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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Counterterrorism: A Public Goods Approach

verfasst von : Todd Sandler

Erschienen in: The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter employs the concepts of public goods and externalities to investigate myriad aspects of proactive and defensive counterterrorism policies. Such policies include degrading terrorist groups’ assets, hardening potential targets, securing border transit points, gathering intelligence, eliminating safe havens, and infiltrating terrorist groups. Counterterrorism actions possess opposing or re-enforcing externalities that create an amazing variety of strategic substitutes and complements. As such, the implications for leadership and/or unilateral action may be quite varied for alternative counterterrorism measures. By drawing on the private provision of public good model, joint products, and aggregator technology, this article serves to underscore the wide-ranging applicability of many theoretic constructs developed by Cornes and his co-authors.

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In a more general model, we could write i’s loss as l(q _i, q _j), so that j’s proactive efforts also limit i’s losses at home. This would provide more publicness and externalities. Because the likelihood of attack depends on both countries’ proactive measures, the model has plenty of externalities without this further complication.

Throughout the analysis, I ignore corner solutions where all attacks are avoided, \( {\pi}_i+{\pi}_j=0 \), or where only one country takes offensive measures.

The slope of IC ₁ is found by the implicit function rule applied to C ₁ to give an expression for \( \partial {q}_2/\partial {q}_1 \) for a constant C ₁. The numerator of this partial derivative is the FOC in (4). The second-order partial is positive.

Without symmetry, these cross partials differ in sign so that the last two terms may offset to some degree. If q _i exceeds q _j, then the net difference is positive and reinforces the positivity of the numerator.

Almost 40 % of all transnational terrorist attacks were directed at US interests during 1968–2010 (Enders and Sandler 2012).

To limit superscripts, I assign Ī to denote j’s intelligence.

Implicit differentiation of the constrained utility function in (17) gives the slope of these isoutility functions, denoted by \( \partial {x}_2/\partial {x}_1 \). The partial derivative of this slope with respect to x ₁ establishes the inverted U-shape to the contours. Similarly, 2’s isoutility contours are inverted C-shaped curves.

A characteristic approach can be used to investigate this case—see Cornes and Sandler (1994).

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Titel: Counterterrorism: A Public Goods Approach
verfasst von: Todd Sandler
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-49441-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-49442-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_11