The iterated Even-Mansour (EM) scheme is a generalization of the original 1-round construction proposed in 1991, and can use one key, two keys, or completely independent keys. In this paper, we methodically analyze the security of all the possible iterated Even-Mansour schemes with two
-bit keys and up to four rounds, and show that none of them provides more than
-bit security. Our attacks are based on a new cryptanalytic technique called
which splits the cipher to different parts in a novel way, such that they can be analyzed independently, exploiting its self-similarity properties. After the analysis of the parts, the key suggestions are efficiently joined using a meet-in-the-middle procedure.
As a demonstration of the multibridge technique, we devise a new attack on 4 steps of the LED-128 block cipher, reducing the time complexity of the best known attack on this scheme from 2
. Furthermore, we show that our technique can be used as a generic key-recovery tool, when combined with some statistical distinguishers (like those recently constructed in reflection cryptanalysis of GOST and PRINCE).