6. Decision-Making in Foreign and Security Policies and EU Affairs

Perustuslakivaliokunnan mietintö 10/1998 (PeVM 10/1998 vp—HE 1/1998 vp). Hallituksen esitys uudeksi Suomen Hallitusmuodoksi, 26; see also Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle uudeksi Suomen Hallitusmuodoksi (HE 1/1998 vp): 146.

According to the Venice Commission this was foreseen by the drafters of constitution: “In defining the area of governmental primacy by reference to an entity, the EU, whose competence is continually shifting/expanding, the framers of the Finnish Constitution have deliberately provided for a growing area of primary governmental competence in foreign policy. The growth of common positions and strategies in the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP), e.g. as regards what has traditionally been a crucially important part of Finnish foreign policy, its relationship with Russia, means that issues previously regarded as purely bilateral will now be regarded, depending on the circumstances, as partially, largely, or wholly, within the Government’s primacy.” Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Constitution of Finland’, Opinion No. 420/2007, Strasbourg, 7 April 2008.

The Sipilä cabinet has a specific ministerial working group on Russia that brings together the president and those cabinet ministers interested in participating in its work.

HE 60/2010, Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi Suomen perustuslain muuttamisesta.

During her 12 years in office, President Halonen made 295 visits abroad (144 in her first term and 151 in the second term). During his first term Niinistö made 85 trips abroad (Mörttinen and Nurmi 2018: 184–185, 319–323).

Mika Kari, a Social Democratic MP and the vice-chair of the Defence Committee in the Eduskunta, had wished that the government would allocate substantially more resources to the president’s office, particularly in light of the more turbulent and fast-paced developments in international politics. Emphasizing the contacts with the foreign ministry, President Niinistö disagreed, stating his office does not need more resources. Mika Koskinen, Erikoishaastattelu: Presidentti Niinistö Sipilän roolista ulkopolitiikassa: “Aktiivisempi kuin yksikään muu pääministeri aikanani”, Iltalehti, 19 August 2018, https://​www.​iltalehti.​fi/​politiikka/​a/​2018081922011452​68

As President Niinistö has repeatedly emphasized, in such situations the discussions in the European Council may deal with matters that fall under the co-leadership in foreign policy as regulated by Section 93 of the constitution. According to Niinistö there have been phone calls between him and the prime minister during the European Council dinners on two occasions, when the informal talks ventured into areas falling under the jurisdiction of the president. Ari Hakahuhta, Analyysi: Presidentti hillitsee jo puheita myyttisestä Putin-suhteesta—Niinistön asema ulkopolitiikan johtajana vahva. Yle, 29 August 2018, https://​yle.​fi/​uutiset/​3-10370652

The Law Supplementing the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania with the Constitutional Act “On Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union” and Supplementing Article 150 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (No. IX-2343) of 13 July 2004, Valstybės žinios (Official Gazette), 2004, No. 111-4123.

The discontinuation of the Council may have stemmed from the plan of President Paksas to use the body for coordinating EU policy as well. The role of the Council was seen as limited and there were also concerns about its constitutional status.

In addition, new legislative changes were introduced which strengthen the powers of the president during times of war (Šlekys 2018).

Prior to EU membership in 2003, President Paksas demanded a major role for the president and his office in the domestic coordination of European affairs. As the impeachment of Paksas coincided with joining the EU and the design of the national EU coordination system, the role of the president ended up being quite limited. Also the president’s office does not have sufficient resources for the daily management of EU issues (Maniokas and Vilpišauskas 2010: 22; Vilpišauskas 2015: 567).

Before President Grybauskaité enforced the resignation of Vygaudas Ušackas in early 2010, the foreign minister and the president did not communicate in person for several months (Krupavičius 2013: 228–229).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press release, 13 November 2018, https://​www.​mae.​ro/​en/​node/​47431

Hence, as in Lithuania, this undermines parliamentary accountability in EU affairs and especially regarding European Council meetings. Interestingly, in the midst of the conflict between Prime Minister Ponta and Băsescu about who represents Romania in the European Council, the parliament organized a special extraordinary plenary meeting of the two chambers after the European Council of 28–29 June 2012, with Ponta presenting a report on the summit. At the same time the parliament tried to adopt new legal provisions that would have strengthened the domestic accountability of the European Council, and particularly the participation rights of the legislature, but the law had to be modified as the Constitutional Court ruled that such provisions were unconstitutional. According to the original law, Romania could have been represented in the European Council either by the president or by the prime minister, and if the two leaders disagreed about who attends the summit, the parliament would have decided who leads the Romanian delegation to the European Council (Tacea 2015: 619, 626–627).

Decision no. 683/27 June 2012; http://​www.​ccr.​ro/​files/​products/​D0683_​12.​pdf

The blog of Prime Minister Ponta: http://​blogponta.​wordpress.​com/​2011/​12/​08/​romania-cainele-surd-la-vanatoarea-europeana/​