Responsiveness in Cyber China. The China Review 20 (3): 13–42.
48.
Mertha, Andrew. 2009. ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process. The China Quarterly 200: 995–1012.CrossRef
49.
Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience. Journal of Democracy 14 (1): 6–17.CrossRef
50.
51.
O’Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. 1999. Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China. Comparative Politics 31 (2): 167–186.CrossRef
52.
O’Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. 2004. Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China. The China Journal 51: 75–96.CrossRef
53.
O’Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. 2006. Rightful Resistance in Rural China. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
54.
O’Brien, Robert M. 2007. A Caution Regarding Rules of Thumb for Variance Inflation Factors. Quality & Quantity 41 (5): 673–690.CrossRef
55.
Pan, Jennifer. 2019. How Chinese Officials Use the Internet to Construct Their Public Image. Political Science Research and Methods 7 (2): 197–213.CrossRef
56.
Pan, Jennifer, and Kaiping Chen. 2018. Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances. American Political Science Review 112 (3): 602–620.CrossRef
57.
58.
Powell, G., and Bingham. 2004. The Chain of Responsiveness. Journal of Democracy 15 (4): 91–105.CrossRef
59.
Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Aaron Wildavsky. 1984. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in. In Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation. University of California Press.
60.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
61.
Qiaoan, Runya, and Jessica C. Teets. 2020. Responsive Authoritarianism in China -- a Review of Responsiveness in Xi and Hu Administrations. Journal of Chinese Political Science 25 (1): 139–153.CrossRef
62.
Roberts, Margaret E. 2018. Censored: Distraction and Diversion inside China’s Great Firewall. Princeton, MA: Princeton University Press.CrossRef
63.
Schlæger, Jesper. 2013. E-Government in China: Technology, Power and Local Government Reform. Abingdon: Routledge.CrossRef
64.
Schlæger, Jesper, and Min Jiang. 2014. Official Microblogging and Social Management by Local Governments in China. China Information 28 (2): 189–213.CrossRef
65.
Sorace, Christian. 2016. Party Spirit Made Flesh: The Production of Legitimacy in the Aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake. China Journal 76: 41–62.CrossRef
66.
Su, Zheng, and Tianguang Meng. 2016. Selective Responsiveness: Online Public Demands and Government Responsiveness in Authoritarian China. Social Science Research 59: 52–67.CrossRef
67.
Teets, Jessica C., and Reza Hasmath. 2020. The Evolution of Policy Experimentation in China. Journal of Asian Public Policy 13 (1): 49–59.CrossRef
68.
Teets, Jessica C., and William Hurst, eds. 2014. Local Governance Innovation in China Experimentation, Diffusion, and Defiance. New York and Oxford: Routledge.
69.
Tianya. 2014. “Tianya Shequ Fabu 2013 Nian Tianya Yuqing Yingdui Nengli Bangdan” [Tianya Released the 2013 Tianya Report on Government Responding Capacity to Public Opinions], January 27, 2014, http://​groups.​tianya.​cn/​post-163879-3b6ace7033504f55b4753d90b7518c01-1.shtml.
70.
Truex, Rory. 2016. Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
71.
Truex, Rory. 2017. Consultative Authoritarianism and Its Limits. Comparative Political Studies 50 (3): 329–361.CrossRef
72.
Tsai, Lily L. 2007. Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
73.
Tsai, Lily L. 2015. Constructive Noncompliance. Comparative Politics 47 (3): 253–279.CrossRef
74.
Ullah, Atta, et al. 2021. The Role of E-Governance in Combating COVID-19 and Promoting Sustainable Development: A Comparative Study of China and Pakistan. Chinese Political Science Review 6 (1): 1–33.CrossRef
75.
Verba, Sidney., Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Harvard University Press.
76.
Wang, Yuhua, and Carl Minzner. 2015. The Rise of the Chinese Security State. The China Quarterly 222: 339–359.CrossRef
77.
Wang, Zhen. 2018. Reassessing the Performance Evaluation System in the Xi Jinping Era: Changes and Implications. East Asia 35 (1): 59–77.CrossRef
78.
Whiting, Susan H. 2001. Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change. Cambridge University Press.
79.
80.
Wu, Yuehua, and Johannes M. Bauer. 2010. E-Government in China: Deployment and Driving Forces of Provincial Government Portals. Chinese Journal of Communication 3 (3): 290–310.CrossRef
81.
Xiao, Qiang. 2011. “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political Impact.”. In Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan Shirk., 202–224. Oxford University Press.
82.
Yang, Guobin. 2009. The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online. Columbia University press.
83.
Yang, Hongxing, and Dingxin Zhao. 2015. Performance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China’s Economic Miracle. Journal of Contemporary China 24 (91): 64–82.CrossRef
84.
85.
Zhao, Yuezhi. 2012. The Struggle for Socialism in China. Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine 64: 1–17.CrossRef
86.
Zhu, Demi, and Shuai Cao. 2019. Decision-Making and Risk Sources: Key to Source Governance for Social Stability. Chinese Political Science Review 5 (1): 95–110.CrossRef
87.
Zhu, Yuchao. 2011. ‘Performance Legitimacy’ and China’s Political Adaptation Strategy. Journal of Chinese Political Science 16 (2): 123–140.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Cosmetic Responsiveness: Why and How Local Authorities Respond to Mundane Online Complaints in China
verfasst von
Yuan Wang
Rongbin Han
Publikationsdatum
04.08.2022
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Journal of Chinese Political Science / Ausgabe 2/2023
Print ISSN: 1080-6954
Elektronische ISSN: 1874-6357
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-022-09798-z

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2023

Journal of Chinese Political Science 2/2023 Zur Ausgabe

Research Article

How Does Workplace Affect Employee Political Efficacy in China?

Research Article

Viewing Persistent Individual Complainants in China Through the Lens of Everyday Politics

Research Article

Responsive Propaganda: The Sharp Shift in the Propaganda of Human Gene Editing in China

Review Essay

Sino-US Competition: Is Liberal Democracy an Asset or Liability?

Research Article

The Political Economy of State Sector Restructuring in China: Cross-Provincial Evidence 2008–2017

Research Article

Authoritarian Policing Under Xi Jinping