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Dynamic Games and Applications

Erschienen in:

25.01.2022

COVID-19 and Stigma: Evolution of Self-restraint Behavior

verfasst von: Kenichi Kurita, Shunsuke Managi

Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Ausgabe 1/2022

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Abstract

Social stigma can effectively prevent people from going out and possibly spreading COVID-19. Using the framework of replicator dynamics, we analyze the interaction between self-restraint behavior, infection with viruses such as COVID-19, and stigma against going out. Our model is analytically solvable with respect to an interior steady state in contrast to the previous model of COVID-19 with stigma. We show that a non-legally binding policy reduces the number of people going out in a steady state.

Vorheriger Artikel The Mask Game with Multiple Populations

Nächster Artikel Herd Behaviors in Epidemics: A Dynamics-Coupled Evolutionary Games Approach

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Titel: COVID-19 and Stigma: Evolution of Self-restraint Behavior
verfasst von: Kenichi Kurita
Shunsuke Managi
Publikationsdatum: 25.01.2022
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications / Ausgabe 1/2022
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Elektronische ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00426-2

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