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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

10. Definition, Tasks and Legal Nature of the Compliance Function

verfasst von : Meinrad Dreher

Erschienen in: Treatises on Solvency II

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

This chapter addresses the compliance function under art. 46, para. 1 of the Solvency II Directive. The first items to be addressed here are the normative bases of compliance under the insurance supervisory regime and its conceptual content. Then, the tasks and relevant requirements for compliance under the insurance supervisory regime are identified. The chapter concludes by examining the function of compliance under the insurance supervisory regime of the Solvency II system.

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Fußnoten
1
The statement is attributed to former U. S. Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty.
 
2
In this chapter, the term “insurance undertaking” includes reinsurance undertakings. See on compliance in the insurance industry, e.g., Bürkle, ed., “Compliance in Versicherungsunternehmen” [in English: Insurance Undertakings’ Compliance] (2009); Müller, “Compliance-Management – Dargestellt am Beispiel der Versicherungswirtschaft” [in English: Compliance Management: A Representative View in the Insurance Industry] (2007); Preusche, sec. 37: “Compliance-Organisation in der Versicherungswirtschaft” [in English: Compliance Organization in the Insurance Industry] in: Hauschka, ed., Corporate Compliance (2nd. ed. 2010).
 
3
See for this tendency, if not precisely for this image, Hemeling, “Organisationspflichten des Vorstands zwischen Rechtspflicht und Opportunität” [in English: The Managing Board’s Organizational Duties: Between Legal Duty and Opportunity], ZHR 175 (2011), 368 (369 ff.).
 
4
See also e.g., Bürkle, id., n. 2 at sec. 1, ref. 70 f. and recently id., “Compliance in (deutschen) Versicherungsunternehmen” [in English: Compliance in (German) Insurance Undertakings], VersRdsch 1–2/2012, 45 (46) as well as from the economic point of view, e.g., Wöhle, “Ökonomische Grundlagen von Compliance” [in English: The Economic Bases of Compliance] in: Braumüller/Ennöckl/Gruber/Raschauer, eds., Compliance & Finanzmarktrecht [in English: Compliance and the Law of Financial Markets] (2011), 1 (10 ff.).
 
5
See on this point recently, e.g., Dreher, “Vorstandsverantwortung im Geflecht von Risikomanagement, Compliance und interner Revision” [in English: Managing Board Responsibility within the Web of Risk Management, Compliance, and Internal Review] in Festschrift für [Publication in Honor of] Uwe Hüffer on his 70th Birthday (2010), 161; Hüffer, “Compliance im Innen- und Außenrecht der Unternehmen” [in English: Compliance of Undertakings in Domestic and Foreign Law] in Festschrift für [Publication in Honor of] Günter H. Roth on his 70th Birthday (2011), 299 ff.; Goette, “Organisationspflichten in Kapitalgesellschaften zwischen Rechtspflicht und Opportunität” [in English: Organizational Duties in Corporations: Between Legal Duty and Opportunity], ZHR 175 (2011), 388; Kindler, “Pflichtverletzung und Schaden bei der Vorstandshaftung wegen unzureichender Compliance” [in English: Managing Board Liability for Breach of Duty and Damages on Account of Inadequate Compliance] in Festschrift für [Publication in Honor of] Günter H. Roth on his 70th Birthday (2011), 367 ff.; Kort, “Rechtsfragen der Compliance-Organisation von Unternehmen außerhalb spezialgesetzlich geregelter Branchen im deutschen Recht” [in English: Legal Issues of Undertakings’ Compliance Organization Outside Specially Regulated Areas in German Law] in Festschrift für [Publication in Honor of] Günter H. Roth on his 70th Birthday (2011), 408 ff.; Reichert/Ott, “Non Compliance in der AG – Vorstandspflichten im Zusammenhang mit der Vermeidung, Aufklärung und Sanktionierung von Rechtsverstößen” [in English: Corporate Non-compliance – Managing Board Duties in the Context of Avoiding, Settling, and Sanctioning Breaches of the Law], ZIP (2009), 2173; Bachmann, “Compliance – Rechtsgrundlagen und offene Fragen” [in English: Compliance – Legal Bases and Open Issues] in: VGR [Corporate Law Association], ed., Gesellschaftsrecht in der Diskussion 2007 [in English: Discussion on Company Law 2007] (2008), 66 ff.
 
6
Of many examples from the literature, see Lösler, “Die Mindestanforderungen an Compliance und die weiteren Verhaltens-, Organisations- und Transparenzpflichten nach §§ 31 f. WpHG (MaComp)” [in English: Minimum Requirements for Compliance and Further Conduct, Organizational, and Transparency Duties under secs. 31 f. of the WpHG [German Securities Trading Act (MaComp)]], WM 2010, 1917.
 
7
The same applies basically to public insurance undertakings under a differing legal basis.
 
8
On this point see Dreher, id., n. 5 above, at 168 ff. id., “Ausstrahlungen des Aufsichtsrechts auf das Aktienrecht” [in English: Effects of Supervisory Law on Corporation Law], ZGR (2010), 496 (519 f.); Spindler, “Compliance in der multinationalen Bankengruppe” [in English: Compliance in Multinational Banking Groups], WM 2008, 905 (906 f.).
 
9
On this point see Hüffer, id., n. 5 above, at 304; Goette, ZHR 175 (2011), 388 (392); Kindler, id., n. 5 above, at 370 f.; Wundenberg, “Compliance und die prinzipiengeleitete Aufsicht über Bankengruppen” [in English: Compliance and Principles-directed Supervision of Banking Groups] (2012) 142 f.; Koch, “Compliance-Pflichten im Unternehmensverbund?” [in English: Compliance Duties in an Undertaking Group?], WM (2009), 1013 (1014); Reichert/Ott, ZIP (2009), 2173 (2174); Bachmann, id., n. 5 above, at 73 f.; Bürkle, “Corporate Compliance – Pflicht oder Kür für den Vorstand der AG?” [in English: Corporate Compliance – Duty or Choice for a Corporate Managing Board?], BB (2005), 565 (568 ff.); Fleischer, “Vorstandsverantwortlichkeit und Fehlverhalten von Unternehmensangehörigen – Von der Einzelüberwachung zur Errichtung einer Compliance-Organisation” [in English: Managing Board Responsibility and Employee Error or Misconduct – from Individual Monitoring to Establishment of a Compliance Organization], AG (2003), 291 (299).
 
10
On this point see Schneider, “Die Überlagerung des Konzernrechts durch öffentlich-rechtliche Strukturnormen und Organisationspflichten” [in English: The Superimposition of Company Law by Public Form Rules and Organization Duties], ZGR (1996), 225 (230); id., “Compliance als Aufgabe der Unternehmensleitung” [in English: Compliance as a Task of Company Management], ZIP (2003), 645 (649) and elsewhere.
 
11
See Dreher, id., n. 5 above, at 169.
 
12
See on this point, e.g., Dreher, id., n. 5 above, at 168 ff.; Bachmann, id., n. 5 above at 67 ff.; Kort, id., n. 5 above, at 408 f.; all with further references.
 
13
On this point see 10.4.2.3, below.
 
14
Directive 2009/138/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Nov. 2009, OJEU L 335, p. 1, of 17 Dec. 2009.
 
15
This passage corresponds to the expectations in Chapter II B 3 of the OECD Guidelines Insurer Governance 2011 and ICP8 IAIS Insurance Core Principles, Standards, Guidance and Assessment Methodology of 1 Oct. 2011 with Supplement of 12 Oct. 2012.
 
16
This is handled differently in credit institutions, where “risk management” stands as an overarching concept comprising, i.a., an ICS, internal audit, a risk-monitoring function, and a compliance function. See sec. 25 a, para. 1, sent. 3, clause 2, no. 3 c of CRD [Capital Requirements Directive] IV, Implementing Act, Government’s Draft, BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/10974.
 
17
EU Commission, Draft Implementing measures Solvency II of 31. Oct. 2011.
 
18
On this point see Dreher/Schaaf, “Die Veröffentlichungspflichten von Versicherungsunternehmen gegenüber der Allgemeinheit nach Solvency II” [in English: Insurance Undertakings’ Duties of Disclosure to the Public under Solvency II] in: Dreher/Wandt, eds., “Solvency II in der Rechtsanwendung”, [in English: Solvency II in Legal Application], (Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, Karlsruhe 2009) 129 ff. (Chap. 13, below).
 
19
On this point see Dreher, “Die Veröffentlichungspflichten von Versicherungsunternehmen gegenüber der BaFin” [in English: Insurance Undertakings’ Duties of Disclosure to the BaFin [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority]], ZVersWiss (2009), 187 (Chap. 12, below); Dreher/Ballmaier, “Das aufsichtliche Überprüfungsverfahren nach Art. 36 Solvency-II-Richtlinie und § 289 VAG-RegE” [in English: The Supervisory Review Process under art. 36 of the Solvency II Directive and Sec. 289 of the Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act], in: Dreher/Wandt, eds., Solvency II in der Rechtsanwendung 2012 [in English: Solvency II in Legal Application 2012], (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 2012) 73 ff. (Chap. 2, above).
 
20
Hereafter denoted as Governance Guidelines.
 
21
On this point see Dreher, “Begriff und Inhaber der Schlüsselfunktionen nach Solvency II und VAG 2012” [in English: Concept and Holders of Key Functions under Solvency II and the German Insurance Supervision Act 2012], VersR (2012), 933 (936) (Chap. 7, above, at 7.​2.​3); id., “Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht und Verbraucherschutz im Solvency-II- und EIOPA-System” [in English: The Insurance Supervisory Regime and Consumer Protection in the Solvency II and EIOPA System], VersR (2013), 401 (408) (Chap. 3, above, at 3.​3.​2.​2); Sasserath-Alberti/Hartig, “EIOPA-Verordnung: Rechtliche Herausforderungen für die Praxis” [in English: EIOPA Regulation: Legal Challenges for Practitioners], VersR (2012), 524 (531).
 
22
On this point see Dreher, “Die aufsichtsbehördliche Kontrolle der Inhaber von Schlüsselfunktionen nach Solvency II and künftigem VAG” [in English: Review by Supervisory Authorities of the Holders of Key Functions under Solvency II and the Future German Insurance Supervision Act], VersR (2012), 1061 (1065) (Chap. 8, above, at 8.​2.​3.​2).
 
23
For the undertaking guidelines see further ref. 3.20 f. of the Governance Guidelines.
 
24
RegE eines Zehnten Gesetzes zur Änderung des VAG [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act] of 15 Feb. 2012, BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/9342; also, BT-Drucks [Document of the German Bundestag] 90/12 (hereafter: VAG-RegE) 90/12.
 
25
See, however, on the absent mention of the term “key functions” in the VAG-RegE [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act], Dreher, VersR (2012), 933 (934) (Chap. 7, above, at 7.​2.​2.​2).
 
26
See 10.3, below.
 
27
See the Statement of Reasons for secs. 29 and 276 of the VAG-RegE [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act].
 
28
BR-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundesrat] 94/13 of 8 Feb. 2013; also, BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/12601 of 4 Mar. 2013 and the substantially amended proposed decision of the German Bundestag Finance Committee, BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/13523.
 
29
On the original version of sec. 142 of the German Insurance Supervision Act, defanged by the proposed decision cited at n. 28 above, see Dreher, “Die Kriminalisierung von Banken- und Versicherungsvorständen” [in English: Criminalizing Banking and Insurance Managing Boards], FAZ no. 97 (26 April 2013), 24.
 
30
BaFin [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] Circular 10/2012 (BA): MaRisk BA of 14 Dec. 2012.
 
31
See MaComp WA AT 1, no. 6.
 
32
See MaComp WA AT 1, no. 6.1 and BT 1.1.2 at 3 and BT 1.2 at 3.
 
33
See on this point but with no explanation of the insurance supervisory regime, e.g., Casper, “Der Compliance-Beauftragte” [in English: The Compliance Officer] in Festschrift für [Publication in Honor of] Karsten Schmidt on his 70th Birthday (2009), 199 ff. Harm, “Compliance in Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und Emittenten von Finanzinstrumenten” [in English: Compliance in Bond/Securities Services and Issuers of Financial Instruments] (2008), 76 ff.; Lösler, WM (2010), 1917.
 
34
See on this point Bürkle, “Vorgaben der Richtlinie Solvabilität II für die Compliance in Versicherungsunternehmen” [in English: Requirements of the Solvency II Directive for Compliance in Insurance Undertakings] in “Düsseldorfer Vorträge zum Versicherungsrecht 2010” [in English: Dusseldorf Lectures on Insurance Law 2010], (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 2011) 1 (3).
 
35
See Recital 31 of the Solvency II Directive and the Statement of Reasons for sec. 24 of the VAG-RegE [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act], id., at n. 24 above, at 271. On the relationship of self-organization to the growing process orientation of the insurance supervisory regime in this context, see Dreher, “Solvenzanforderungen in der Versicherungsaufsicht nach Solvency II und künftigem VAG” [in English: Solvency Requirements in Insurance Supervision under Solvency II and the Future German Insurance Supervision Act], ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (Chap. 4, above).
 
36
On the undertakings’ guidelines for key functions, see Dreher, VersR (2012), 1061 (1065) (Chap. 8, above, at 8.​2.​3.​2); on the requirements of the Governance Guidelines, see 10.2.4, above.
 
37
On this point see in detail Dreher/Ballmaier, id., n. 19, above.
 
38
On this point see for more detail Dreher/Ballmaier, id., n. 19 above, at 89 ff.
 
39
On this point see in detail Dreher/Lange, “Die Vollharmonisierung der Versicherungsaufsicht durch Solvency II” [in English: Full Harmonization of Insurance Supervision under Solvency II], VersR (2011), 825 (Chap. 1, above); Bürkle, “Die Zukunft der materiellen Versicherungsaufsicht in Deutschland” [in English: The Future of Substantive Insurance Supervision in Germany], VersR (2011), 1469 (1472 f); Wandt/Sehrbrock, “Regelungsziele der Solvency-II-Rahmenrichtlinie” [in English: Regulatory Objectives of the Solvency II Framework Directive], ZVersWiss (2011), 193 (200). On an unclear basis – “The Directive does not prescribe full harmonization in all areas…” – and inconsistent with continuing the VAG’s [German Insurance Supervision Act’s] existing law in RegE eines Zehnten Gesetzes zur Änderung des VAG [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act] of 15 Feb. 2012, BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/9342, p. 255. On the contrary, affirming the principle of full harmonization, BR-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundesrat] 90/12 at 2 f in substance and at 13 explicitly. Also in support of full harmonization, Wagner, “Solvabilität II und VAG neu: Was bleibt, was ändert sich”? [in English: Solvency II and the New German Insurance Supervision Act: What is Unchanged? What is Changed?], VersRdsch 9/2010, 23 (24, 26) and FMA-Österreichische Finanzaufsicht, Solvency II Handbuch [in English: Financial Market Supervision: Austrian Financial Supervision, Solvency II Manual] (2012), 1 (5) in reference to the “new rules” under Solvency II.
 
40
As formulated by Bürkle, id., n. 2 above, at sec. 1 ref. 4 and recently Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 2; Bürkle, VersRdsch 1-2/2012, 45 and Bürkle, “Compliance und Revision im Versicherungsbereich nach Solvency II” [in English: Compliance and Review in the Insurance Industry under Solvency II], CCZ (2012), 220. Taking an approach based on the law of organizations for the insurance supervisory regime are, e.g., Reese/Ronge, “Aufgaben und Charakter der Compliance-Funktion im Versicherungsunternehmen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Solvency II” [in English: Tasks and Character of the Compliance Function in Insurance Undertakings with Particular Regard for Solvency II], VersR (2011), 1217 (1220 f.) and for compliance in bond/securities services undertakings, Casper, id., n. 33 above, at 201 and for general company law, e.g., Spindler, WM (2008), 905; Reichert/Ott, ZIP (2009), 2173 and Kort, “Verhaltensstandardisierung durch Corporate Compliance” [in English: Standardization of Conduct through Corporate Compliance], NZG (2008), 81.
 
41
Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 2; id., VersRdsch 1-2/2012, 45.
 
42
And see 10.4.1.1, below.
 
43
See in detail 10.4.2, below.
 
44
See in detail 10.4.310.4.5, below.
 
45
Thus in essence also, Hemeling, “Compliance im Erst- und Rückversicherungsunternehmen” [in English: Compliance in Direct Insurance and Reinsurance Undertakings], CCZ (2010), 21; also appearing in GDV-Leitfaden, “Compliance im Erst- und Rückversicherungsunternehmen” [in English: Compliance in Direct Insurance and Reinsurance Undertakings] (Nov. 2009) 6, in which here – id., 22 and 10 – respectively, contrary to the term “function” in the Solvency II Directive, “a clear difference between the compliance function and a compliance organization” is postulated; on the term “function” under the insurance supervisory regime see for a detailed treatment Dreher VersR (2012), 933 (Chap. 7, above); and similarly for general company law see Goette, ZHR 175 (2011), 388 (391); Hüffer, n. 5 above, at 301 f.; Hauschka in: Hauschka, ed., Corporate Compliance (2nd ed. 2010) sec. 1, ref. 2; “Arbeitskreis externe und interne Überwachung der Unternehmung” [in English: Working Group for External and Internal Audit] (AKEIÜ), “Compliance: 10 Thesen für die Unternehmenspraxis” [in English: Compliance: 10 Subjects for Business Management], DB (2010), 1509 (1510); Kremer/Klahold, “Compliance-Programme in Industriekonzernen” [in English: Compliance Programs in Industrial Concerns], ZGR (2010), 113 (116).
 
46
On the term “business manager”, see in detail Dreher, “Nicht delegierbare Geschäftsleiterpflichten” [in English: Non-delegable Duties of Business Managers] in Festschrift für [Publication in Honor of] Klaus J. Hopt on his 70th Birthday (2010) 517 (518 ff.).
 
47
See, e.g., Dreher, id., n. 5 above, at 168 ff.; Hüffer, id., n. 5 above, at 303 f.
 
48
See Dreher, ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (393, 418 ff.) (Chap. 4, above, at 4.​3.​2.​3 and 4.​4.​2.​5); Wandt/Sehrbrock, “Die Umsetzung des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes der Solvency-II-Richtlinie im VAG-Regierungsentwurf” [in English: Implementation of the Solvency II Directive’s Principle of Proportionality in the Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the Insurance Supervision Act], VersR (2012), 802, also reprinted in: Dreher/Wandt, eds., Solvency II in der Rechtsanwendung [in English: Solvency II in Legal Application], (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 2012) 21 ff. Wandt, “Prinzipienbasiertes Recht und Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz im Rahmen von Solvency II” [in English: Principles-based Law and the Principle of Proportionality in the Context of Solvency II] (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 2012); Dröse/Littmann, “Der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz im Anwendungsbereich des Solvency-II-Regimes unter besonderer Berücksichtigung firmeneigener (Rück-)Versicherungsunternehmen” [in English: The Principle of Proportionality as Applied within the Framework of Solvency II with Particular Attention to In-house Insurance and Reinsurance Undertakings], ZVersWiss (2012), 339; and generally on the principle of proportionality in European Union law Trstenjak/Beysen, Das Prinzip der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Unionsrechtsordnung [in English: The Principle of Proportionality in European Union Law], EuR (2012), 265.
 
49
On this point see 10.4.1.3, below.
 
50
See 10.3, above.
 
51
With respect to credit institutions, there is a differing function description, consistent with the EBA [European Banking Authority] Guidelines on Internal Governance, not in the text of the Act, but only in the Statement of Reasons for sec. 25 a, para. 1, sent. 3, cl. 2, no. 3 c CRD [Capital Requirements Directive] IV, Implementing Act, Government’s Draft, id., n. 16 above, at 108.
 
52
To the extent that Bürkle, id., n. 2 above, at sec. 1, ref. 141 f. and id., n. 34 above, at 16 and elsewhere, who was most likely the first to undertake a conceptual and content-based systemization of the compliance function tasks, characterizes the evaluation of risks arising from changes in the law as an “early warning function”, his use of terminology lacks a concrete legal point of reference.
 
53
The term chosen by Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 18 – “risk monitoring function” – likewise encounters difficulty through lacking a concrete legal point of reference and runs the hazard of conceptual fuzziness with regard to risk management under art. 44 of the Solvency II Directive.
 
54
This traces back to Bürkle, id., n. 2 above, at sec. 1, ref. 141 ff. id., n. 34 above, at 16 and elsewhere; see recently, id., CCZ (2012), 220 (222) and VersRdsch 1–2/2012, 45 (49).
 
55
See, e.g., Korinek/Schadler-Liebl, “Versicherungsaufsichtsrechtliche Compliance nach Solvency II” [in English: Compliance under the insurance supervisory regime under Solvency II], VersRdsch 9/2011, 30 (32 ff.) and Wolf, “Zur Aufgabenverteilung zwischen den Governance-Funktionen von Versicherungsunternehmen nach der Solvency II-Richtlinie – Überlegungen am Beispiel der Funktionen Compliance, Risikomanagement und interne Revision” [in English: On the Division of Tasks between the Governance Functions of Insurance Undertakings under the Solvency II Directive – Thoughts on the Functions of Compliance, Risk Management, and Internal Audit], VersR (2013), 678 (680).
 
56
For a detailed treatment, see Schaaf, “Risikomanagement und Compliance in Versicherungsunternehmen” – aufsichtsrechtliche Anforderungen und Organverantwortung”, [in English: Risk Management and Compliance in Insurance Undertakings – Supervisory Requirements and Institutional Responsibility], (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft 2010) 135 ff.
 
57
For more detail see Dreher, “Kartellrechtscompliance” [in English: Competition Law Compliance], ZWeR (2004), 75 (93 ff.); id. in: Krieger/Schneider, eds., Handbuch Managerhaftung [in English: Manual of Managerial Liability] (2nd. ed. 2010) sec. 31 ref. 61 ff. Bürkle, id., n. 2 above, at sec. 1; Hauschka, id. at n. 45 above, at sec. 1, ref. 24 ff. Inderst, in: Görling/Inderst/Bannenberg, eds., Compliance (2010) 103 ff.; Moosmayer, Compliance (2nd. ed. 2012) 33 ff.
 
58
See 10.4.1.3, below.
 
59
See on this point Dreher, VersR (2012), 933 (939, 941) (Chap. 7, above, at 7.​3.​5.​3 and 7.​3.​5.​5). Likewise for the lending sector, now the new MaRisk BA, id., n. 30 above, at no. 4; and explicitly BaFin [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority], MaRisk-Novelle [Amended] 2012 – Correspondence to the associations of 14 Dec. 2012 in the section on the compliance function.
 
60
See on this point 10.1, above.
 
61
See in detail on this point Dreher, ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (417 f.) (Chap. 4, above, at 4.​4.​2.​5).
 
62
See Dreher, ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (417) (Chap. 4, above, at 4.​4.​2.​5) with other references.
 
63
These two insurance supervisory regime principles can be differentiated under the parameters of the insurance supervisory regime. Therefore, they may also be differentiated in connection with compliance under the insurance supervisory regime; to this extent ambiguous, Reese/Ronge, VersR (2011), 1217 (1221) und Saria, “Compliance nach Solvency II” [in English: Compliance under Solvency II], VersRdsch 11/2011, 21 (24): “Principle of materiality, which…can claim general application as an expression of the principle of proportionality”.
 
64
There is in addition a mention in Recital 38.
 
65
See 10.3, above.
 
66
Under art. 46, para. 1, subpara. 2 of the Solvency II Directive, compliance under the insurance supervisory regime is a part of the ICS of the insurance undertakings.
 
67
See 10.4.1.2, above.
 
68
On this point see Dreher, ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (405 f.) (Chap. 4, above, at 4.​4.​1.​1).
 
69
On this point see Dreher, ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (385 ff.) (Chap. 4, above, at 4.​2.​3).
 
70
See BGH [in English: Federal Court of Justice], 11 Mar. 1986 – KRB 7/85 – WuW/E 2262, 2264 – file notes: “what is realistically reasonable”; Dreher, id., n. 5 at 174; id., ZWeR (2004), 75 (94 f.); Spindler, WM (2008), 905 (909); Fleischer, AG (2003), 291 (300); Reichert/Ott, ZIP (2009), 2173 (2174); Bürkle, “Corporate Compliance als Standard guten Unternehmensführung des DCGK” [in English: Corporate Compliance as a Standard of Good Business Management of the DCGK [German Corporate Governance Code]], BB (2007), 1797 (1798); Bachmann, id., n. 5 above, at 78 f.
 
71
See art. 41, para. 4 of the Solvency II Directive.
 
72
Likewise now explicit in MaRisk BA, id., at n. 30, AT 4.4.2 no. 2, and BaFin [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority], Correspondence to the associations, id., n. 59 above, in the relevant chapter.
 
73
On this point see Dreher, VersR (2012), 1061 (1065) (Chap. 8, above, at 8.​2.​3.​2).
 
74
On this point see 10.2.4, above.
 
75
See in detail Dreher, VersR (2012), 1061 (Chap. 8, above).
 
76
Such as an attorney-at-law.
 
77
See, e.g., J. Hüffer/U. H. Schneider, “Juristen an die Compliance-Front!” [in English: Lawyers to the Compliance Front!], ZIP (2010), 55.
 
78
See, e.g., Moosmayer, “Modethema oder Pflichtenprogramm guter Unternehmensführung? – Zehn Thesen zu Compliance” [in English: Fashion Subject or Obligatory Program of Good Business Management? – Ten Theses on Compliance], NJW (2012), 3013 (3014); somewhat vague in its conclusion, AKEIÜ [in English: Working Group for External and Internal Audit], DB (2010), 1509 (1516 f.).
 
79
See Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 15; id., n. 2 above, at sec. 1, ref. 147.
 
80
See for more detail 10.4.2.3, below.
 
81
Somewhat vaguely as to the conclusion, Korinek/Schadler-Liebl, VersRdsch 9/2011, 30 (37), would require “in any case well-grounded legal knowledge and skills” and, though referring to the “necessary legal education”, do not give concrete details on the point.
 
82
See Schaaf, id., n. 56 above, at 20, 131 f. and recently Korinek/Schadler-Liebl, VersRdsch 9/2011, 30 (34) and Reese/Ronge, VersR (2011), 1217 (1224); contra, Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 5 (“it depends upon the European supervisory regime source of the given legal requirements”) and at 14 (“the totality of the requirements of the internal control system”), id., VersRdsch 1-2/2012, 45 (48) (“Insurance supervisory regime compliance is primarily concerned with compliance with regulatory rules particularly relating to insurance activities.”) and again id., n. 2 above, at sec 1, ref. 142, but not resolving the contradiction to the two subtasks offered as examples, i.e., evaluation of risks arising from changes in the legal environment and compliance risks, a contradiction not restricted to the insurance supervisory regime according to Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 17 f. To the extent that Wolf, VersR (2013), 678, would restrict compliance under the insurance supervisory regime “in the undertakings’ areas classified as not relevant to risk” generally “to overarching inquiries and structural aspects” and proceeds from the premise that “monitoring in reference to factual, content-oriented subjects to the contrary will not occur for the present”, this view has no support in the Solvency II Directive and would lead to substantial legal uncertainty in the fringes of the two areas.
 
83
Explicitly, Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 5.
 
84
The explanations of Saria, VersRdsch 11/2011, 21 (27 ff.), suffer from failure to consider the core provision para. 1 of art. 46 of the Solvency II Directive and from sole focus on para. 2 of the Directive, which identifies subtasks of compliance under the insurance supervisory regime only by way of example. She arrives, therefore, above all on the basis of general considerations of the telos of the Directive, at the conclusion that the compliance duty “clearly at least” pertains to the insurance supervisory regime. Further, however, “those legal provisions that exhibit a particular reference to the actual business of insurance” are included. VersRdsch 11/2011, 21 (29). Thus “the general provisions of law on companies, taxation, crime, labor, and social services,…etc.” should be “excluded”. This delineation fails to persuade for lack of clarity. This can be seen in the simplistic examples: drawn from the criminal law, participation of an insurance undertaking in a bidding cartel (punishable under sec. 298 of the StGB [German Criminal Code]) with respect to calls for proposal for insurance services; based on the likewise excluded general company law, non-compliance with the requirements applicable to managing board compensation by an insurance undertaking, which requirements are separate from the insurance supervisory regime rules.
 
85
It is not relevant to determining the subject matter of compliance under the insurance supervisory regime that the European insurance supervisory regime in supplementing the Insurance Accounts Directive – RL [of DVO] 91/674/EWG ABlEG 1991 L 374, sent. 7 by later amendment – contains no substantive provisions, but only procedural ones. This is so because the Solvency II Directive does not distinguish in this respect among the “requirements” to be monitored. Insofar as Wolf, VersR (2013), 678 (684), largely excludes accounting from the monitoring by compliance under the insurance supervisory regime, he ignores the contexts adduced here.
 
86
See above, at 10.2.2.
 
87
See for the opposing view the references in n. 82, above.
 
88
See Dreher/Ballmaier, id., n. 19 above, at 108 f., 114 f.
 
89
Accord Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 14; Saria, VersRdsch 11/2011, 21 (31); Korinek/Schadler-Liebl, VersRdsch 9/2011, 30 (32) and for general company law, no. 4.1.3 DCGK [German Corporate Governance Code] since July 2007; for a different view see Hüffer, id., n. 5 above, at 302 f., misjudging the legal nature of internal company guidelines and regarding only governmental law provisions as compatible with compliance. The GDV [German Insurance Association] discussion paper “Governance-Funktionen unter Solvency II: Kernaufgaben um Schnittstellenfragen” [in English: Governance Functions under Solvency II: Core Functions in Interface Areas] (2012), 13 f. designates the “internal requirements” as subjects of monitoring, not for the compliance function, but only for the internal audit. Id. at 19.
 
90
See above, at 10.2.1.
 
91
On this point generally, see Dreher, ZGR (2010), 496 (502); Saria, VersRdsch 11/2011, 21 (32 f.), initially argues contra for a special feature of company law compliance which would assume “parallel and mutually independent” existing obligations. Ludwig, in: Branchenspezifische Wirtschaftsaufsicht und Corporate Governance [in English: Sector-specific Economic Supervision and Corporate Governance] (2012) 258 f. writes of “internal audit focused on compliance with timely identification of legal risks”. Unfortunately and astonishingly, his description is completely uninfluenced by the impact of supervisory law on compliance law nor does it reflect the impact of the current literature on the subject.
 
92
See Dreher, id., n. 5 above, at 171 ff. with further references, disputed.
 
93
See, e.g., Bürkle, BB (2007), 1797 (1799); Fleischer, “Corporate Compliance im aktienrechtlichen Unternehmensverbund” [in English: Corporate Compliance Groups Formed under Company Law], CCZ (2008), 1 (3); Spindler, WM (2008), 905 (909); Dreher, id., n. 5 above, at 172; id., ZWeR (2004), 75 (94) on concretizing bases on competition law compliance.
 
94
See as to their determination, Dreher, VersR (2012), 933 (936 ff.) (Chap. 7, above, at 7.​3) and VersR (2012), 1061 (Chap. 8, above), on “fit-and proper” supervision.
 
95
See Dreher, VersR (2012), 1061 (1069 ff.) (Chap. 8, above, at 8.​5 and 8.​6).
 
96
See for this view in the literature 10.4.2.1, above.
 
97
See above, at 10.4.2.1.
 
98
Directive 2005/60/EC, OJEU L 309, 25 Nov. 2005 at 15.
 
99
See in detail on this point and on the individual legal questions for the company officials Rittner/Dreher, Europäisches und deutsches Wirtschaftsrecht [in English: European and German Economic Law] (3rd. ed. 2008) sec. 12.
 
100
Of a differing view is Saria, VersRdsch 11/2011, 21 (34), excluding from the factual ambit of compliance under the insurance supervisory regime those legal areas covered by company officials under special laws but paying no regard to the job description, which in part is wholly divergent from compliance under the insurance supervisory regime. Consistent pursuit of this view would necessarily require her to view even the issue of the presence of a money-laundering official in an insurance undertaking as not compatible with compliance.
 
101
See above, at 10.2.5.
 
102
See above, at 10.4.2.1. Likewise essentially, MaRisk BA, id., n. 30 above, at no. 1.
 
103
See above, at 10.2.1.
 
104
See above, at 10.2.2.
 
105
See Bürkle, id., n. 34 above, at 15.
 
106
The issue of the managing board’s duty to act and the application of the BJR in the realm of a principles-based supervisory regime is as yet not clear. Based on the supervisory regime Legal Judgment Rule, Bürkle, in “Aufsichtsrechtliches Legal Judgment: Sachlicher Anwendungsbereich und prozedurale Voraussetzungen” [in English: Supervisory Regime Legal Judgment: Factual Realm of Application and Procedural Requisites], VersR (2013), 792, arrives at a very broad application of the BJR in the insurance supervisory regime with respect to the “how” of an action. To this extent also in favor of “at least a suitable application” of the BJR is Louven/Raapke, in “Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Corporate Governance von Versicherungsunternehmen” [in English: Current Developments in Corporate Governance of Insurance Undertakings], VersR (2012), 257 (264). For a view against transference of the BJR into principles-based insurance supervision with a reference to decisions bound by law despite “a certain discretionary scope with respect to concrete implementation”, see Armbrüster, “Aufsichtsrecht überlagert Aktienrecht” [in English: The Supervisory Regime Imposed on Corporate Law], KSzW (2013), 10 (14) and id. in: Bähr, ed., Handbuch des Versicherungsaufsichtsrechts [in English: Manual of Insurance Supervision Law] (2011) sec. 11, ref. 66. According to the view presented here, in this context the issue is likewise not the application of the BJR but on the one hand the criteria for the concretization of the insurance supervisory regime principles set up as guidelines for the managing board’s actions on behalf of the undertaking. And on the other hand, the issue is the scrutiny, initially supervisory but thereafter judicial, when these sorts of principles-based decisions are involved. Whereas, as a consequence of the prohibition on optimization in supervisory review proceedings, see Dreher, VersR (2013), 401 (405) (Chap. 3, above, at 3.​3.​2.​1); Dreher/Ballmaier, id. n. 19 above, at 95, (108 f.), the supervisory authority can test the management decisions only as to reasonableness, the supervisory decision itself is subject to full judicial review, see Dreher, ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (416 f. 422 f.) (Chap. 4, above, at 4.​4.​2.​5 and 4.​4.​3.​1); Dreher/Häußler, “Die Aufsicht über Versicherungsunternehmen durch die BaFin und die Überwachungsaufgabe des Aufsichtsrats” [in English: Supervision of Insurance Undertakings by BaFin [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] and the Monitoring Task of the Supervisory Board], ZGR (2011), 471 (490 f.), in which the limitation of review by the supervisory authority continues to be restricted to the reasonableness of the management decision. On the other side of the fence, Langenbucher, “Vorstandshaftung und Legalitätspflicht in regulierten Branchen” [in English: Managing Board Liability and the Duty of Legality in Regulated Sectors], ZBB (2013), 16 (22 f.) argues for an optimization directive as follows: “In any case, principles-based supervisory rules require that every effort be made to effectuate the legislatively formulated supervisory principle as optimally as possible”.
 
107
Accord BGHZ [in English: Decisions of the Federal Court of Justice in Civil Matters] (Ger.) (hereafter, BGHZ) 114, 127 (130); Dreher/Häußler, ZGR (2011), 471 (474 f.); Hüffer, AktG [in English: German Stock Corporation Act] (10th ed. 2012) sec. 111, ref. 5; Hopt/Roth, AktG [in English: German Stock Corporation Act], v. 4 (4th ed. 2006) sec. 111, refs. 56, 58 f.; Lutter/Krieger, “Rechte und Pflichten des Aufsichtsrats” [in English: Rights and Obligations of the Supervisory Board] (5th ed. 2008) sec. 3, ref. 94 ff.
 
108
See above, at 10.4.1.2.
 
109
See above, at 10.4.1.3.
 
110
Accord also Korinek/Schadler-Liebl, VersRdsch 9/2011, 30 (33) and previously in detail Schaaf, id., n. 56 above, at 141 ff. Bürkle, id., n. 2 above, at sec. 1, ref. 173 f.
 
111
See 10.3, above.
 
112
Some particular situations, such as cases of sharpening crisis or especially risk-threatened positions, cannot be regarded as normal.
 
113
On this point see, independently of compliance under the insurance supervisory regime, BGH AG 2011, 876 (ISION) and from the literature, e.g., Junker/Biederbick, AG (2012), 898; Strohn, ZHR 176 (2012), 137; Krieger, ZGR (2012), 496; Binder, AG [in English: The Corporation] (2012), 885; Fleischer, KSzW (2013), 3.
 
114
BGH [German Federal Court of Justice], NJW (2011), 1517 pnt. 6.
 
115
EuGH [European Court of Justice], NJW (2010), 3557, pnt. 49 (Akzo Nobel).
 
116
See “BGH” [in English: German Federal Court of Justice], VersR (2012), 1149 and also Armbrüster, “Konsequenzen des Urteils zu unwirksamen Klauseln” [in English: Consequences of the Judgment on Ineffective Clauses], VW 19/2012, 1434; id., “Kehrtwende des BGH bei der AGB-Kontrolle in der Lebensversicherung” [in English: The Federal Court of Justice Makes an About-face in Monitoring of General Terms and Conditions for Life Insurance], NJW (2012), 3001; Präve, VersR (2012), 1159 (1163) and VersR (2012), 657.
 
117
See in detail on this point, but without reference to the insurance industry, Moosmayer, id., n. 57 above, at 25 ff.
 
118
See above, at 10.2.4.
 
119
See on this point in detail Dreher/Ballmaier, “Die unternehmenseigene Risiko- und Solvabilitätsbeurteilung (ORSA) nach Solvency II und VAG 2012” [in English: Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) by Undertakings under Solvency II and the German Insurance Supervision Act 2012], VersR (2012), 129 (Chap. 5, above).
 
120
See Saria, VersRdsch 11/2011, 21 (24).
 
121
See above, at 10.2.2.
 
122
See above, at 10.2.2 and 10.2.3.
 
123
See Dreher VersR 2012, 1061 (1069 f.) (Chap. 8, above, at 8.​5.​1).
 
124
See as to the determination of the group of key function holders Dreher, VersR (2012), 933 (Chap. 7, above).
 
125
This is a different issue from that of the relationship of the insurance supervisory regime compliance function to company officials required by special law in general and especially in insurance undertakings. This issue resolves into two areas: the respectively assigned tasks – see 10.4.2.4, above – and whether the holder of a compliance function can serve at the same time as a company official under the special laws.
 
126
See on this point and the following in detail Rittner/Dreher, id., n. 99 above, at sec. 12 with further references.
 
127
See, e.g., Lösler, “Zur Rolle und Stellung des Compliance-Beauftragten” [in English: On the Role and Position of the Compliance Officer], WM (2008), 1098 (1099); Casper, id., n. 33 above, at 214; for a different view Veil, “Compliance-Organisationen in Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen im Zeitalter der MiFiD” [in English: Compliance Organizations in Bond/Securities Services Undertakings in the Age of the MiFiD [Markets in Financial Services Directive]], WM 2008, 1093 (1097); Harm, id., n. 33 above, at 170.
 
128
See above, at 10.4.2.4.
 
129
See for more detail the systematization in Rittner/Dreher, id., n. 99 above, at sec. 12, ref. 15 ff.
 
130
On this point see also Rittner/Dreher, id., n. 99 above, at sec. 12, ref. 34 and Dreher, id., “Unternehmensbeauftragte und Gesellschaftsrecht” [in English: Company Officials and Company Law] in Festschrift für [Publication in Honor of] Carsten Peter Claussen on his 70th birthday (1997) 69 (83 ff.).
 
131
For two possible, general exceptions – independent of compliance under the insurance supervisory regime –, in which the compliance officer shall be entitled to the information from the authority even absent special statutory basis, see Bürkle, “Grenzen der Garantenstellung des Compliance Officers” [in English: Limits of the Penal Guarantor Position of the Compliance Officer], CCZ 2010, 4 (10). The exceptions relate to cases involving the risk of personal criminal liability for failure to provide information and cognizable collusion between the supervisory board and the managing board.
 
132
See above, at 10.2.3.
 
133
See generally on this point Dreher, ZGR (2010), 496 (520 f.) with further references; Bürkle, “Neues Aufsichtsrecht für Aufsichtsräte durch den Regierungsentwurf zum 10. VAG-Änderungsgesetz” [in English: A New Supervisory Regime in the Government’s Draft on the Tenth VAG [German Insurance Supervision Act] Amended Act], ZVersWiss (2012), 493 (504); and from the perspective of the supervisory board for direct contact to staff of the undertaking, Dreher, “Antikorruptionsuntersuchungen durch den Aufsichtsrat – Compliance und Bildung eines Antikorruptionsausschusses” [in English: Anti-corruption Investigations by the Supervisory Board – Compliance and Establishment of an Anti-corruption Commission] in Festschrift für [Publication in Honor of] Wulf Goette on his 65th Birthday (2011) 43 (48 ff.) and for voluntarily appointed compliance officers, Bürkle, CCZ (2010), 4 (9 f.).
 
134
See, id., Dreher, VersR (2012), 1061 (1071) (Chap. 8, above, at 8.​6.​2); likewise since, Bürkle, CCZ (2012), 220 (223) and for compliance officers in insurance undertakings under existing law, Schaaf, id., n. 56 above, at 147 f.
 
135
On the questions of waiving compliance under the insurance supervisory regime from an organizational point of view in smaller insurance undertakings, see Dreher, VersR (2012), 933 (939) (Chap. 7, above, at 7.​3.​5.​3).
 
136
See in detail Dreher, VersR (2012), 1061 (Chap. 8, above).
 
137
VAG-RegE [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act], n. 24 above, at 275 f.
 
138
See on this point in more detail Dreher, VersR (2012), 933 (940) (Chap. 7, above, at 7.​3.​5.​4).
 
Metadaten
Titel
Definition, Tasks and Legal Nature of the Compliance Function
verfasst von
Meinrad Dreher
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46290-4_10