Weitere Kapitel dieses Buchs durch Wischen aufrufen
The principal objective of this chapter is to investigate the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. Our evidence suggests that acquirer firms that compensate their directors with a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation have significantly higher stock returns around the announcement. An increase in director equity-based pay results in a lower probability of value-destroying acquisitions and a lower acquisition premium for targets. We further find that acquirers with higher equity-based pay exhibit greater improvements in stock price and operating performance following acquisitions.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Adams, R. (2005). What do boards do? Evidence from board committee and director compensation data (Unpublished Working Paper).
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291–309.
Adams, M., Lin, C., & Zou, H. (2011). Chief executive officer incentives, monitoring, and corporate risk management: Evidence from insurance use. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(3), 551–582.
Aktas, N., De Bodt, E., & Roll, R. (2010). Negotiations under the threat of an auction. Journal of Financial Economics, 98(2), 241–255.
Alexandridis, G., Fuller, K. P., Terhaar, L., & Travlos, N. G. (2013). Deal size, acquisition premia and shareholder gains. Journal of Corporate Finance, 20, 1–13.
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301–1327.
Andreas, J. M., Rapp, M. S., & Wolff, M. (2012). Determinants of director compensation in two-tier systems: Evidence from German panel data. Review of Managerial Science, 6(1), 33–79.
Asquith, P., Bruner, R. F., & Mullins, D. W. (1983). The gains to bidding firms from merger. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1), 121–139.
Bange, M. M., & Mazzeo, M. A. (2004). Board composition, board effectiveness, and the observed form of takeover bids. Review of Financial Studies, 17(4), 1185–1215.
Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1997). Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3), 341–372.
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, 71–92.
Berger, P. G., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. L. (1997). Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. The Journal of Finance, 52(4), 1411–1438.
Berk, J. B., Stanton, R., & Zechner, J. (2010). Human capital, bankruptcy, and capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 65(3), 891–926.
Berle, A., & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan.
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. The Journal of Political Economy, 81, 637–654.
Bliss, R. T., & Rosen, R. J. (2001). CEO compensation and bank mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 61(1), 107–138.
Bøhren, Ø., & Staubo, S. (2013). Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid board upheaval. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 152–168.
Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., & Wald, J. K. (2006). CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 403–423.
Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers?: Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 195–221.
Cai, Y., & Sevilir, M. (2012). Board connections and M&A transactions. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2), 327–349.
Chang, S. (1998). Takeovers of privately held targets, methods of payment, and bidder returns. The Journal of Finance, 53(2), 773–784.
Chen, X., Harford, J., & Li, K. (2007). Monitoring: Which institutions matter? Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), 279–305.
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356.
Cornett, M. M., & Tehranian, H. (1992). Changes in corporate performance associated with bank acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 31(2), 211–234.
Cotter, J. F., Shivdasani, A., & Zenner, M. (1997). Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics, 43(2), 195–218.
Datta, S., Iskandar-Datta, M., & Raman, K. (2001). Executive compensation and corporate acquisition decisions. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2299–2336.
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35–54.
Elston, J. A., & Goldberg, L. G. (2003). Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(7), 1391–1410.
Engel, E., Hayes, R. M., & Wang, X. (2010). Audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1), 136–154.
Ertugrul, M., & Hegde, S. (2008). Board compensation practices and agency costs of debt. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(5), 512–531.
Faleye, O. (2011). CEO directors, executive incentives, and corporate strategic initiatives. Journal of Financial Research, 34(2), 241–277.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301–325.
Farrell, K. A., Friesen, G. C., & Hersch, P. L. (2008). How do firms adjust director compensation? Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(2), 153–162.
Fedaseyeu, V., Linck, J. S., & Wagner, H. F. (2013). The determinants of director compensation. Available at SSRN.
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 689–724.
Fuller, K., Netter, J., & Stegemoller, M. (2002). What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 57(4), 1763–1793.
Grinstein, Y., & Hribar, P. (2004). CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(1), 119–143.
Harford, J., & Li, K. (2007). Decoupling CEO wealth and firm performance: The case of acquiring CEOs. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 917–949.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review, 88(1), 96–118.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review, 9, 7–26.
Huang, Y.-S., & Walkling, R. A. (1987). Target abnormal returns associated with acquisition announcements: Payment, acquisition form, and managerial resistance. Journal of Financial Economics, 19(2), 329–349.
Humphery-Jenner, M. L., & Powell, R. G. (2011). Firm size, takeover profitability, and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control: Does the absence of anti-takeover provisions make a difference? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(3), 418–437.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76, 323–329.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225–264.
Kothari, S., & Warner, J. B. (1997). Measuring long-horizon security price performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3), 301–339.
Levi, M., Li, K., & Zhang, F. (2013). Director gender and mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 185–200.
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 308–328.
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2009). The effects and unintended consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on the supply and demand for directors. Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3287–3328.
Linn, S. C., & Park, D. (2005). Outside director compensation policy and the investment opportunity set. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(4), 680–715.
Liu, Y., Wei, Z., & Xie, F. (2013). Do women directors improve firm performance in China? Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 169–184.
Maloney, M. T., McCormick, R. E., & Mitchell, M. L. (1993). Managerial decision making and capital structure. Journal of Business, 66, 189–217.
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance and acquirer returns. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1851–1889.
Merton, R. C. (1973). Theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4, 141–183.
Minnick, K., Unal, H., & Yang, L. (2011). Pay for performance? CEO compensation and acquirer returns in BHCs. Review of Financial Studies, 24(2), 439–472.
Mitchell, M., Pulvino, T., & Stafford, E. (2004). Price pressure around mergers. The Journal of Finance, 59(1), 31–63.
Mkrtchyan, A. (2012). Director compensation incentives: Evidence from acquisitions (Working Paper).
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2004). Firm size and the gains from acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), 201–228.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293–315.
Officer, M. S. (2003). Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), 431–467.
Rhodes-Kropf, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2004). Market valuation and merger waves. The Journal of Finance, 59(6), 2685–2718.
Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business, 59, 197–216.
Ryan, J. H. E., & Wiggins, I. R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(3), 497–524.
Savor, P. G., & Lu, Q. (2009). Do stock mergers create value for acquirers? The Journal of Finance, 64(3), 1061–1097.
Schwert, G. W. (2000). Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholder? The Journal of Finance, 55(6), 2599–2640.
Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16(1), 167–198.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Value maximization and the acquisition process. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 7–20.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2003). Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 70(3), 295–311.
Strebulaev, I. A., & Yang, B. (2013). The mystery of zero-leverage firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 109(1), 1–23.
Subrahmanyam, V., Rangan, N., & Rosenstein, S. (1997). The role of outside directors in bank acquisitions. Financial Management, 26, 23–36.
Travlos, N. G. (1987). Corporate takeover bids, methods of payment, and bidding firms’ stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 42(4), 943–963.
Vafeas, N. (2003). Length of board tenure and outside director independence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 30(7–8), 1043–1064.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385–417.
Weiss, E. (1991). The board of directors, management, and corporate takeovers: Opportunities and pitfalls. In A. Sametz (Ed.), The battle for corporate control. Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211.
Yermack, D. (2004). Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors. The Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2281–2308.
- Director Compensation Incentives and Acquisition Outcomes
- Chapter 4
microm, Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, Avaloq/© Avaloq Evolution AG, Avaloq/© Avaloq