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2013 | Buch

Cyber Security

Deterrence and IT Protection for Critical Infrastructures

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Über dieses Buch

The experts of the International Working Group-Landau Network Centro Volta (IWG-LNCV) discuss aspects of cyber security and present possible methods of deterrence, defense and resilience against cyber attacks. This SpringerBrief covers state-of-the-art documentation on the deterrence power of cyber attacks and argues that nations are entering a new cyber arms race. The brief also provides a technical analysis of possible cyber attacks towards critical infrastructures in the chemical industry and chemical safety industry. The authors also propose modern analyses and a holistic approach to resilience and security of Industrial Control Systems. The combination of contextual overview and future directions in the field makes this brief a useful resource for researchers and professionals studying systems security, data security and data structures. Advanced-level students interested in data security will also find this brief a helpful guide to recent research.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Cyber as Deterrent
Abstract
“Cyber as Deterrent” authored by Maurizio Martellini and Sandro Gaycken, is a state-of-the-art document on the deterrence power of cyber attacks. It is divided in five parts: the first explains some characteristics relevant to understand the specifics of cybered deterrence; the second one explores possible doctrines of cybered deterrence and their effects; the third one will determine relevant features for the design of a force posture; the fourth analyses the dilemmas stemming from the uncertainty of attribution of an attack, that’s to say escalating or refrain from continuing the counterattack; the fifth part compares cybered deterrence and nuclear deterrence, concluding that the basic benchmarks underpinning nuclear deterrence are not effective for cyber warfare, and that “cyber as a deterrent” doesn’t seem like a valid tool in comparable situations of serious crisis among states.
Sandro Gaycken, Maurizio Martellini
Cybersecurity and Cyber Weapons: Is Nonproliferation Possible?
Abstract
Cybersecurity and Cyber Weapons: is Nonproliferation possible?” by Clay Wilson, deals with the argument that several international organizations now describe malicious codes as a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and argue that nations are entering a new cyber arms race. Dr. Wilson questions whether it is possible to manage the global spread of malicious cyber weapons by using methods for nonproliferation in the ways they were used to control traditional nuclear weapons. The paper also discusses emerging threats from malicious cyber code, and describes characteristics of cyber weapons that some organizations now classify as Weapons of Mass Destruction, similar to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) WMD.
Clay Wilson
Cyber Security for Nuclear Power Plants
Abstract
Cyber Security for Nuclear Power Plants by Thomas Shea and Sandro Gaycken and Maurizio Martellini is a meticulous analysis of the current situation regarding the security of Nuclear Power Plants. It describes the current stage, outlining the motivations of potential cyberattacks and how they could be carried out. It proceeds in presenting an all-comprehensive security circle that provides opportunities for engagement and collaboration to deal with cyberissues at various levels. Since this paper was presented at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit of 2012, it ends with useful recommended action for the Summit to take, in order to ensure that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is not vulnerable to cyberattacks.
Thomas Shea, Sandro Gaycken, Maurizio Martellini
Cyber Security for Chemical Plants
Abstract
“Cyber Security for Chemical Plants” by Maurizio Martellini, Stephanie Meulenbelt and Krzysztof Paturej provides a technical analysis of possible cyber attacks towards critical infrastructures in chemical industry and chemical safety. The paper analyses attacks and possible countermeasures such as those aimed at sabotage, those exploit the SCADA systems like Stuxnet, and those aimed at espionage, such as Flame. The paper also pictures a possible involvement of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in cyber security for chemical plants.
Maurizio Martellini, Stephanie Meulenbelt, Krzysztof Paturej
From Fortress to Resilience
Abstract
“From Fortress to Resilience” written by Maurizio Martellini, Sandro Bologna and Alessandro Fasani, outlines firstly the need for differentiating approaches between dealing with cyber attacks against critical infrastructures, that must be dealt by engineers, and cyber attacks against government infrastructures and institutions, that must be dealt by the intelligence. The paper then focuses on the imperative of moving from a “fortress” to a “resilience” approach, that’s to say from a preventive, passive defense to an holistic one that can adapt to diverse cyber attacks and can recover and recover quickly when systems are damaged.
Sandro Bologna, Alessandro Fasani, Maurizio Martellini
Cyber Security and Resilience of Industrial Control Systems and Critical Infrastructures
Abstract
“Cyber Security And Resilience Of Industrial Control Systems And Critical Infrastructures”, written by Maurizio Martellini, Sandro Bologna and Alessandro Fasani, it’s a natural follow-up of the previous paper and describes what Industrial Control Systems are, provides an analysis on what are the main vulnerabilities affecting ICS and describes the principal methodologies for attacking them. Then, the paper defines what measures could be taken in order to make ICS and Critical Infrastructures resilient. The document ends outlining what international measures are being taken in order to protect critical infrastructure and their systems.
Sandro Bologna, Alessandro Fasani, Maurizio Martellini
Metadaten
Titel
Cyber Security
herausgegeben von
Maurizio Martellini
Copyright-Jahr
2013
Electronic ISBN
978-3-319-02279-6
Print ISBN
978-3-319-02278-9
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02279-6