2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Differential Power Analysis Attack on SIMON and LED Block Ciphers
verfasst von : Dillibabu Shanmugam, Ravikumar Selvam, Suganya Annadurai
Erschienen in: Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
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Power analysis attack is one of the most important and effective side channel attack methods, that has been attempted against implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of
SIMON
[5] and
LED
[16] lightweight block ciphers against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. Firstly, we describe the power model used to mount the attack on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation of
SIMON
and
LED
block ciphers. Then, we proceed to experimentally verified DPA attack, which is the first successful DPA attack on the algorithms. Our attack retrieves complete 64-bit key of
SIMON32/64
and
LED-64
with a complexity of 176 and 2
18
hypotheses respectively. Finally, we present our analysis on other versions of
SIMON
and
LED
. Our DPA results exhibits the weakness of algorithms, which emphasize the need for secure implementation of
SIMON
and
LED
.