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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Development of Corporate Governance Index

verfasst von : Neelam Rani, Surendra Singh Yadav, Pramod Kumar Jain

Erschienen in: Mergers and Acquisitions

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

The objective of this chapter is to discuss the development of corporate governance index. Inputs from questionnaire constitute the basis for preparing corporate governance index. The questionnaire focused not only on the transparency and disclosures but broader issues like management discipline and social recognition and responsibility. Corporate Governance Score (CGS) is based on the responses of the 67 issues, categorized under seven main aspects included in the questionnaire. The chapter also presents corporate governance score of the respondent companies.

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Fußnoten
1
Calculated as ((mandatory requirement/total attributes) * 100) i.e. (18/67 * 100) = 26.9 %.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Development of Corporate Governance Index
verfasst von
Neelam Rani
Surendra Singh Yadav
Pramod Kumar Jain
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Verlag
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2203-6_6