Cyber and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Challenges

This paper is focused on the concept of CBRN security paradigm and how this concept is affecting the international community on develop and maintain an appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport; on the develop and maintain an appropriate physical protection; on the develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts. Basically on the develop and maintain all the actions needed to reduce risks.

The article highlights the strong relevance and crucial importance of cyber security defence and response capacities in CBRNeCy assets and management, including in ICS and SCADA systems. Based on the overview of the recent cyber security publications and available information on global cybercrime, it reviews types of cyber and cyber related physical attacks on CBRN Industrial Control Systems; classifies attack types and defence techniques by network layer of attack; analyses security testing approaches based on knowledge of the targeted system, and evaluates types of due protection. The proper combination of existing physical security measures and cyber security testing exercises is considered, by the authors, as one of the most efficient ways to ensure sufficient protection against increasing global cyber threats to CBRNeCy infrastructures. The paper deals also with the best security practises, and contains enumeration of the globally recognized testing techniques and methodologies required to design effective multi-disciplinary security measures, thus providing a substantial ground for their practical implementation in the areas of concern.

At its summits, NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. Some of the summit declarations led to concrete results that are still influencing presence and future, such as NATO’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (CJ-CBRND-TF), the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRND COE) in Vyškov, the Joint CBRN Defence Capability Development Group (JCBRND-CDG) and – of course – NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN threats. The Framework Nations Concept (FNC) Cluster on CBRN Protection might join these success stories.

This chapter is to update the assessment of potential military applications of nanotechnology published in 2006. Expecting nanotechnology to bring the next industrial revolution, around 2000 many countries started research and development (R&D) programs. In particular in the US National Nanotechnology Initiative, military aspects have figured prominently, with a budget share around 30% until 2008, then slowly decreasing to about 10%. While applications are increasingly emphasized, most of the work is still at the research stage. Many other countries do military R&D of nanotechnology, too, but apparently at a much lower level of funding. Rough estimates of 2006 about when specific military applications would arrive have turned out about correct in one third of the cases, but for the others the expected arrival times have to be postponed by five to 10 years.

When re-considering the list of potential military applications, the 30 areas given in 2006 still seem appropriate. Also their evaluation under criteria of preventive arms control does not need to be changed. The eight applications that would be particularly dangerous to arms control and international humanitarian law, to international peace and military stability, or to humans and societies in peace time, remain the same: small sensors, small missiles, small satellites, small robots, metal-free firearms, implants and other body manipulation, autonomous weapon systems, and new biochemical weapons. They should be subject to specific international bans or limits as proposed in 2006.

The large use of chemical substances in our normal life, doesn’t give the real perception of the potential threats that these substances pose if used for a terrorist attack. For example chlorine or ammonia, that are some of the most common chemical substances in our life, may have a catastrophic impact if used for a malevolent action. To this end, OPCW, the International Organization responsible for the application of the Chemical Weapons Convention, exercises control over all chemical substances that can be used as Chemical Weapons. Another aspect to be considered is the response in case of intentional or unintentional chemical release in terms of preparation, training of first responders, decision-makers, and other stakeholders involved in case of a CBRN incident and sharing of best practices. To be fully prepared to respond to, and recover from, the consequences of a CBRN incident, the actors involved (i.e. first responders, CBRN specialists, decision-makers) must be fully aware of their responsibilities and duties in mitigating potential threats and related likely hazards. The current nature of a CBRN incident and its trans-border effects imply that civil-military interaction/cooperation is necessary. So the importance of developing and implementing a comprehensive approach and the link between civil and military preparedness, resilience, deterrence and defence is nowadays well acknowledged. This paper provides a general overview of chemical threats, of preventive actions to control the spread of chemical substances, of requirements to cope with cases of chemical release, highlighting the need for a national response organization in order to assure safety and security of populations.

Paper is describing basic postulates of product development of CBRN/HAZMAT equipment, current status in development protocols of the different equipment with recognized reviews, with emphasis on how much feedback of end-user appears to have been used in finalization of the product for serial/commercial production. As well, special emphasis is placed on views based on comparison of the trials in the laboratory conditions to a full scope investigation in as much realistic conditions as possible, and by using real live agents-contaminants, performed by experienced end-users. Experiences and results of this paper are presented comparatively for several types of current products used by experienced CBRN operators, both in real operations and in live agent field trials and trainings/exercises. Proposals and recommendations are given for more complex systematic integration and cooperation of product developers with end-users of CBRN equipment in implementing feedback from early trials in as near as possible live agent conditions (and not from just more controlled laboratory environment).

Over the last few years a broad array of organizations have practiced terrorism with the aim to achieve political, criminal, religious, and ideological goals. These acts have revitalized awareness of the threat of attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. In particular radiological and nuclear methods are likely to be pursued by well organised terrorist groups, particularly those which have access to financial resources. The objective of this paper is to provide the reader with basic knowledge of possible radiological and nuclear events and the potential risks they pose. The document focuses on the characteristics of radiologic and nuclear agents as well as on the basics of response. Ultimately, this article explores how emerging technology has been infusing additional complexity into the global radiological and nuclear threat scenario.

The active remote sensing standoff detection is a very interesting methodology that could be used with the aim to reduce the risk for the health, in the case of intentional (terrorism or war) or accidental (natural or incident event) diffusion in the air of chemical agents. At the present day, there are several laser-based methodologies that could be applied for this aim but the future developments seem to be the integration of two methodologies. The integration of two methodologies could guarantee the development of a network of low-cost laser based systems for chemical detection integrated with a more sophisticated layout able to identify the nature of a release that could be used only in the case that the anomalies are detected. The requirements for standoff detection and identification are discussed in this paper, including the technologies and some examples for chemical traces detection and identification. The paper will include novel techniques and tools not tested yet in operative environments and the preliminary results will be presented.

The threats to information security have dramatically increased with the proliferation of information systems and the internet. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNe) facilities need to address these threats in order to protect themselves from the loss of intellectual property, theft of valuable or hazardous materials, and sabotage. Project 19 of the European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative is designed to help CBRN security managers, information technology/cybersecurity managers, and other decision-makers deal with these threats through the application of cost-effective information security programs. Project 19 has developed three guidance documents that are publically available to cover information security best practices, planning for an information security management system, and implementing security controls for information security.

Biorisk Management Culture (BRMC) is a subset of an organizational culture that emphasizes responsible conduct in life sciences, biosafety, and biosecurity. BRMC is further defined as an assembly of beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of behavior of individuals and organizations that can support, complement or enhance operating procedures, rules, and practices as well as professional standards and ethics designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, and diversion of biological agents, related materials, technology or equipment, and the unintentional or intentional exposure to (or release from biocontainment of) biological agents. Effective BRMC could also significantly contribute to preventing proliferation of biological weapons as an integral part of a comprehensive WMD non-proliferation strategy including culture. Given the complexity of biosafety/biosecurity oversight systems, the need for evidence-based decision-making (e.g. on staffing, areas for improvement, choice of training programs), and the ability to detect behavioral changes associated with a particular intervention, it is important to periodically assess the strengths and weaknesses of BRMC. The purpose of this paper is to apply the experience in culture assessment and enhancement accumulated in other domains to biorisk management with due regard for its special features. This methodology is not prescriptive and leaves much latitude to its users. With appropriate modifications, the model can be applicable to a wide range of institutions including biological research and public health laboratories, diagnostic facilities, and bioproduction facilities. The BRMC and its systematic assessment (conducted periodically) are critical to understanding inter alia, the role of the human factor, the strengths and weaknesses of the bio-risk management framework, causality of system breakdowns or analysis of incidents, sources of human error or breaches of biosafety/biosecurity, and the effectiveness of training.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been an intensified global effort to keep nuclear materials and weapons out of the hands of terrorists and non-state actors. This began with the creation and subsequent significant expansion of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, further intensifying after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. President Obama provided a special focus on this issue through the creation of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process, resulting in four heads-of-state meetings. However, the NSS process did not address many of the difficult questions that could significantly strengthen nuclear security and constructed a weak bridge to future improvements. With the conclusion of the summits, the political momentum created by them is rapidly decreasing and the issue is settling back into the bureaucratic channels. The challenge now is how best to address the nuclear policy gaps and new threat challenges in a post-summit environment.

The paper addresses some important issues related to the need for a timely, reliable and accurate tool for the early warning in case of CBRNe events. The state-of-the-art of the currently available tools is briefly presented in the first part of the two-papers set. While the accurate calculation of the dispersion of both lighter- and heavier-than-air contaminants in complex three-dimensional domains is definitely possible with commercially available CFD packages, the time needed to obtain a reliable numerical solution, under the pertinent atmospheric conditions prevailing at the time of the attack, exceeds the requirements of a first-aid intervention. Therefore, it would be advisable to combine these CFD packages with some sort of “intelligent” Decision Support System that makes use of multidisciplinary knowledge base and of some kind of detection-diagnostic-prognostic Expert System. The DSS could be interfaced with some standard early detection tools and ought to include an enhanced diagnostic/prognostic utility based on a specific series of local CFD simulations of dispersion events. Its use ought to be relatively easy for trained personnel. Since the database for the CFD dispersion calculation is by definition “local”, detailed maps of the presumable target areas must be included in the database. The second part of this paper presents a detailed description and one example of application of such an Expert Assisted CFD dispersion calculation, named FAST-HELPS (Fast Hazard estimate of low-level particles spread).

Migration is part of human history since ancient times; this phenomenon can result from several reasons, through which are delivered, as well as individuals, the main characteristics of the societies of origin. Currently, several theories relate the spread of international terrorism with migration, particularly by supporting the close relationship between migration, religious extremism and terrorist events. Other literature considers terrorism as a phenomenon with characteristics similar to a disease, for many common aspects with specific illness, such as cancer or psychiatric pathologies. In this review, the correlations between migration and terrorism are analysed and the different theories that consider terrorism similar to a disease are considered.

We witness today a global spread of threat of use of toxic chemicals as a means of warfare or terror. The recent use of chemical weapons and chemicals as weapons in Syria, and terrorist attacks against chemical infrastructure are visible confirmations of a growing threat of misuse of chemicals. The threat is today coming not only from a few rough states but mainly from the groups operating in territories not controlled by the governments and non-state actors. While the globalization and spread of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) industries and materials are rapid and very dynamic, international responses and regulatory mechanisms in the area of prevention, preparedness and response against misuse of these agents, especially chemical agents, remain weak. The answer is to move towards global chemical safety and security architecture. A global chemical safety and security architecture, free from political limitations should be built within two core processes. A first process is a continued development of a global chemical safety and security culture. The second one is the development of the global market for chemical safety and security.

‘Risk’ and ‘risk assessment’ rhetoric has become pervasive in twenty-first century politics and policy discourses. Although a number of different meanings of ‘risk’ are evident, the concept frequently purports to be an objectively, quantifiable and rational process based on the likelihood and consequences of adverse events. However, using the example of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), this chapter argues that security-related risks are not always objectively analysable, let alone quantifiable. Moreover, the process of risk assessment is not always ‘rational’. This is, first, because efforts to quantify CBW-related risks normally require a body of data from which to inform assessments of probability when in fact there are limitations in data pertaining to the human dimension of CBW terrorism; with considerable gaps in knowledge of CBW incidents and a need for caution because of the emotive power of allegations of association with CBW. Second because the consequences of a CBW event are often informed by a wide range of variables, which make such weapons highly unpredictable. Third because conclusions that are drawn from any dataset often depend on the questions asked and the assumptions and values that ‘subjectify’ risk calculations, not least depending on if and how ‘expertise’ on risk is defined. This is not to say that risk assessment is not important, but that CBW risks might require a combination of a more rational phase of risk characterization with a more ‘subjective’ process of risk evaluation that acknowledges uncertainty of probabilistic modelling, deals with ambiguity, and opens-up the questions and assumptions that inform the risk assessment process to wider scrutiny and to the consideration of social and other factors.

CBRNe defense and its effectiveness depend on up-to-date education and realistic training programs. Such programs should allow confirmation through verification; therefore, they also require standards. CBRNe risks have been changing significantly over the last years, and such changes should be reflected in education and training programs. The combination of theoretical education and practical training is the best approach to minimize risks stemming from CBRNe materials and their malicious use. This article will analyze CBRNe education and training; more specifically, focus will be placed on both the theoretical education of First Responders and their realistic, practical training, including live agent training. How realistic does an education and training program have to be to counter current CBRNe risks? Is the use of CBR substances for training an essential element? And if so, can those substances be used safely for individual and/or collective training? According to the Author, realistic training can only be delivered when CBR materials are used; the benefits of combining theoretical education and realistic live agent training with CBR materials outweigh the related occupational risks, thus being essential parts of any effective CBRNE training program. Data from live agent trainings and their analysis will support this theory.

“Chemical security” is not a new topic, and in fact has been for some time an integral requirement in the daily operations in the chemical industry. Chemical security has been discussed and addressed for many years, but became an international issue after key events like Seveso and 9/11. These two events were followed by regulations that focused on security and in the case of 9/11 the creation of a federal agency in the United States with a primary focus on the security of critical infrastructure including the chemical industry. After years of being an industry-driven effort of less international significance than biological, radiological and nuclear events, the chemical industry and “chemical security” in general came to the forefront of government and public concern.

Chemicals are part of daily life. They are essential, amongst others, to fight disease, produce and preserve food, provide clean water, manufacture goods, and provide energy. But chemicals also can be exploited for hostile purposes. Certain precursor chemicals, for example, can be converted into chemical weapons, prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Other industrial chemicals can be used directly as improvised weapon given their toxicity or explosiveness. Access to, use and transfers of chemicals therefore are subject to strict controls. Balancing chemical security objectives with ensuring that chemical products can legitimately be use is complicated and requires a multi-stakeholder governance approach. It requires legislation and administrative measures, but also voluntary compliance assurance by the manufacturers and users of chemicals. This paper provides an overview on the chemical risks embedded in today’s society, explains how trends in science, technology and commerce may affect this threat environment, and discusses good practices to prevent misuse and mitigate risks.

Nowadays threats are diffuse and hybrid with a pertinent “role” of non-state actors. Criminal networks are capable of quickly exploiting vulnerabilities in the security environment.

The global security environment remains extremely dynamic. New security challenges and threats are increasingly blended and integrated. Many of the governmental structures in the countries with whom the EU is working in the field of external relations will struggle to cope with these challenges.

All these developments require the EU to revisit its response options. This paper proposes a number of steps to simplify the overall architecture of the EU’s external financing assistance. It makes a number of recommendations on the focus of cooperation. Based on the experience under the EU CBRN risk mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative and EU policy to promote cybersecurity, it recommends that greater emphasis be placed on addressing governance issues in order to deal more effectively with the new security challenges.