Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s13280-013-0459-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
In general, approved Total Allowable Catches (TACs) are higher than proposed TACs by the scientific assessment and reported landings approved are higher than approved TAC. We build a simple enforcement agency’s behavior model that generates—as a rational behavior—those two facts. The model has two ingredients. First, there exists illegal fishing generated by an imperfect enforcement technology; second, the enforcement agency cannot commit on announced penalties. We show that lack of commitment increases the potential benefits for national enforcement agency of deviating from proposal (scientific optimal) quotas. Although the enforcement agency wants to announce a low quota target to induce a low level of illegal harvest, it will find optimal to revise the quota announced in order to reduce penalties and improve fishermen welfare. Therefore, agencies find it optimal to approve higher quotas than that proposed by the scientific advice. Our main result is to show that when full compliance is not possible, and national agencies cannot commit, the introduction of Individual Transferable Quotas increases the potential benefits for agencies of deviating from the optimal proposed TAC by the scientific advised.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Supplementary material 1 (PDF 6989 kb)13280_2013_459_MOESM1_ESM.pdf
Antelo, M., D. Rodríguez, and S. Villasante. 2012. The Spanish fishing fleet and the economic value of Southern stock of European hake fishery ( Merluccius merluccius). Ocean and Coastal Management 70: 59–64. CrossRef
Arnason, R. 2002. A review of international experiences with ITQs: An annex to Future options for UK fish quota management. CEMARE Report No. 58, 64 pp.
Arnason, R., 2006. Fisheries enforcement: Basic theory. In Proceedings from the IIFET Biennial Conference 2006, Portsmouth, UK.
Banks, R., K. Stokes, and D. Dews. 2011. MSC assessment report for Spencer Gulf Prawn (Penaeus (Melicertus) latisulcatus) fishery, 221 pp. Sheffield, UK: MSC.
Barret, S. 2007. Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public goods. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bjørndal, T., and D.V. Gordon. 1993. The opportunity cost of capital and optimal vessel size in the Norwegian Fishing Fleet. Land Economics 69: 98–107. CrossRef
Branch, T.A., R. Watson, E.A. Fulton, S. Jennings, C.R. McGilliard, G.T. Pablico, and D. Ricard. 2010. The trophic fingerprint of marine fisheries. Nature 468: 431–435. CrossRef
Buck, E.H. 1995. Individual transferable quotas in fisheries management. Report for Congress by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, DC: The Committee for the National Institute for the Environment.
Chavez, C., and H. Salgado. 2005. Individual transferable quota markets under illegal fishing. Environmental & Resource Economics 31: 303–324. CrossRef
Chavez, C., N. González, and H. Salgado. 2008. ITQs under illegal fishing: An application to the red shrimp fishery in Chile. Marine Policy 32: 570–579. CrossRef
Clark, C.W. 1990. Mathematical bioeconomics: The optimal management of renewable resources, 2nd ed. New York: Wiley.
Costello, C., S.D. Gaines, and J. Lynham. 2008. Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science 321: 1678–1681. CrossRef
Da Rocha, J.M., S. Cerviño, and S. Villasante. 2012a. The Common Fisheries Policy: An enforcement problem. Marine Policy 36: 1309–1314. CrossRef
Da Rocha, J.M., S. Villasante, and R. Trelles González. 2012b. Credible enforcement policies: The role of ITQs in marine social-ecological systems. Beijer Discussion Paper No. 332. Stockholm, Sweden: The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
Dasgupta, P. 2009. Trust and cooperation among economic agents. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society B 364: 3301–3309. CrossRef
Dasgupta, P., and G. Heal. 1979. Economic theory and exhaustible resources. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Emery, T.J., B.S. Green, C. Gardner, and J. Tisdell. 2010. Are input controls required in individual transferable quota fisheries to address ecosystem based fisheries management objectives? Marine Policy 36: 122–131. CrossRef
Einarsson, N. 2013. Private property rights, irreversibility and the potential for alternative governance in fishing: The case of ITQs in Iceland. In Taller Comunidades pesqueras, sociedad civil, estado y mundo científico del diálogo: identificando herramientas para una gobernanza del mar. Fundación Lonxanet, A Coruña, October 23rd 2013.
Essington, T.E. 2010. Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries. The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107: 754–759. CrossRef
Essington, T.E., M. Melnychuk, T.A. Branch, S.S. Heppell, O.P. Jensen, J.S. Link, S.J.D. Martell, A.M. Parma, et al. 2012. Catch shares, fisheries, and ecological stewardship: A comparative analysis of resource responses to a rights-based policy instrument. Conservation Letters 5: 186–195. CrossRef
European Commission (EC). 2011. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, Brussels, 13.7.2011 COM (2011) 417 final; 2011.
Froese, R., and A. Proelss. 2011. Rebuilding fish stocks no later than 2015: Will Europe meet the deadline? Fish and Fisheries 11: 194–202. CrossRef
Furness, R., P. Knapman, J. Nichols, and I. Scott. 2010. MSC assessment report for the Canadian Pacific sablefish (Anoplopoma fimbria) fishery (Version 3, Draft report). Derby, UK: Moody International, Moody Marine.
Grafton, R.Q., and A. McIlgorm. 2009. Ex ante evaluation of the costs and benefits of individual transferable quotas: A case-study of seven Australian commonwealth fisheries. Marine Policy 33: 714–719. CrossRef
Grafton, R.Q., T. Kompas, and R. Hilborn. 2007. Economics of overexploitation revisited. Science 318: 1601. CrossRef
Gutiérrez, N., R. Hilborn, and O. Defeo. 2011. Leadership, social capital and incentives promote successful fisheries. Nature 470: 386–389. CrossRef
Hannesson, R. 2013. Norway’s experience with ITQs. Marine Policy 37: 264–269. CrossRef
Hatcher, A. 2005. Non-compliance and the quota price in an ITQ fishery. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 49: 427–436. CrossRef
Hilborn, R. 2004. Ecosystem-based fisheries management: The carrot or the stick. Marine Ecology Progress Series 274: 275–278.
Jardine, S.J., and J.N. Sanchirico. 2012. Catch share programs in developing countries: A survey of the literature. Marine Policy 36: 1242–1254. CrossRef
Machal, P., P. Lallemand, K. Stokes, and O. Thébaud. 2009. A comparative review of the fisheries resource management systems in New Zealand and in the European Union. Aquatic Living Resources 22: 463–481. CrossRef
Markus, T. 2010. Towards sustainable fisheries subsidies: Entering a new round of reform under the Common Fisheries Policy. Marine Policy 34: 1117–1124. CrossRef
Melnychuk, M.C., T.E. Essington, T.A. Branch, S.S. Heppell, O.P. Jensen, J.S. Link, S.J.D. Martell, A.M. Parma, et al. 2012. Can catch share fisheries better track management targets? Fish and Fisheries 13: 267–290. CrossRef
Munro, G., R. Willmann, and A. Van Houtte. 2005. The conservation and management of shared fish stocks: Legal and economic aspects. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 465. Rome: FAO.
Munro, G.R., B. Turris, C. Clark, U. Sumaila, and M. Bailey. 2009. Impacts of harvesting rights in Canadian Pacific fisheries. Statistics and Economic Analysis Series No. 1-3. Ottawa, Canada: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Economic Analysis and Statistics Branch.
Nielander, W.J., and M.S. Sullivan. 2000. Enforcement and compliance of ITQs: New Zealand and the United States of America. In Use of property rights in fisheries management, ed. R. Shotton, pp. 415–427. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 404/2. Rome: FAO.
Nøstbaken, L. 2008. Fisheries law enforcement—A survey of the economic literature. Marine Policy 32: 293–300. CrossRef
Nøstbaken, L. 2013. Formal and informal quota enforcement. Resource and Energy Economics 35: 191–215. CrossRef
Ostrom, E. 1991. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. 2000. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 137–158. CrossRef
Ostrom, E. 2006. The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61: 149–163. CrossRef
Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner. 1992. Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review 86: 404–417. CrossRef
Parslow, J. 2010. Individual transferable quotas and the “tragedy of the commons”. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science 67: 1889–1896. CrossRef
Pauly, D., T. Branch, and R. Hilborn. 2013. Does catches reflects abundance? Nature 494: 303–306. CrossRef
Strandlund, J.K., and K.K. Dhanda. 1999. Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emission permit system. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 38: 267–282. CrossRef
Sumaila, R. 2010. A cautionary note on individual transferable quotas. Ecology and Society 15: 36.
Sumaila, R., W. Cheung, A. Dyck, K. Gueye, L. Huang, V. Lam, D. Pauly, T. Srinivasan, et al. 2012. Benefits of rebuilding global marine fisheries outweigh costs. PLoS ONE 7: e40542. CrossRef
Teraji, S. 2013. A theory of norm compliance: Punishment and reputation. The Journal of Socio-Economics 44: 1–6. CrossRef
Van Long, N., and S. McWhinnie. 2012. The tragedy of the commons in a fishery when relative performance matters. Ecological Economics 81: 140–154. CrossRef
Vélez, M.A., J.K. Stranlund, and J.J. Murphy. 2012. Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia. Ecological Economics 77: 185–192. CrossRef
Villasante, S. 2010. Global assessment of the European Union fishing fleet: An update. Marine Policy 34: 663–670. CrossRef
Villasante, S., and R. Sumaila. 2010. Estimating the effects of technological efficiency on the European fleet. Marine Policy 34: 720–722. CrossRef
Villasante, S., R. Sumaila, and M. Antelo. 2014. Why cooperation is better? The gains of cooperative management of the Argentine shortfin squid fishery in South America. In Environment and development economics: Essays in honour of Sir Partha Dasgupta, ed. S. Barret, K.-G. Mäler, and E. Maskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walker, B., S. Barret, S. Polasky, V. Galaz, C. Folke, G. Engström, F. Ackerman, K. Arrow, et al. 2009. Looming global scale failures and missing institutions. Science 325: 1345–1346. CrossRef
- Credible Enforcement Policies Under Illegal Fishing: Does Individual Transferable Quotas Induce to Reduce the Gap Between Approved and Proposed Allowable Catches?
José María Da Rocha
Rafael Trelles González
- Springer Netherlands