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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Crowdfunding in the Context of New Institutional Economics

verfasst von : Andrea S. Funk

Erschienen in: Crowdfunding in China

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

New Institutional Economics can help explain why new institutions like crowdfunding arise. Irrespective of their constitution and status, institutions receive their legitimacy from the necessity to restrict and organise transactions and social behaviour. Characteristically, developed countries have stronger institutions and their citizens primarily rely on formal institutions. Although the Chinese government is promoting the formalisation of its institutions, per definition and as of today, the PRC is still a developing or at least a transition country. In particular, in terms of its financial sector, China is struggling to accelerate reforms. Indeed, the majority of its population still relies on informal finance as formal institutions do not meet their demand for finance. This work will argue that crowdfunding has the potential to bridge informal and formal financial institutions in China and eventually support the country’s move towards a developed country with strong institutions.

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Fußnoten
1
Picot et al. (2002, p. 36).
 
2
Williamson (1986, p. 178 ff).
 
3
North (1990, p. 20).
 
4
Rutherford (1989).
 
5
North (1990, p. 11).
 
6
Ibid.
 
7
Ibid.
 
8
Williamson (1975, p. 7).
 
9
Williamson (1990, p. 69).
 
10
Picot et al. (2002, p. 70).
 
11
North (1990, p. 3).
 
12
North (1990, p. 4 ff).
 
13
Hodgson (2006, p. 2).
 
14
Hodgson (2006, p. 9).
 
15
Social institutions “refer to established ways of behaving […] which organize the primary social practices, roles, and relationships within a culture”. (Chandler and Munday 2011, n.p.).
 
16
Hodgson (2006, p. 11).
 
17
North (1990, p. 61).
 
18
North (1990, p. 61). The author explicitly distinguishes between formal rules and informal constraints; however, as informal institutions can likewise enable and formal institutions simultaneously can restrict, the terms rules and constraints are used as synonyms in this work.
 
19
North (1990, p. 6).
 
20
The Coase Theorem proposes that market participants can solve market problems that arose from externalities themselves as long as there are no transactions costs (Coase 1960).
 
21
Chandler and Munday (2011, n.p.).
 
22
Hodgson (2006, p. 2).
 
23
Hodgson (2006, p. 3).
 
24
Hodgson (2006, p. 3 ff).
 
25
Chandler and Munday (2011, n.p.).
 
26
North (1990, p. 34).
 
27
Granville and Leonard (2010).
 
28
Depending on the eye of the beholder, China is either categorised as a developing or a transitory country. Each definition includes certain advantages and disadvantages, depending on the respective situation. For example, a developing status may be supportive to obtain subsidies, whilst a transitory status, for instance, may ease international trade. Thus, the PRC or other actors deliberately using one or the other definition are likely to pursue a certain end.
 
29
In this context, Hall and Soskice (2001) have discussed varieties of capitalism. Depending on the criteria and sector in perspective, China can be located in different categories of capitalism.
 
30
Arrow (1969, p. 1).
 
31
Coase (1937).
 
32
Coase (1937, p. 389).
 
33
North (1990, p. 12).
 
34
North (1990, p. vi).
 
35
Williamson (1985, p. 22).
 
36
North (1990, p. 34).
 
37
Williamson (1986, p. 175).
 
38
Macneil (1978).
 
39
Williamson (1985, p. 69 ff).
 
40
Wallis and North (1986, p. 120).
 
41
Williamson (1985, p. 17 ff, p. 387).
 
42
Williamson (1985, p. 20).
 
43
Williamson (1985, p. 21).
 
44
Dahlmann (1979, p. 148).
 
45
Furubotn and Richter (1991, p. 9).
 
46
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308).
 
47
“[H]uman agents are intendedly rational but only limitedly so. That is manifestly true and massively influences the manner in which the subject of contract is conceived”. (Williamson 1985, p. 388).
 
48
According to Williamson, opportunism “is a condition of self-interest seeking with guile”. (Williamson 1985, p. 30).
 
49
Akerlof (1970, p. 492 ff).
 
50
Goebel (2002, p. 278 ff).
 
51
Williamson (1986, p. 174).
 
52
Ibid.
 
53
Williamson (1985, p. 388 ff).
 
54
Williamson (1986, p. 181).
 
55
Williamson (1986, p. 178).
 
56
Williamson (1986, p. 187).
 
57
Williamson (1986, p. 118).
 
58
Williamson (1986, p. 105).
 
59
Williamson (1986, p. 111).
 
60
Williamson (1986, p. 122).
 
61
Williamson (1986, p. 112).
 
62
Williamson (1986, p. 105).
 
63
Williamson (1986, pp. 112–114).
 
64
Williamson (1986, p. 117 ff).
 
65
Williamson (1986, p. 118).
 
66
Williamson (1986, p. 118).
 
67
Furubotn and Richter (1991, p. 14).
 
68
Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010, p. 7).
 
69
Winborg (2009, p. 72).
 
70
Belleflamme et al. (2014, p. 590).
 
71
Schwienbacher and Larralde (2012, p. 377).
 
72
People’s Bank of China (2014, p. 135). However, private Chinese citizens are allowed to trade with Bitcoins. In fact, “China has become the world’s largest bitcoin trading market.” (Cryptocoinsnews.com n.d., n.p.).
 
73
Harrison (2013).
 
74
The differences of donation-, reward-, debt-, and equity-based crowdfunding are explained in Sect. 3.​1.
 
75
Donaldson (1965).
 
76
Schwienbacher (2007, p. 755).
 
77
Woo et al. (1991).
 
78
Woo et al. (1991, p. 107).
 
79
Miner et al. (1992, p. 112).
 
80
“Novice founders are those that have no prior entrepreneurial experience as either a founder, an inheritor, or a purchaser of a business.” (Westhead and Wright 1998, p. 173).
 
81
“Portfolio founders retain their original business and inherit, establish, and/or purchase another business.” (Westhead and Wright 1998, p. 173).
 
82
“Serial founders are those who sell their original business but at a later date inherit, establish, and/or purchase another business.” (Westhead and Wright 1998, p. 173).
 
83
Westhead and Wright (1998, p. 174).
 
84
Westhead and Wright (1998, p. 177).
 
85
Westhead and Wright (1998, p. 179).
 
86
Westhead and Wright (1998, p. 191).
 
87
80.5% of novice founders, 73.3% of portfolio founders, and 87.9% of serial founders stated that they relied on personal savings and capital from friends and family in order to start-up their venture. (Westhead and Wright 1998, p. 191).
 
88
Westhead and Wright (1998, p. 190). The authors discovered that novice, portfolio and serial founders on average applied a number of 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 sources respectively for their start-up phase. (Westhead and Wright 1998, p. 187).
 
89
Westhead and Wright (1998, p. 190 ff).
 
90
Schwienbacher (2007, p. 754).
 
91
According to (Schwienbacher 2007, p. 759), in terms of financial decisions “portfolio entrepreneurs and opportunistic entrepreneurs share some similarities with serial entrepreneurs, while craftsman entrepreneurs and inventor entrepreneurs resemble life-style entrepreneurs.”
 
92
Schwienbacher (2007, p. 756).
 
93
Schwienbacher (2007, p. 755 ff).
 
94
Schwienbacher (2007, p. 755).
 
95
Schwienbacher (2007, p. 755 ff).
 
96
Benston and Smith (1976, p. 217).
 
97
See e.g. Mas-Colell (2016).
 
98
Benston and Smith (1976, p. 215).
 
99
Draper and Hoag (1978, p. 595).
 
100
Benston and Smith (1976, p. 215 ff).
 
101
Benston and Smith (1976, p. 222).
 
102
Ibid.
 
103
Benston and Smith (1976, p. 223).
 
104
This dissertation will not further analyse securities markets.
 
105
Xie et al. (2016, p. 10).
 
106
Ibid.
 
107
Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2007, p. 4 ff).
 
108
Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2007, p. 5 ff).
 
109
Lapavitsas (2013a).
 
110
Boston University (2014, 35:25).
 
111
Boston University (2014, 45:18).
 
112
Boston University (2014, 46:05).
 
113
Boston University (2014, 49:33).
 
114
Boston University (2014, 51:42).
 
115
Boston University (2014, 24:36–25:30).
 
116
Piketty (2014).
 
117
Bofinger and Scheuermeyer (2015).
 
118
Lapavitsas used the term “re-regulation”, see above.
 
119
Lapavitsas (2013b).
 
120
Boston University (2014, 1:18:50).
 
121
Lapavitsas refers to the global financial crisis of 2007–2009.
 
122
Boston University (2014, 1:21:40).
 
123
Jiang (2009a, p. 12).
 
124
Adams and Fitchett (1992b, p. 2).
 
125
Adams (1992, p. 18).
 
126
Wai (1957).
 
127
Hsu (2009, p. 4).
 
128
Callier (1990, p. 273).
 
129
See e.g. Maloney and Ahmed (1988) directing at Bangladesh; Bell (1990) contemplating India; Lamberte (1992) concentrating on the Philippines; amongst others.
 
130
See e.g. Larson and Urquidi (1987), Adams and Canavesi (1992).
 
131
Begashaw (1978).
 
132
Graham and Cuevas (1990).
 
133
Shipton (1992).
 
134
Baydas et al. (1995).
 
135
Besley and Levenson (1996).
 
136
Madestam (2014).
 
137
Adams and Fitchett (1992b, p. 3).
 
138
Mohieldin and Wright (2000, p. 658).
 
139
Wai (1992, p. 344).
 
140
Wai (1992, p. 339 ff).
 
141
Adams and Fitchett (1992a, p. xi).
 
142
Adams (1992, p. 7).
 
143
Adams and Fitchett (1992b, p. 2).
 
144
Jiang (2009a).
 
145
Wai (1992, p. 338).
 
146
Bouman and Moll (1992, p. 211).
 
147
Adams (1992, p. 20).
 
148
Wai (1992, p. 343).
 
149
Wai (1992, p. 339).
 
150
Ibid.
 
151
Acharya et al. (2013).
 
152
McCulley (2007).
 
153
Pozsar et al. (2012, p. 1).
 
154
Pozsar et al. (2012, p. 7 ff).
 
155
Pozsar et al. (2012, p. 13).
 
156
See e.g. Wei and Burns (2016).
 
157
Pozsar et al. (2012, p. 10).
 
158
Wei and Burns (2016, p. 2).
 
159
Jiang (2009a, p. 26).
 
160
See e.g. Besley and Levenson (1996); Tsai (2002); Madestam (2014); amongst others.
 
161
Hsu (2009, p. 4).
 
162
Adams (1992, p. 6).
 
163
Tsai (2002), Adams and Fitchett (1992a), amongst others.
 
164
Adams (1992, p. 19 ff).
 
165
Li (2009, p. 53).
 
166
Wai (1992, p. 337 ff).
 
167
Adams (1992, p. 16).
 
168
Adams and Canavesi (1992, p. 320).
 
169
Adams and Canavesi (1992, p. 19).
 
170
Deposits.org (2016).
 
171
Inflation.eu (n.d.).
 
172
See Sect. 2.4.1.
 
173
Adams (1992, p. 19).
 
174
This characteristic of informal finance reflects its unorganised connotation.
 
175
Li (2009, p. 43).
 
176
Baydas et al. (1995, p. 652).
 
177
Jiang (2009b, p. 60).
 
178
Wai (1992, p. 343).
 
179
Adams and Fitchett 1992b, p. 3 ff; Wai (1992, p. 342 ff).
 
180
See e.g. Callier (1990); Besley and Levenson (1996).
 
181
Wai (1992, p. 343).
 
182
Alijani et al. (2016, p. 210).
 
183
Alijani et al. (2016, p. 222).
 
184
Pischke (1992, p. 327).
 
185
Pischke (1992, p. 334).
 
186
Pischke (1992, p. 330).
 
187
Pischke (1992, p. 329).
 
188
Pischke (1992, p. 326 ff).
 
189
Gugerty (2007, p. 278).
 
190
Levenson and Besley (1996).
 
191
Donoso et al. (2011, p. 191).
 
192
Benda (2013, p. 232).
 
193
Pischke (1992, p. 327).
 
194
However, in fact, the members do not have to meet all in person in order to form a group; it is sufficient if the organiser approaches each member, collects the deposits and finally disburses it to the one who is entitled to receive the hand. (Pischke 1992, p. 328).
 
195
Pischke (1992, p. 328).
 
196
Guha and Gupta (2005, p. 1473).
 
197
In contrast to ordinary members of a ROSCA, the organiser commonly bears a larger share of the overall transaction costs. Yet, she is often compensated for the latter by receiving the first hand of the cycle (Pischke 1992, p. 327).
 
198
Pischke (1992, p. 329).
 
199
“Inflation of course skews the benefits of ROSCAs when the hand consists of a fixed amount of currency. This may be accommodated by distributing the hand by auction, by shortening the life of the ROSCA, by specifying that ROSCA payments [are] made in kind, by requiring payment in dollars, or by reversing the order or rotation in subsequent cycles” (Pischke 1992, p. 332).
 
200
Pischke (1992, p. 330).
 
201
Pischke (1992, p. 331).
 
202
Ibid.
 
203
“Ease” of verification is a synonym for “convenience and speed” of verification. (Arner et al. 2015, p. 38).
 
204
Dunkley (2016, n.p.).
 
205
Xie et al. (2016, p. 1).
 
206
Arner et al. (2015, p. 4).
 
207
Yang (2016).
 
208
Arner et al. (2015, p. 4).
 
209
Ibid.
 
210
Direct banks are “banks without physical branches” (Arner et al. 2015, p. 11).
 
211
Arner et al. (2015, p. 6).
 
212
Arner et al. (2015, p. 15 ff).
 
213
Arner et al. (2015, p. 17).
 
214
Arner et al. (2015, p. 33).
 
215
Arner et al. (2015, p. 17).
 
216
Jumpstart Our Business Startups: H.R.3606 (2012, p. 1).
 
217
See also Sect. 3.​3.​1.
 
218
Arner et al. (2015, p. 18).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Crowdfunding in the Context of New Institutional Economics
verfasst von
Andrea S. Funk
Copyright-Jahr
2019
Buch
Crowdfunding in China

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-97252-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-97253-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2019

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97253-4_2