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2022 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Decentralized Blockchain Technology: Towards a Trusted and Transparent Beneficial Ownership Regime

verfasst von : Paul Michael Gilmour

Erschienen in: Financial Technology and the Law

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Dieses Kapitel befasst sich mit dem Einsatz der Blockchain-Technologie zur Verbesserung der Transparenz von Unternehmen durch die Führung von Registern wirtschaftlicher Eigentumsrechte. Er beginnt mit der Diskussion des globalen Problems der illegalen Offshore-Finanzierung und der Herausforderungen, die die gegenwärtigen Systeme wirtschaftlichen Eigentums mit sich bringen. Der Autor hebt das Potenzial der Blockchain hervor, ein vertrauenswürdiges und transparentes System zu schaffen, das die Möglichkeiten für Geldwäsche und Steuerhinterziehung verringert. Das Kapitel untersucht auch die technischen Aspekte der Blockchain, wie ihre dezentrale Beschaffenheit und kryptographische Prozesse, und wie diese angewendet werden können, um die Verifizierung und Weitergabe wirtschaftlicher Eigentumsinformationen zu verbessern. Darüber hinaus werden die Herausforderungen und potenziellen Lösungen für die Implementierung der Blockchain-Technologie in einem globalen Kontext diskutiert und die Notwendigkeit internationaler Zusammenarbeit und regulatorischer Leitlinien betont. Das Kapitel schließt mit der Betonung der Bedeutung der Blockchain-Technologie, um die AML-Bemühungen zu stärken und eine bessere Transparenz der Unternehmen zu gewährleisten.
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Vorheriges Kapitel Where’s Wally? FATF, Virtual Asset Service Providers, and the Regulatory Jurisdictional Challenge
Nächstes Kapitel Evolving Regulatory Frameworks: Blockchain as a Form of Trust—Comparative Evidence
Fußnoten
1
See Radon and Achuthan (2017), p. 90.
 
2
It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement. See Financial Action Task Force (2014), p. 8.
 
3
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recognises the involvement of complex structures in obscuring corporate transparency. See Chandra (2020), p. 178.
 
4
Gilmour (2020) identifies the moral, legal, and practical challenges in implementing the UK’s registers of beneficial owners.
 
5
Konstantinidis et al. (2018), p. 1.
 
6
For an explanation of how bitcoin system operates, see Nakamoto’s (2008) seminal paper.
 
7
Ølnes (2016), p. 262.
 
8
A novel model centred on confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of public sector records is presented in Warkentin and Orgeron (2019), p. 3.
 
9
See Yli-Huumo et al. (2016), p. 21.
 
10
International Monetary Fund (2000), para. 5.
 
11
See Otusanya and Lauwo (2012), pp. 337–338.
 
12
Zucman (2014), p. 139.
 
13
Henry (2016), pp. 79–81; see also Bohoslavsky (2018), p. 752.
 
14
Henry (2016), pp. 79–81.
 
15
Bohoslavsky (2018), p. 754.
 
16
Botiş (2014).
 
17
See Botiş (2014); Georgiou (2017); Ojala (2018).
 
18
Ojala (2018).
 
19
For a comprehensive discussion on secrecy jurisdictions, see Christensen (2012).
 
20
Tax Justice Network (n.d.).
 
21
Gregory (2011).
 
22
Oei and Ring (2018).
 
23
Aluko and Bagheri (2012).
 
24
See also Aluko and Bagheri (2012), p. 446.
 
25
See Financial Action Task Force (2014) for guidance on beneficial ownership transparency.
 
26
See Rusanov and Pudovochkin (2018), p. 23; Transparency International EU (2016), p. 15.
 
27
See Hendriyetty and Grewal (2017), p. 67.
 
28
Christensen (2012), p. 328.
 
29
Young and Woodiwiss (2021).
 
30
Zali and Maulidi (2018).
 
31
Financial Action Task Force (2012).
 
32
See also Rusanov and Pudovochkin (2018).
 
33
For criticisms of the traditional three-stage ‘placement-layering-integration’ model, see Murray (2018); Cassella (2018).
 
34
See Cassella (2018); Gilmour (2020); Naheem (2015); Teichmann (2020).
 
35
Brown (2016); Cassella (2018).
 
36
Naheem (2015).
 
37
Murray (2018),
 
38
Turner (2011).
 
39
Financial Action Task Force (2018).
 
40
See Umar et al. (2020).
 
41
Gilmour (2021).
 
42
See He (2010); Le Nguyen (2018); Stack (2015).
 
43
Le Nguyen (2018).
 
44
Sharman (2010), pp. 127–128.
 
45
Jancsics (2017).
 
46
See also Pacini and Wadlinger (2018).
 
47
Jancsics (2017).
 
48
Pacini and Wadlinger (2018).
 
49
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (2016).
 
50
See van der Does de Willebois et al. (2011).
 
51
Campbell (2018).
 
52
See Campbell (2018); Pacini and Wadlinger (2018).
 
53
For several case studies demonstrating the misuse of trusts, see Global Witness (2017).
 
54
See Levi (2021).
 
55
For useful insights into the role of professional intermediaries in facilitating money laundering, see Lord et al. (2018, 2019).
 
56
See Martínez Cruz (2020), p. 146.
 
57
See also Martínez Cruz (2020).
 
58
He (2010); Lord, et al. (2018).
 
59
See Christensen (2012), p. 333.
 
60
See also Forstater (2017); Noseda (2017).
 
61
Le Nguyen (2018).
 
62
Böszörmenyi and Scheighofer (2015); Yeoh (2018).
 
63
See Gilmour (2020), p. 730.
 
64
Chandra (2020), p. 181; Raweh et al. (2017).
 
65
See Nance (2018); Teichmann (2020).
 
66
For early developments on AML controls, see Nance (2018), pp. 113–114.
 
67
Mugarura (2020); Jayasekara (2020).
 
68
Alldridge (2008); Financial Action Task Force (2012).
 
69
For example, see Nance (2018), p. 117; and Simmons (2001). Most EU Member States, remain influential members of FATF insofar how anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorism financing (CTF) requirements are implemented internationally. See Borlini and Montanaro (2017).
 
70
See Drezner (2007).
 
71
Nance (2018); see also de Koker (2014).
 
72
This CDD process is underpinned by the ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) principle rooted in many Western governments’ AML regimes. See Le Nguyen (2018).
 
73
The customer due diligence regime is discussed in some detail in Zali and Maulidi (2018).
 
74
See Zali and Maulidi (2018).
 
75
Gilmour (2020).
 
76
Gilmour (2020).
 
77
See de Koker (2014), p. 285.
 
78
Nanyun and Nasiri (2020).
 
79
Cassella (2018); Chaikin (2017). The first Anti-Money Laundering Directive (1AMLD) introduced in 1991 recognized the role of beneficial ownership in money laundering, by requiring obliged institutions within Member States to verify their customers’ identity and report suspicions of money laundering. Subsequent updates have largely followed FATF Recommendations.
 
80
See Salas (2005).
 
81
See Gilmour (2020).
 
82
Jourová (2017); Unger (2017); Zagaris (2018). For further insight into scope of beneficial ownership registers, see Gilmour (2020).
 
83
For a critical overview of the EU’s 4th AMLD’s legal framework, which advocated for a risk-based approach to CDD, see Campbell (2018); Gilmour (2020).
 
84
Global Witness (2018).
 
85
See Mor (2018); Mourant (2017).
 
86
See Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018).
 
87
Mor (2018). Such strides are especially important considering that FATF’s 2007 critical evaluation report identified failures in the UK’s beneficial ownership regime at that time.
 
88
The newly enacted Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) is part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (H.R. 6395).
 
89
See Greytak (2021); Kontrimas et al. (2021); Aguilar and Charnas (2020).
 
90
Quinlivan (2020) provides a comprehensive list of exemptions.
 
91
For example, publicly listed companies, companies having more than 20 full-time employees, and those having a physical office address within the US, are exempt, along with inactive businesses holding no assets or ownership interest in any corporation. See Greytak (2021); Open Ownership (2021); Quinlivan (2020).
 
92
Ferranti et al. (2021).
 
93
The CTA defines the beneficial owner of a corporate entity as a person who exerts ‘substantial control’ over the entity, or who directly or indirectly, owns or controls more than 25% of the ownership interest in it. See Greytak (2021); Ferranti et al. (2021).
 
94
Thomas-James (2020).
 
95
See Thomas-James (2020), pp. 1009–1011.
 
96
Nakamoto (2008).
 
97
See Barber et al. (2012); Simser (2015).
 
98
Brown (2016).
 
99
See Nakamoto (2008), p. 7. For further discussions on bitcoin, see Bashir (2017); Casino et al. (2019).
 
100
See also Bashir (2017); Mukhopadhyay (2018); Simser (2015).
 
101
Belonick (2020); Iansiti and Lakhani (2017).
 
102
Belonick (2020).
 
103
Lage et al. (2019).
 
104
Turner et al. (2018).
 
105
See Conte de Leon et al. (2017); Yeoh (2017).
 
106
Wang et al. (2021).
 
107
For example, see Conte de Leon et al. (2017); Orcutt (2018).
 
108
See Conte de Leon et al. (2017), p. 288.
 
109
Yli-Huumo et al. (2016).
 
110
Barber et al. (2012).
 
111
See also Barber et al. (2012).
 
112
Reynolds and Irwin (2017).
 
113
See Barber et al. (2012); Konstantinidis et al. (2018).
 
114
Mikołajewicz-Woźniak and Scheibe (2015).
 
115
Al-Saqqa and Almajali (2020).
 
116
Belonick (2020).
 
117
Lage et al. (2019).
 
118
Norta et al. (2019).
 
119
See Al-Saqqa and Almajali (2020), p. 7.
 
120
Saad et al. (2021).
 
121
See Saad et al. (2021), p. 1961.
 
122
See also Kovačević (n.d.).
 
123
See Casino et al. (2019); Konstantinidis et al. (2018); Lage et al. (2019).
 
124
Conte de Leon et al. (2017); de Meijer (2020).
 
125
Ma et al. (2019).
 
126
See Ma et al. (2019), pp. 4–5.
 
127
According to Conte de Leon et al. (2017), p. 296.
 
128
de Meijer (2020).
 
129
de Long et al. (2017); Shust and Dostov (2020).
 
130
See Bashir (2017), pp. 440–441.
 
131
Ghiro et al. (2021); Konstantinidis et al. (2018); Lemieux (2016).
 
132
Ølnes (2016).
 
133
See Ghiro (2021), p. 13.
 
134
See de Long et al. (2017), p. 4.
 
135
de Long et al. (2017), p. 5.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Decentralized Blockchain Technology: Towards a Trusted and Transparent Beneficial Ownership Regime
verfasst von
Paul Michael Gilmour
Copyright-Jahr
2022
Buch
Financial Technology and the Law

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-88035-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-88036-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2022

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88036-1_8